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105 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1897–2026 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Veno v. Meredithgreen2 sentences2023Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 (1992). 2023Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 (1992). | 8 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Glassgreen2 sentences2026To the contrary, [this Court] should apply the prevailing standard where [its] own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.’” Id. (quoting Glass, 754 A.2d at 660 ). “[I]n short,” this Court explained, “Pennsylvania history . . . weighs strongly against any notion that open fields are entitled to the same heightened privacy as one’s person or home.” Id. 2026To the contrary, [this Court] should apply the prevailing standard where [its] own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.’” Id. (quoting Glass, 754 A.2d at 660 ). “[I]n short,” this Court explained, “Pennsylvania history . . . weighs strongly against any notion that open fields are entitled to the same heightened privacy as one’s person or home.” Id. | 7 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2023Alternatively, even if we accept that Appellant properly raised a distinct claim of ineffectiveness in connection with prior counsel’s pursuit of these claims, see Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 570 (Pa. 2005) (explaining that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analytically distinct), Appellant offers little argument as to why the outcome would be any different under an ineffectiveness framework. 2022Nevertheless, the Collins Court - 10 - further explained that “although we will analyze a distinct claim of ineffectiveness that is based on the underlying issue that was litigated on direct appeal, in many cases, those claims will fail for the same reasons as they failed on direct appeal.” Id. at 574-75 . | 5 | 13 |
Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen2 sentences2002To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Id., 738 A.2d at 431-32 (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, ... 586 A.2d 887, 894 ([Pa.] 1991). 2002To the contrary, we should apply the prevailing standard "where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard." Id., 738 A.2d at 431-32 (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, ... 586 A.2d 887, 894 ([Pa.] 1991). | 5 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Cleckleygreen2 sentences2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8. 2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8. | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Hudegreen2 sentences1995More recently, the Court has stated that “[a]ny treatment of an alleged Campana rule violation as a separate and distinct claim from an asserted section 110 violation is misleading,” and that “section 110 in its entirety and the related sections of the Crimes Code are broader than our Cam-pana rule.” Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 488 , 458 A.2d 177 , 180 & n. 12 (1983). 1995More recently, the Court has stated that “[a]ny treatment of an alleged Campana rule violation as a separate and distinct claim from an asserted section 110 violation is misleading,” and that “section 110 in its entirety and the related sections of the Crimes Code are broader than our Cam-pana rule.” Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 488 , 458 A.2d 177 , 180 & n. 12 (1983). | 2 | 5 |
Baldwin v. Halegreen2 sentences2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v 2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v | 2 | 2 |
Fuentes v. Shevingreen2 sentences2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v 2023Over time, this concern with procedural fairness evolved, developing into a view that certain governmental actions are intolerable regardless of the process employed.15 The precise moment at which “substantive due process” crystallized as a distinct doctrine 12 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)); Mullane v | 2 | 2 |
Ferrick Excavating & Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co.green2 sentences2022See id., at 749 . 2022See id., at 749. | 2 | 2 |
High v. COM., UNEMPLOY. COMP. BD. OF REV.green2 sentences2020High v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 479 A.2d 967, 968-69 (Pa. 1984).9 The Majority recognizes the referee’s authority to decide a matter based upon the pertinent available records. 34 Pa. Code §101.51 . 2018High v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 479 A.2d 967, 968-69 (Pa. 1984). | 2 | 2 |
American Future Systems, Inc. v. Better Business Bureaugreen2 sentences2019Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 ____________________________________________ voluntarily exposed itself to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood and has effectively “assumed the risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena and engaging the public’s attention.” American Future Systems Inc., supra, 923 A.2d at 402 (quotation and citations omitted). 2019Veno v. Meredith, 357 Pa.Super. 85 , 515 A.2d 571, 575 (1986), appeal denied, 532 Pa. 665 , 616 A.2d 986 ____________________________________________ voluntarily exposed itself to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood and has effectively “assumed the risk of potentially unfair criticism by entering into the public arena and engaging the public’s attention.” American Future Systems Inc., supra, 923 A.2d at 402 (quotation and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Kinggreen2 sentences2015See Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 624 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 2015See Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 624 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Stoffangreen2 sentences2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941 , 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute[,] suggests that it is not an element of the crime"); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception"). [2] I recognize that many of the fact 2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute),] suggests that it is not an element of the crime”); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception”). . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Nealgreen2 sentences2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941 , 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute[,] suggests that it is not an element of the crime"); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception"). [2] I recognize that many of the fact 2003Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. at 140 , 323 A.2d at 324 (quoting Commonwealth v. Neal, 78 Pa.Super. 216 (1922)); accord United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir.2001) (explaining that the appearance of the contested language "in a distinct clause, in a different section of the statute),] suggests that it is not an element of the crime”); United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (5th Cir.1981) (where "an exception ... [is] so necessary to a true definition of the offense ... the elements of the crime are not fully stated without the exception”). . | 1 | 2 |
Manzitti v. Amslergreen2 sentences1993See Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454, 457-65 , 550 A.2d 537, 538-42 (1988), aff'd, 524 Pa. 587 , 574 A.2d 601 (1990). 1993See Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454, 457-65 , 550 A.2d 537, 538-42 (1988), aff'd, 524 Pa. 587 , 574 A.2d 601 (1990). | 1 | 2 |
| Freedman v. McCandlessgreen | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Arias, E.green1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. -5- Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 349 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting the distinctions between weight and sufficiency of the evidence challenges). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Lagenellagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Phantom Fireworks Showrooms, LLC v. Tom Wolf, Governor of the Comwlth of PAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Medinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gardner, F. v. Consolidated Rail Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaftgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mason, L., Apltgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Dodgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re I.G.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Lippertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doria v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Perrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Lordred | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Russogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chapel v. Allisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Samgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blackwell v. Eskingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scott-Taylor, Inc. v. Stokesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| DeSantis v. Yawgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McGillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fink v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kujawagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Darr Construction Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2016"While it stems from the spouse's bodily injury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim," Id. | 3 | 2016–2019 |
Anchorstar v. MacK Trucks, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001In Anchorstar v. Mack Trucks Inc., 533 Pa. 177 , 620 A.2d 1120 (1993), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed this issue specifically as it relates to Pa.R.C.P. 238 and explained that while a claim of loss of consortium stems from the spouse’s bodily injury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim and that one who has suffered a loss of consortium has not sustained a bodily injury, but rather has experienced an injury to marital expectations, thus, delay damages are inappropriate. 2001In Anchorstar v. Mack Trucks Inc., 533 Pa. 177 , 620 A.2d 1120 (1993), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed this issue specifically as it relates to Pa.R.C.P. 238 and explained that while a claim of loss of consortium stems from the spouse’s bodily injury, it is nevertheless a separate and distinct claim and that one who has suffered a loss of consortium has not sustained a bodily injury, but rather has experienced an injury to marital expectations, thus, delay damages are inappropriate. | 3 | 1996–2001 |
United States v. Leon-Delfis
green
2 sentences2014Because Appellee’s express written waiver, as approved by his counsel before the lawyer surrendered his client to police, was limited to examination by the polygraph examiner, I would hold that a distinct waiver was required to support subsequent interrogation by a different officer.3 In such circumstances, whether or not counsel should have anticipated a factor-based approach such as the First Circuit adopted in United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2000), I believe he should at least have been aware of the express scope of the written 2 These circumstances presented also raise 2014Because Appellee’s express written waiver, as approved by his counsel before the lawyer surrendered his client to police, was limited to examination by the polygraph examiner, I would hold that a distinct waiver was required to support subsequent interrogation by a different officer. 3 In such circumstances, whether or not counsel should have anticipated a factor-based approach such as the First Circuit adopted in United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.2000), I believe he should at least have been aware of the express scope of the written waiver executed by his client. 4 Moreover, | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Revtai
green
2 sentences1999In Revtai which concerned the appropriate remedy for a violation of former Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(d), 1 we recognized that, “similar rules of procedure ... should not be enforced with dismissal of charges in the absence of prejudice to the defendant.” Revtai 516 Pa. at 64-65 , 532 A.2d at 6 -7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Schimelfenig, 361 Pa.Super. 325 , 522 A.2d 605 (1987) (citing Commonwealth v. Young, 318 Pa.Super. 538, 544 , 465 A.2d 684, 687 (1983) (Pa.R.Crim.P.130(a); no discharge where defendant failed to show prejudice by delay in arraignment); Commonwealth v. Tavianini 315 Pa.Super. 434 , 462 1999In Revtai which concerned the appropriate remedy for a violation of former Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(d), 1 we recognized that, “similar rules of procedure ... should not be enforced with dismissal of charges in the absence of prejudice to the defendant.” Revtai 516 Pa. at 64-65 , 532 A.2d at 6 -7 (quoting Commonwealth v. Schimelfenig, 361 Pa.Super. 325 , 522 A.2d 605 (1987) (citing Commonwealth v. Young, 318 Pa.Super. 538, 544 , 465 A.2d 684, 687 (1983) (Pa.R.Crim.P.130(a); no discharge where defendant failed to show prejudice by delay in arraignment); Commonwealth v. Tavianini 315 Pa.Super. 434 , 462 | 2 | 1988–1999 |
Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1964–1983 |
Loch Et Ux. v. Confair Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1964–1983 |
Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co.
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1964–1983 |
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works
green
2 sentences1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . 1983Each remedy should be effectuated by its particular statute of limitations and find dispositive what was stated in Gardner, supra, 413 Pa. at 419-20 , 197 A.2d at 614 : In this Commonwealth we have always recognized that a personal injury claim based upon a breach of warranty is a distinct claim from a personal injury claim based on negligence: Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1 , 176 A.2d 648 ; Loch et ux. v. Confair et ux, 361 Pa. 158,162 , 63 A.2d 24 ; Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 561 , 28 A.2d 913 , 143 A.L.R. 1417 . | 2 | 1965–1983 |
Commonwealth v. Vrooman
green
2 sentences1943Legislation which confers upon municipalities, powers and privileges, properly relating to municipal affairs, while denying such powers to individual and private corporations, does not violate that provision of the constitution of the state which the appellant seeks to invoke: Com. v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306 ; Clark’s Estate, 195 Pa. 520 .” In Barnett v. Borough of Aliquippa et al., supra, the court said (p. 526) : “If article III, see. 7, permits distinctions between municipal corporations and private persons and corporations, and between municipal corporations and even quasi-public corporations 1907Legislation which confers upon municipalities powers and privileges, properly relating to municipal affairs, while denying such powers to individuals and private corporations, does not violate that provision of the constitution of the state which the appellant seeks to invoke: Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306 ; Clark’s Estate, 195 Pa. 520 . | 2 | 1907–1943 |
Clark's Estate
green
2 sentences1943Legislation which confers upon municipalities, powers and privileges, properly relating to municipal affairs, while denying such powers to individual and private corporations, does not violate that provision of the constitution of the state which the appellant seeks to invoke: Com. v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306 ; Clark’s Estate, 195 Pa. 520 .” In Barnett v. Borough of Aliquippa et al., supra, the court said (p. 526) : “If article III, see. 7, permits distinctions between municipal corporations and private persons and corporations, and between municipal corporations and even quasi-public corporations 1907Legislation which confers upon municipalities powers and privileges, properly relating to municipal affairs, while denying such powers to individuals and private corporations, does not violate that provision of the constitution of the state which the appellant seeks to invoke: Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306 ; Clark’s Estate, 195 Pa. 520 . | 2 | 1907–1943 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2026As to the third Edmunds factor—i.e., relevant case law from other jurisdictions— this Court discussed the four decisions that Russo cited from other states that “refused to adopt the federal open fields doctrine for purposes of their constitutions:” People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); [J-20-2025] - 9 State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988 (Vt. 1991); and State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Bullock
green
1 sentence2026As to the third Edmunds factor—i.e., relevant case law from other jurisdictions— this Court discussed the four decisions that Russo cited from other states that “refused to adopt the federal open fields doctrine for purposes of their constitutions:” People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); [J-20-2025] - 9 State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988 (Vt. 1991); and State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Kirchoff
green
1 sentence2026As to the third Edmunds factor—i.e., relevant case law from other jurisdictions— this Court discussed the four decisions that Russo cited from other states that “refused to adopt the federal open fields doctrine for purposes of their constitutions:” People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); [J-20-2025] - 9 State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988 (Vt. 1991); and State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Brinkley v. King
green
2 sentences2024Id. at *1. -6- involves a legal determination that, because of a person’s conduct, such as holding a child out as his own, the person, regardless of his biological relationship with a child, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will a child’s mother be permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the third party is the biological father. * * * Questioning the wisdom of the presumption’s application due to dramatic societal changes that had arisen since the presumption was created, concerning not only the nature of the relationship between men and women, but also the common 2024Id. at *1. -6- involves a legal determination that, because of a person’s conduct, such as holding a child out as his own, the person, regardless of his biological relationship with a child, will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor will a child’s mother be permitted to sue a third party for support, claiming that the third party is the biological father. * * * Questioning the wisdom of the presumption’s application due to dramatic societal changes that had arisen since the presumption was created, concerning not only the nature of the relationship between men and women, but also the common | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Commonwealth v. Matos green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Commonwealth v. Fransen green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Commonwealth v. Santiago green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Banellis green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Bavusa green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Coon green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Mallory green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Williams green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Commonwealth v. Pierce green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Tucker v. Philadelphia Daily News green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Leon green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Property Situate Along Pine Road in Earl Township green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Sortino green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Commonwealth v. Melendez green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.