distinct analysis in Utah

1994In re Juvenile Appeal, 190 Conn. 310 , 460 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1983).

1994In re Juvenile Appeal, 190 Conn. 310 , 460 A.2d 1277, 1281 (1983).

2020But that does not automatically mean that minors do not have a distinct claim for unpaid premajority medical expenses. 4 Cite as: 2020 UT 6 Opinion of the Court ¶11 To ensure that the jury is not left to speculate, plaintiffs may not provide just any evidence of proximate cause: They must generally “produce expert testimony that the medical professional’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff injury.” Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 102 (emphasis added); see also Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 7 , 179 P.3d 754 . 4 The expert-testimony requirement exists because “most medical malpractice cases dep

2020But that does not automatically mean that minors do not have a distinct claim for unpaid premajority medical expenses. 4 Cite as: 2020 UT 6 Opinion of the Court ¶11 To ensure that the jury is not left to speculate, plaintiffs may not provide just any evidence of proximate cause: They must generally “produce expert testimony that the medical professional’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff injury.” Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 102 (emphasis added); see also Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 7 , 179 P.3d 754 . 4 The expert-testimony requirement exists because “most medical malpractice cases dep

2020But that does not automatically mean that minors do not have a distinct claim for unpaid premajority medical expenses. 4 Cite as: 2020 UT 6 Opinion of the Court ¶11 To ensure that the jury is not left to speculate, plaintiffs may not provide just any evidence of proximate cause: They must generally “produce expert testimony that the medical professional’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff injury.” Butterfield, 831 P.2d at 102 (emphasis added); see also Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 7 , 179 P.3d 754 . 4 The expert-testimony requirement exists because “most medical malpractice cases dep

2019And it also makes clear that what courts sometimes refer to as the premises rule, or premises exception, is nothing more than a shorthand description of a circumstance in which the going-and-coming rule does not apply. ¶23 The going-and-coming rule is a “judicially adopted principle” that guides courts in determining whether an accident an employee suffers while traveling between home and work occurred in the course of the employee’s employment.37 An accident occurs in the course of employment if it occurs in “the time, place, and circumstances” typical of the employee’s employment.38 For exam

2015See, e.g., Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah 1985) ('The standard definition of proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.

2015See Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, ¶ 17 , 309 P.3d 216 ("In reaching the conclusion that law enforcement officers owe a legal duty to fleeing suspects, we reiterate that the imposition of a duty is a separate and distinct analysis from breach and proximate cause."); 40 .

2015See Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, ¶ 17 , 309 P.3d 216 ("In reaching the conclusion that law enforcement officers owe a legal duty to fleeing suspects, we reiterate that the imposition of a duty is a separate and distinct analysis from breach and proximate cause."); 40 .

2014Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 102 (Tex.App.2002) ("[A] court determining whether or not to enforce a forum selection clause will not inquire into the enforceability of the contract in which that clause is found.") (abrogation on other grounds recognized by Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex.App.2011)); Haynsworth v. Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir.1997) ('Fraud and overreaching must be specific to a forum selection clause in order to invalidate it."); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 960 (10th Cir.1992) ("A plaintiff seeking

2014Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 102 (Tex.App.2002) ("[A] court determining whether or not to enforce a forum selection clause will not inquire into the enforceability of the contract in which that clause is found.") (abrogation on other grounds recognized by Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex.App.2011)); Haynsworth v. Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir.1997) ('Fraud and overreaching must be specific to a forum selection clause in order to invalidate it."); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 960 (10th Cir.1992) ("A plaintiff seeking

2014Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 102 (Tex.App.2002) ("[A] court determining whether or not to enforce a forum selection clause will not inquire into the enforceability of the contract in which that clause is found.") (abrogation on other grounds recognized by Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex.App.2011)); Haynsworth v. Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir.1997) ('Fraud and overreaching must be specific to a forum selection clause in order to invalidate it."); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 960 (10th Cir.1992) ("A plaintiff seeking

2014Inst., Inc., 94 S.W.3d 91, 102 (Tex.App.2002) ("[A] court determining whether or not to enforce a forum selection clause will not inquire into the enforceability of the contract in which that clause is found.") (abrogation on other grounds recognized by Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Haaksman, 355 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex.App.2011)); Haynsworth v. Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir.1997) ('Fraud and overreaching must be specific to a forum selection clause in order to invalidate it."); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 960 (10th Cir.1992) ("A plaintiff seeking

2013The Torries recognize in their briefing that a ―police officer may engage in the pursuit so long as it is reasonable to do so.‖ ―An essential difference among the elements is that duty is a question of law determined on a categorical basis, while breach and proximate cause are questions for the fact finder determined on a case-specific basis.‖29 ―[Q]uestions about which circumstances pose such a high degree of risk that a [professional] should have taken greater precautions are questions of breach of duty; they are insufficient to defeat the categorical existence of a duty.‖30 To impose liabil

2005Under this test, we assess whether the activity giving rise to the cause of action is “ ‘of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that ... is essential to the core of governmental immunity.’ ” Laney, 2002 UT 79 at ¶ 52 , 57 P.3d 1007 (quoting Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37 ); see Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at ¶ 35 , 5 P.3d 616 (recognizing that the Standiford test “reflect[s] the proper constitutional boundary between those governmental activities that” implicate the open courts clause and those that do not). ¶23 We previously have noted that the Standiford test

2005Under this test, we assess whether the activity giving rise to the cause of action is “ ‘of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that ... is essential to the core of governmental immunity.’ ” Laney, 2002 UT 79 at ¶ 52 , 57 P.3d 1007 (quoting Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37 ); see Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at ¶ 35 , 5 P.3d 616 (recognizing that the Standiford test “reflect[s] the proper constitutional boundary between those governmental activities that” implicate the open courts clause and those that do not). ¶23 We previously have noted that the Standiford test

2005Under this test, we assess whether the activity giving rise to the cause of action is “ ‘of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that ... is essential to the core of governmental immunity.’ ” Laney, 2002 UT 79 at ¶ 52 , 57 P.3d 1007 (quoting Standiford, 605 P.2d at 1236-37 ); see Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at ¶ 35 , 5 P.3d 616 (recognizing that the Standiford test “reflect[s] the proper constitutional boundary between those governmental activities that” implicate the open courts clause and those that do not). ¶23 We previously have noted that the Standiford test

2001While the landowners correctly state the general rule that "failure to make either a contemporaneous objection or some specific preservation of a claim of error ... whe[n] a pretrial motion to suppress hals] been made and denied" waives that objection's appeala-bility, Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ¶23 , 987 P.2d 22 ; see also State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983), we have carved a distinct exception to this blanket principle.

1997It also “ ‘focuses the section on the culpable party and recognizes that the enterprise itself is often a passive instrument or victim of the racketeering activity.’ ” Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp., 30 F.3d at 344 (citation omitted).

1994While several Utah cases list factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of attorney fees, see, e.g., Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1199-1200 (Utah 1993); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985); Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984), no Utah case delineates distinct factors to be considered in the indemnity context.