distinct claim in Pennsylvania

2023Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 (1992).

2023Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 (1992).

2012To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Sam, 597 Pa. 523 , 952 A.2d 565, 586 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000)). *544 Franks is not an iteration of the good faith exception; it predated Leon by six years.

2012To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Sam, 597 Pa. 523 , 952 A.2d 565, 586 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000)). *544 Franks is not an iteration of the good faith exception; it predated Leon by six years.

2023Alternatively, even if we accept that Appellant properly raised a distinct claim of ineffectiveness in connection with prior counsel’s pursuit of these claims, see Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 570 (Pa. 2005) (explaining that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analytically distinct), Appellant offers little argument as to why the outcome would be any different under an ineffectiveness framework.

2022Nevertheless, the Collins Court - 10 - J-S01020-22 further explained that “although we will analyze a distinct claim of ineffectiveness that is based on the underlying issue that was litigated on direct appeal, in many cases, those claims will fail for the same reasons as they failed on direct appeal.” Id. at 574-75 .

2002To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Id., 738 A.2d at 431-32 (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, ... 586 A.2d 887, 894 ([Pa.] 1991).

2002To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard "where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard." Id., 738 A.2d at 431-32 (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, ... 586 A.2d 887, 894 ([Pa.] 1991).

2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8.

2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8.

1995More recently, the Court has stated that “[a]ny treatment of an alleged Campana rule violation as a separate and distinct claim from an asserted section 110 violation is misleading,” and that “section 110 in its entirety and the related sections of the Crimes Code are broader than our Cam-pana rule.” Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 488 , 458 A.2d 177 , 180 & n. 12 (1983).

1995More recently, the Court has stated that “[a]ny treatment of an alleged Campana rule violation as a separate and distinct claim from an asserted section 110 violation is misleading,” and that “section 110 in its entirety and the related sections of the Crimes Code are broader than our Cam-pana rule.” Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 488 , 458 A.2d 177 , 180 & n. 12 (1983).

2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v

2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v

2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v

2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v

2022See id., at 749 .

2022See id., at 749.

2020High v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 479 A.2d 967, 968-69 (Pa. 1984).9 The Majority recognizes the referee’s authority to decide a matter based upon the pertinent available records. 34 Pa. Code §101.51 .

2018High v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 479 A.2d 967, 968-69 (Pa. 1984).

2019Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 ____________________________________________ voluntarily exposed itself to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood and has effectively “assumed the risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena and engaging the public’s attention.” American Future Systems Inc., supra, 923 A.2d at 402 (quotation and citations omitted).

2019Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 ____________________________________________ voluntarily exposed itself to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood and has effectively “assumed the risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena and engaging the public’s attention.” American Future Systems Inc., supra, 923 A.2d at 402 (quotation and citations omitted).

2015See Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 624 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

2015See Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 624 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941 , 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute[,] suggests that it is not an element of the crime"); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception"). [2] I recognize that many of the fact

2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute),] suggests that it is not an element of the crime”); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception”). .

2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941 , 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute[,] suggests that it is not an element of the crime"); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception"). [2] I recognize that many of the fact

2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute),] suggests that it is not an element of the crime”); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception”). .

1993See Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454, 457-65 , 550 A.2d 537, 538-42 (1988), aff'd, 524 Pa. 587 , 574 A.2d 601 (1990).

1993See Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454, 457-65 , 550 A.2d 537, 538-42 (1988), aff'd, 524 Pa. 587 , 574 A.2d 601 (1990).

2024Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529, 532-33 (Pa. 1995).

2024See Commonwealth v. -5- J-S30009-24 Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 349 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting the distinctions between weight and sufficiency of the evidence challenges).

2023And the judicial injection of the non- deceptive-title requirement into Section 1 has led to some confusion, as reflected for example in the Commonwealth Court’s recent suggestion that Section 1 is satisfied so long as “the original and final versions [of a bill] fall under the same broad, general subject area.” Phantom Fireworks Showrooms v Wolf, 198 A.3d 1205, 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (emphasis added). [J-50-2022] [MO: Todd, C.J.] - 3 Beyond alleviating confusion, disentangling the purpose and subject tests of Sections 1 and 3 may be salutary in that a distinct standard can then be developed

2023See Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 102 (Pa. 2013).