distinct claim in Washington

2024“In other words, a separate and distinct instruction informs the jury that, to convict, ‘one particular act has [to be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt for each count.’” Id. at 387-88 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ).

2020Id. at 664 .

2020Tsai, 183 Wn.2d at 103-05 .

2017Restraint of Tsai, 183 Wn.2d 91, 103 , 351 P.3d 138 (2015).

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - No. 86629-0-I/32 Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - No. 86629-0-I/32 Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025“Unjust enrichment is the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained absent any contractual relationship because notions of fairness and justice require it.” Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484 , 191 P.3d 1258 (2008).

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - No. 86629-0-I/32 Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 644 , 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled by State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 740-44 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). 14 Concurrence at 10. - 31 - No. 86629-0-I/32 Nowhere in our analysis herein have we cited to or applied the additional “flagrant or apparently intentional” test from Monday, 15 that the Zamora court plainly identified as “a distinct rule that applies to allegations of race-based misconduct.” Zamora, 199 Wn.2d at 709.

2025“Unjust enrichment is the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained absent any contractual relationship because notions of fairness and justice require it.” Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484 , 191 P.3d 1258 (2008).

2025Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 .

2024“In other words, a separate and distinct instruction informs the jury that, to convict, ‘one particular act has [to be] proved beyond a reasonable doubt for each count.’” Id. at 387-88 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ).

2024“Where jury instructions are ‘lacking for their failure to include a “separate and distinct” instruction’ they may be flawed.” Id. at 388 (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 663 ) (emphasis added). “‘However, flawed jury instructions that permit a jury to convict a defendant of multiple counts based on a single act do not necessarily mean that the defendant received multiple punishments for the same offense; it simply means that the defendant potentially received multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Id. (quoting Mutch 171 Wn.2d at 663 ) (some emphasis added).

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2021Here, our focus is CrRLJ 4.7. 9See State v. White, 74 Wn.2d 386, 394 , 444 P.2d 661 (1968) (analyzing RCW 10.37.030, the precursor to CrR 4.7) (citing State v. Townsend, 7 Wash. 462 , 35 P. 367 (1893); State v. Thomas, 8 Wn.2d 573 , 113 P.2d 73 (1941)). 10 State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 245 , 937 P.2d 587 (1997) (quoting State v. Whitney, 96 Wn.2d 578, 580 , 637 P.2d 956 (1981)); see, e.g., State v. Jieta, 12 Wn.

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2020Appellants assume, without providing any support, that constitutional reasonableness is a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, or it is equal to or lesser than intermediate scrutiny. “[W]here no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cottingham, 191 Wn.2d 450 , 465 n.1, 423 P.3d 818 (2018) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Young, 89 Wn.2d 613, 625 , 574 P.2d 1171 (1978)).

2019In Chinn, “the plaintiff failed to make a separate and distinct claim for negligence apart from the battery allegations.” 839 A.2d at 711 .

2019In Chinn , "the plaintiff failed to make a separate and distinct claim for negligence apart from the battery allegations." 839 A.2d at 711 .

2019This is a distinct standard from the review of the alleged constitutional violation itself, as RAP 2.5 "serves a `gatekeeping function." (citing State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576, 583 , 327 P.3d 46 (2014)).

2019This is a distinct standard from the review of the alleged constitutional violation itself, as RAP 2.5 "serves a `gatekeeping function." (citing State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576, 583 , 327 P.3d 46 (2014)).

2018Dennis also elaborated on the distinct requirement that the disease “arise naturally” out of employment, id. at 481 , but did not address whether expert medical testimony was required to prove it.

2016JDFJ Corp., 97 Wn.

1995Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. at 250-51 , 58 S.Ct. at 160-61 . [6] Smoke asks the court to award him damages on a theory of liability rejected by the trial court.

1995Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. at 250-51 , 58 S.Ct. at 160-61 . [6] Smoke asks the court to award him damages on a theory of liability rejected by the trial court.

1967Cf. Perry v. Hillman, 153 Wash. 689 , 280 Pac. 346 (1929).

1967Cf. Perry v. Hillman, 153 Wash. 689 , 280 Pac. 346 (1929).

1911It was made payable to the respondent [the supply house], a stranger to the drawer, and not to Fraser, and it is not reasonable to suppose that Fraser would have accepted payment of an obligation due himself in a form which he could not use without the consent and co-operation of a third person.” In Crane Co. v. Pacific Heat & Power Co., 36 Wash. 95 , 78 Pac. 460 , it was held that the answer of a surety, alleging that plaintiff had received and credited money paid on a particular contract, knowing its source, to other accounts, stated a defense; and further that, knowing the source of the pay

1911It was made payable to the respondent [the supply house], a stranger to the drawer, and not to Fraser, and it is not reasonable to suppose that Fraser would have accepted payment of an obligation due himself in a form which he could not use without the consent and co-operation of a third person.” In Crane Co. v. Pacific Heat & Power Co., 36 Wash. 95 , 78 Pac. 460 , it was held that the answer of a surety, alleging that plaintiff had received and credited money paid on a particular contract, knowing its source, to other accounts, stated a defense; and further that, knowing the source of the pay