distinct analysis in Washington

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2025Lange, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 147-48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michielli, 132 Wn.2d at 245 ). 4 3 See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 4 The criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction (CrRLJ) that were interpreted in Lange are substantively identical to the criminal rules for the superior court (CrR) that are at issue here. 10 We review decisions on CrR 4.7 and CrR 8.3(b) motions for an abuse of discretion.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn. App. 2d 227 , 457 P.3d 1209 (affirming dismissal of criminal charges under CrRLJ 8.3(b) where mismanagement by court administrative staff effectively deprived a defendant of inter

2024“In other words, a separate and distinct instruction informs the jury that, to convict, ‘one particular act has [to be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt for each count.’” Id. at 387-88 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ).

2024“In other words, a separate and distinct instruction informs the jury that, to convict, ‘one particular act has [to be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt for each count.’” Id. at 387-88 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ).

2020Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 103-05 .

2017Restraint of Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 103 , 351 P.3d 138 (2015).

2025Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 .

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025“Unjust enrichment is the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained absent any contractual relationship because notions of fairness and justice require it.” Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484 , 191 P.3d 1258 (2008).

2025“Unjust enrichment is the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained absent any contractual relationship because notions of fairness and justice require it.” Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484 , 191 P.3d 1258 (2008).

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2024“Where jury instructions are ‘lacking for their failure to include a “separate and distinct” instruction’ they may be flawed.” Id. at 388 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ) (emphasis added). “‘However, flawed jury instructions that permit a jury to convict a defendant of multiple counts based on a single act do not necessarily mean that the defendant received multiple punishments for the same offense; it simply means that the defendant potentially received multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Id. (quoting Mutch 171 Wn.2d at 663 ) (some emphasis added). 3 That said, we do believe that t

2024“Where jury instructions are ‘lacking for their failure to include a “separate and distinct” instruction’ they may be flawed.” Id. at 388 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ) (emphasis added). “‘However, flawed jury instructions that permit a jury to convict a defendant of multiple counts based on a single act do not necessarily mean that the defendant received multiple punishments for the same offense; it simply means that the defendant potentially received multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Id. (quoting Mutch 171 Wn.2d at 663 ) (some emphasis added). 3 That said, we do believe that t

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn. App. 2d 227 , 457 P.3d 1209 (affirming dismissal of criminal charges under CrRLJ 8.3(b) where mismanagement by court administrative staff effectively deprived a defendant of inter

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn. App. 2d 227 , 457 P.3d 1209 (affirming dismissal of criminal charges under CrRLJ 8.3(b) where mismanagement by court administrative staff effectively deprived a defendant of inter

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2019This is a distinct standard from the review of the alleged constitutional violation itself, as RAP 2.5 "serves a `gatekeeping function." (citing State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576, 583 , 327 P.3d 46 (2014)).

2019This is a distinct standard from the review of the alleged constitutional violation itself, as RAP 2.5 "serves a `gatekeeping function." (citing State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576, 583 , 327 P.3d 46 (2014)).

2019In Chinn , "the plaintiff failed to make a separate and distinct claim for negligence apart from the battery allegations." 839 A.2d at 711 .

2019In Chinn, “the plaintiff failed to make a separate and distinct claim for negligence apart from the battery allegations.” 839 A.2d at 711 .

2018Dennis also elaborated on the distinct requirement that the disease “arise naturally” out of employment, id. at 481 , but did not address whether expert medical testimony was required to prove it.

2016JDFJ Corp., 97 Wn.