30 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dunlapgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Dunlap, 318 N.C. 384, 389 , 348 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1986) (stating that standby counsel is not “a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver”). 2020See State v. Dunlap, 318 N.C. 384, 389 , 348 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1986) (stating that standby counsel is not “a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver”). | 7 | 9 |
Burdine v. Texasgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (“Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 132 L. 2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (" Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 115 S.Ct. 2256 , 132 L.Ed.2d 263 (1995); State v. McLeod, 197 N.C.App. 707, 715 , 682 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2009) ("N.C. | 2 | 2 |
Sheng v. Nintendo of America, Inc.green2 sentences2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (“Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 132 L. 2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (" Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 115 S.Ct. 2256 , 132 L.Ed.2d 263 (1995); State v. McLeod, 197 N.C.App. 707, 715 , 682 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2009) ("N.C. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (“Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 132 L. 2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (“Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied.” (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 132 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stanbackgreen2 sentences2017App. 583 , 586, 529 S.E.2d 229 , 230-31 (2000) ("Furthermore, neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel nor the actual participation of standby counsel is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver." (Citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted)). 2009App. 583, 586 , 529 S.E.2d 229, 230-31 (2000) (holding a new trial was warranted based on the trial court’s failure to comply with § 15A-1242 because “neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel . . . nor the actual participation of standby counsel... is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.”). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pruittgreen2 sentences2011Furthermore, “[i]t is the trial court’s duty to conduct the inquiry of defendant to ensure that defendant understands the consequences of his decision.” Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 604 , 369 S.E.2d at 593 . *516 Moreover, “ ‘neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1243, nor the actual participation of standby counsel... is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.’ ” Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 603 , 369 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting State v. Dunlap, 318 N.C. 384, 389 , 348 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1986)). 2011Furthermore, “[i]t is the trial court’s duty to conduct the inquiry of defendant to ensure that defendant understands the consequences of his decision.” Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 604 , 369 S.E.2d at 593 . *516 Moreover, “ ‘neither the statutory responsibilities of standby counsel, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1243, nor the actual participation of standby counsel... is a satisfactory substitute for the right to counsel in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.’ ” Pruitt, 322 N.C. at 603 , 369 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting State v. Dunlap, 318 N.C. 384, 389 , 348 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1986)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. McFaddengreen2 sentences2024Our Supreme Court has long held “the right to be defended by chosen counsel is not absolute.” McFadden, 292 N.C. at 612 , 234 S.E.2d at 745 (citation omitted). “[A]n indigent defendant does not have the right to have counsel of his choice to -8- STATE V. 2024Our Supreme Court has long held “the right to be defended by chosen counsel is not absolute.” McFadden, 292 N.C. at 612 , 234 S.E.2d at 745 (citation omitted). “[A]n indigent defendant does not have the right to have counsel of his choice to -8- STATE V. | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Hazelwoodgreen1 sentence2021La Fave Co., 312 N.C. 224 , 229 n.3 (1984) (“A party may, of course, expressly waive contractual arbitration.”), and that a knowing and voluntary waiver of a contract right effects a release “from the terms of the original proposition[,]” Johnson v. Noles, 224 N.C. 542, 545 (1944). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. . Nolesgreen1 sentence2021La Fave Co., 312 N.C. 224 , 229 n.3 (1984) (“A party may, of course, expressly waive contractual arbitration.”), and that a knowing and voluntary waiver of a contract right effects a release “from the terms of the original proposition[,]” Johnson v. Noles, 224 N.C. 542, 545 (1944). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences2014“Because forfeiture does not require a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the inquiry pursuant to section 15A-1242 is not required in such cases.” State v. Boyd, 200 N.C. 2014App. 97, 102 , 682 S.E.2d 463, 467 (2009) (citing Montgomery), disc. review denied,_N.C._, 691 S.E.2d 414 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McLeodgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (" Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 115 S.Ct. 2256 , 132 L.Ed.2d 263 (1995); State v. McLeod, 197 N.C.App. 707, 715 , 682 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2009) ("N.C. 2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (" Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 115 S.Ct. 2256 , 132 L.Ed.2d 263 (1995); State v. McLeod, 197 N.C.App. 707, 715 , 682 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2009) ("N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Carpino v. Demosthenesgreen1 sentence2011See State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 581 , 451 S.E.2d 157, 163 (1994) (" Before a defendant is allowed to waive in-court representation by counsel, the trial court must insure that constitutional and statutory standards are satisfied." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 , 115 S.Ct. 2256 , 132 L.Ed.2d 263 (1995); State v. McLeod, 197 N.C.App. 707, 715 , 682 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2009) ("N.C. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Andujar-Bascogreen1 sentence2008See U.S. v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. P.R. 2007) ("As a general rule, any inculpatory or exculpatory statements made by a defendant (including silence with regard to particular questions) are admissible at trial insofar as they were the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver."); U.S. v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here the accused initially waives his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but `subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible | 1 | 1 |
Tyreese Rowan v. Norman G. Owens, Superintendent, Indiana State Reformatory, Pendleton, Indianagreen1 sentence2008See U.S. v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. P.R. 2007) ("As a general rule, any inculpatory or exculpatory statements made by a defendant (including silence with regard to particular questions) are admissible at trial insofar as they were the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver."); U.S. v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here the accused initially waives his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but `subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arthur Lee Burns, Jr.green1 sentence2008See U.S. v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. P.R. 2007) ("As a general rule, any inculpatory or exculpatory statements made by a defendant (including silence with regard to particular questions) are admissible at trial insofar as they were the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver."); U.S. v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here the accused initially waives his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but `subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Safleygreen1 sentence2008See U.S. v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. P.R. 2007) ("As a general rule, any inculpatory or exculpatory statements made by a defendant (including silence with regard to particular questions) are admissible at trial insofar as they were the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver."); U.S. v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here the accused initially waives his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but `subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Doe, Inc. Igreen1 sentence2008See U.S. v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. P.R. 2007) ("As a general rule, any inculpatory or exculpatory statements made by a defendant (including silence with regard to particular questions) are admissible at trial insofar as they were the product of a knowing and voluntary waiver."); U.S. v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here the accused initially waives his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but `subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible | 1 | 1 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2006See Allen, 359 N.C. at 440 , 615 S.E.2d at 266 . 2006See Allen, 359 N.C. at 440 , 615 S.E.2d at 266 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Swink
green
2 sentences2024RAGER Opinion of the Court determine whether defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial[,]” id. at 219 , 797 S.E.2d at 331 , this Court held that “the record reflect[ed] that [defendant’s] waiver was knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 225 , 797 S.E.2d at 335 . 2024RAGER Opinion of the Court determine whether defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial[,]” id. at 219 , 797 S.E.2d at 331 , this Court held that “the record reflect[ed] that [defendant’s] waiver was knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 225 , 797 S.E.2d at 335 . | 3 | 2020–2024 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1994A defendant who chooses to represent himself "must be permitted to do so upon the sole condition that he make a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel." Id. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-82 . 1994A defendant who chooses to represent himself "must be permitted to do so upon the sole condition that he make a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel." Id. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-82 . | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Berghuis v. Thompkins
green
1 sentence2017We do not need to reach the prejudice issue, though, because we hold that, as in Berghuis , defendant understood his Miranda rights and that, through a “course of conduct indicating waiver,” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 386 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 ), he effected a knowing and voluntary waiver of them. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences2017We do not need to reach the prejudice issue, though, because we hold that, as in Berghuis , defendant understood his Miranda rights and that, through a “course of conduct indicating waiver,” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 386 (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 ), he effected a knowing and voluntary waiver of them. 2017Here, as in Berghuis , defendant never said “during the interrogation ... that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police, or that he wanted an attorney.” Id. at 375 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Boyd
green
1 sentence2014App. 97, 102 , 682 S.E.2d 463, 467 (2009) (citing Montgomery), disc. review denied,_N.C._, 691 S.E.2d 414 (2010). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 525 , 530 S.E.2d at 69 . 2009Id. at 525 , 530 S.E.2d at 69 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Carnley v. Cochran
green
2 sentences2006Specifically, defendant relies on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) and State v. Williams, 65 N.C.App. 498 , 309 S.E.2d 721 (1983) in asserting that his motion to suppress the use of the prior convictions at issue under N.C. 2006Specifically, defendant relies on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) and State v. Williams, 65 N.C.App. 498 , 309 S.E.2d 721 (1983) in asserting that his motion to suppress the use of the prior convictions at issue under N.C. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2006Specifically, defendant relies on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) and State v. Williams, 65 N.C.App. 498 , 309 S.E.2d 721 (1983) in asserting that his motion to suppress the use of the prior convictions at issue under N.C. 2006Specifically, defendant relies on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 , 82 S.Ct. 884 , 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) and State v. Williams, 65 N.C.App. 498 , 309 S.E.2d 721 (1983) in asserting that his motion to suppress the use of the prior convictions at issue under N.C. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Tap Electrical Contracting Service, Inc. v. Sweeney
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Illinois v. Allen
green
2 sentences1993Id. at 835 , 45 L. 1993Id., 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 , 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-82 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Dunaway v. New York
green
1 sentence1984Defendant challenges the admission of his confession on two grounds: (1) the confession was obtained as a result of an illegal detention in violation of Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); and (2) the confession was ob *502 tained by threats and promises and was without a knowing and voluntary waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. McZorn
green
2 sentences1982In State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417 , 219 S.E. 2d 201 (1975), death penalty vacated, 428 U.S. 904 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 1210 , 96 S.Ct. 3210 (1976), this Court speaking through Chief Justice Sharp set forth five factors to be considered among others as part of the totality of circumstances which determine whether initial warnings to a defendant have become so stale and remote as to raise a substantial possibility that the defendant was unaware of his constitutional rights at the time of the subsequent interrogation in question. 1982In State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417 , 219 S.E. 2d 201 (1975), death penalty vacated, 428 U.S. 904 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 1210 , 96 S.Ct. 3210 (1976), this Court speaking through Chief Justice Sharp set forth five factors to be considered among others as part of the totality of circumstances which determine whether initial warnings to a defendant have become so stale and remote as to raise a substantial possibility that the defendant was unaware of his constitutional rights at the time of the subsequent interrogation in question. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Sanders green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| McZorn v. North Carolina green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Griffin v. North Carolina green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Avery v. North Carolina green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Kirby v. Illinois green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.