distinct claim in California

2026Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 ; see also Bonni v. St.

2025Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 ; accord, Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648 , 661.) Rosen seeks a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights and obligations with respect to the Rosen citation.

2021Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 .) Even if the defendant makes the required showing that the cause of action arises from protected speech or petitioning activity, the motion should be denied and the cause of action allowed to proceed if the plaintiff (here the counter-plaintiff) demonstrates “there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)

2017Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing." ( Id. at p. 396, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) "Only a [claim] that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit-is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute." ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 , original italics.) II First Prong: Claims Arising fro

2020(See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 314 .) If the court finds that the defendant has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that "there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562 , 567–568.) The second step of the anti- SLAPP analysis consists of "a 'summary-judgment-like procedure.' " (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384 .) At this stage, "[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.

2019(See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 , 314, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 139 P.3d 2 .) If the court finds that the defendant has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that "there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." ( § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) ; see DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562 , 567-568, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 .) "Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit-is a SLAPP, subjec

2019(See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 , 314, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 139 P.3d 2 .) If the court finds that the defendant has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that "there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." ( § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) ; see DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562 , 567-568, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 .) "Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit-is a SLAPP, subjec

2019(See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 , 314, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 139 P.3d 2 .) If the court finds that the defendant has made the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that "there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." ( § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) ; see DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562 , 567-568, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 .) "Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit-is a SLAPP, subjec

2017(Warner Construction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 294 ; LiMandri, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at pp. 336-337.) Where, as here, a sufficient relationship or transaction does not exist, no duty to disclose arises even when the defendant speaks. ( Hoffman, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1191-1192; see Platt Electrical Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Electrical, Inc. (9th Cir. 2008) 522 F.3d 1049, 1059, fn. 3 [applying California law].) Bigler-Engler correctly asserts that an affirmative statement may be so misleading that it may give rise to a fraud cause of action even where the relationshi

2016(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 89 , 108, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ["[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law."].) Bigler-Engler also points out that "a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading 'half-truths.' " ( Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640 , 1659, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 .) "This is because of the principle that 'where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conc

2016Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 [ 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 ] (Bared).) To make a showing under the first prong, the defendant need not show that the actions it is alleged to have taken were protected as a matter of law, but need only establish a prima facie case that its alleged actions fell into one of the categories listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e). 8 (See Flat

2016Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 [ 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 ] (Bared).) To make a showing under the first prong, the defendant need not show that the actions it is alleged to have taken were protected as a matter of law, but need only establish a prima facie case that its alleged actions fell into one of the categories listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e). 8 (See Flat

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) “We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Ibid.) Considering the pleadings and the affidavits concerning the facts, we accept the plaintiffs’ submissions as true “and consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) B.

2022(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) B.

2022(See Trujillo, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 856 ; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 352, fn. 15 .) 23 Finally, section 1202.4 is inapposite here because the attorney fees were awarded by the trial court “under the broader, discretionary authority of section 1203.1” (Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 31 ), not under section 1202.4.

2022(See Trujillo, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 856 ; Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 352, fn. 15 .) 23 Finally, section 1202.4 is inapposite here because the attorney fees were awarded by the trial court “under the broader, discretionary authority of section 1203.1” (Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 31 ), not under section 1202.4.

2025(See, e.g., People v. Elliot[, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469, 475 ].) However, this principle does not appear to have been developed as a distinct requirement akin to the independent-felonious-purpose rule applied to the felony-murder special circumstance. [Citation.] Also, an independent-felonious-purpose requirement applied by the courts (under the merger doctrine) to felonies that involve only an intent to assault has recently been prospectively overruled by the California Supreme Court for purposes of the felony-murder statute.

2013(See, e.g., People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 469, 475 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759 , 122 P.3d 968 ].) However, this principle does not appear to have been developed as a distinct requirement akin to the independent-felonious-purpose rule applied to the felony-murder special circumstance.

2021(Id. at p. 1294; see also Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson (1912) 223 U.S. 605, 619-620 [“The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded].”) Although tribal officials sued in their individual capacities cannot seek protection under the tribe’s sovereign immunity, they may nonetheless be immune from suit under the distinct defense of official (or personal) immunity.

2021(Id. at p. 1294; see also Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson (1912) 223 U.S. 605, 619-620 [“The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded].”) Although tribal officials sued in their individual capacities cannot seek protection under the tribe’s sovereign immunity, they may nonetheless be immune from suit under the distinct defense of official (or personal) immunity.

2021Courts have long recognized that, under common law rules, “government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages.” (Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 731, 744 .) This “immunity of government officers from personal liability,” the Supreme Court has explained, “springs from the same root considerations that generated the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” (Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 239 (Scheuer), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Davis v. Scherer (1984) 468 U.S. 183, 191 .) In particular, the court noted, “[t]his official immunity apparently r

2021Courts have long recognized that, under common law rules, “government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages.” (Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) 457 U.S. 731, 744 .) This “immunity of government officers from personal liability,” the Supreme Court has explained, “springs from the same root considerations that generated the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” (Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 239 (Scheuer), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Davis v. Scherer (1984) 468 U.S. 183, 191 .) In particular, the court noted, “[t]his official immunity apparently r

2021Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 .) “To make a showing under the first prong, the defendant need not show that the actions it is alleged to have taken were protected as a matter of law, but need only establish a prima facie case that its alleged actions fell into one of the categories listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal

2021Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 .) “To make a showing under the first prong, the defendant need not show that the actions it is alleged to have taken were protected as a matter of law, but need only establish a prima facie case that its alleged actions fell into one of the categories listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal

2017Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing." ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 , 396, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) We review rulings on anti-SLAPP motions de novo. ( Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719 , 727, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 867 .) We also consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits, " ' "accept[ing] as true the *254 evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluat[ing] the defendant's

2017Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing." ( Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 , 396, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) We review rulings on anti-SLAPP motions de novo. ( Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719 , 727, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 867 .) We also consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits, " ' "accept[ing] as true the *254 evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluat[ing] the defendant's

2017(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4lh 89, 108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ] [‘“[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law.”].) Bigler-Engler also points out that ‘“a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading ‘half-truths.’ ” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1659 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ].) “This is because of the principle that ‘where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not

2017(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4lh 89, 108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ] [‘“[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law.”].) Bigler-Engler also points out that ‘“a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading ‘half-truths.’ ” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1659 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ].) “This is because of the principle that ‘where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not

2017(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4lh 89, 108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ] [‘“[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law.”].) Bigler-Engler also points out that ‘“a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading ‘half-truths.’ ” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1659 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ].) “This is because of the principle that ‘where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not

2017(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4lh 89, 108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ] [‘“[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law.”].) Bigler-Engler also points out that ‘“a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading ‘half-truths.’ ” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1659 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ].) “This is because of the principle that ‘where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not

2017(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4lh 89, 108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ] [‘“[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law.”].) Bigler-Engler also points out that ‘“a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading ‘half-truths.’ ” (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1659 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ].) “This is because of the principle that ‘where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not

2016(Cf. Conte v. Wyeth, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 89 , 108, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 ["[W]e do not agree that a suit based on a theory of negligent or intentional misrepresentation is governed by rules developed under the distinct doctrine of strict products liability law."].) Bigler-Engler also points out that "a duty to speak may arise when necessary to clarify misleading 'half-truths.' " ( Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640 , 1659, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 .) "This is because of the principle that 'where one does speak he must speak the whole truth to the end that he does not conc

2019Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing." ( Baral , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 396, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. ( Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147 , 1162, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 ( Sheley ).) "The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. [Citation

2019Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing." ( Baral , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 396, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 475 , 376 P.3d 604 .) The plaintiff must demonstrate this probability of success with admissible evidence. ( Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147 , 1162, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 ( Sheley ).) "The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. [Citation