knowing and voluntary waiver in South Carolina

43 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 6 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (40)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Raygreen sc · 1993 · cited in 7 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1999–2024 2 sentences 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d	6	7
Gardner v. Stategreen sc · 2002 · cited in 6 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2015–2025 2 sentences 2025See Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 412 , 570 S.E.2d 184, 186 (2002) ("In a PCR action, if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be remanded for a new trial."). 2025See Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 412 , 570 S.E.2d 184, 186 (2002) ("In a PCR action, if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be remanded for a new trial.").	6	6
Pittman v. Stategreen sc · 1999 · cited in 6 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2024 2 sentences 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d	6	6
Roddy v. Stategreen sc · 2000 · cited in 7 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2014 2 sentences 2014See Moore v. State, 399 S.C. 641, 647 , 732 S.E.2d 871, 873 (2012) (“A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory or constitutional rights must be established by a complete record, and may be accomplished by a colloquy between the court and defendant, between the court and defendant’s counsel, or both.” (citing Roddy v. State, 339 S.C. 29, 34 , 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000))). 2014See Moore v. State, 399 S.C. 641, 647 , 732 S.E.2d 871, 873 (2012) (“A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory or constitutional rights must be established by a complete record, and may be accomplished by a colloquy between the court and defendant, between the court and defendant’s counsel, or both.” (citing Roddy v. State, 339 S.C. 29, 34 , 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000))).	4	7
Faretta v. Californiagreen scotus · 1975 · cited in 4 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1995–2023 2 sentences 2023See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see also, e.g., Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 412 , 570 S.E.2d 184, 186 (2002) ("In a PCR action, if the record fails to demonstrate the Petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the Petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be remanded for a new trial."). 2019In the absence of a specific inquiry by the trial [court] addressing the disadvantages of a pro se defense as required by the second Faretta prong, this [c]ourt will look to the record to determine whether [the applicant] had sufficient background or was apprised of his rights by some other source."); Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 412-13 , 570 S.E.2d 184, 186-87 (2002) (listing factors a court may consider when determining the sufficiency of a defendant's background); id. at 1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 412, 570 S.E.2d at 186 ("In a PCR action, if the record fails to de	3	4
State v. Orrgreen sc · 1991 · cited in 5 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1992–2001 2 sentences 2001Additionally, in State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), State v. Charping, 313 S.C. 147 , 437 S.E.2d 88 (1993), and State v. Cooper, 312 S.C. 90 , 439 S.E.2d 276 (1994), we held that failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the statutory rights under section 16-3-28 was alone ground for reversal. 2001Additionally, in State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), State v. Charping, 313 S.C. 147 , 437 S.E.2d 88 (1993), and State v. Cooper, 312 S.C. 90 , 439 S.E.2d 276 (1994), we held that failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the statutory rights under section 16-3-28 was alone ground for reversal.	2	5
Watts v. Stategreen sc · 2001 · cited in 3 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2015 2 sentences 2015See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107 , 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (holding the issue of whether there was an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel should be raised by way of PCR, not appeal, where the issue of sufficiency of the waiver was not presented to the trial court); see also Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407 , 570 S.E.2d 184 (2002) (stating if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with "eyes open," the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399 , 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001) (stati 2015See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107 , 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (holding the issue of whether there was an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel should be raised by way of PCR, not appeal, where the issue of sufficiency of the waiver was not presented to the trial court); see also Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407 , 570 S.E.2d 184 (2002) (stating if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with "eyes open," the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399 , 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001) (stati	2	3
Brown v. Stategreen sc · 1994 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2014–2024 2 sentences 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d	2	2
State v. Dixongreen sc · 1977 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2015–2021 2 sentences 2021See Dixon, 269 S.C. at 110 , 236 S.E.2d at 421 (summarily disposing of Dixon's remaining issues and remanding for a hearing on the issue of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel). 2021See Dixon, 269 S.C. at 110 , 236 S.E.2d at 421 (summarily disposing of Dixon's remaining issues and remanding for a hearing on the issue of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel).	2	2
State v. Lambertgreen sc · 1976 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2011 2 sentences 2011As to the guilty plea: Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (noting that generally, a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently); State v. Lambert , 266 S.C. 574, 580 , 225 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1976) (holding the record should reflect that the trial court has assured itself that the plea was voluntary and intelligently entered with full knowledge of the nature of the offense); State v. Ray , 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1993) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory or constitutional right must be established by a complete recor 2011As to the guilty plea: Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (noting that generally, a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently); State v. Lambert , 266 S.C. 574, 580 , 225 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1976) (holding the record should reflect that the trial court has assured itself that the plea was voluntary and intelligently entered with full knowledge of the nature of the offense); State v. Ray , 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1993) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory or constitutional right must be established by a complete recor	2	2
Harres v. Leekegreen sc · 1984 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007“A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea may be accomplished by colloquy between the Court and the defendant, between the Court and defendant’s counsel, or both.” Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 600 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999). “[T]he voluntariness of a guilty plea is not determined by an examination of the specific inquiry made by the sentencing judge alone, but is determined from both the record made at the time of the entry of the guilty plea and the record of the post-conviction hearing.” Harres v. Leeke, 282 S.C. 131, 133 , 31 2007“A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea may be accomplished by colloquy between the Court and the defendant, between the Court and defendant’s counsel, or both.” Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 600 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999). “[T]he voluntariness of a guilty plea is not determined by an examination of the specific inquiry made by the sentencing judge alone, but is determined from both the record made at the time of the entry of the guilty plea and the record of the post-conviction hearing.” Harres v. Leeke, 282 S.C. 131, 133 , 31	2	2
Smith v. Robbinsgreen scotus · 2000 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2024 2 sentences 2024See Brown v. State, 317 S.C. 270, 272 , 453 S.E.2d 251, 252 (1994) ("An on-the- record waiver of a constitutional or statutory right is but one method of determining whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived that right."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 599 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) ("A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea 'may be accomplished by colloquy between the [trial c]ourt and the defendant, between the [trial c]ourt and defendant's counsel, or both.'" (quoting State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 437 , 427 S.E.2d 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo	1	2
Brannon v. Stategreen sc · 2001 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2012–2016 2 sentences 2016"A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory or constitutional rights must be established by a complete record, and may be accomplished by [a] colloquy between [the] court and defendant, between [the] court and defendant's counsel, or both." Brannon, 345 S.C. at 439 , 548 S.E.2d at 867 . 2016"A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory or constitutional rights must be established by a complete record, and may be accomplished by [a] colloquy between [the] court and defendant, between [the] court and defendant's counsel, or both." Brannon, 345 S.C. at 439 , 548 S.E.2d at 867 .	1	2
Iowa v. Tovargreen scotus · 2004 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021In Iowa v. Tovar, the Supreme Court addressed "the extent to which a trial [court], before accepting a guilty plea from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to representation." 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004).	1	1
State v. Thompsongreen scctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo	1	1
David A. Gray v. James Greergreen ca7 · 1986 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 1 sentence 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo	1	1
Bennett v. Stategreen sc · 2009 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo	1	1
Prince v. Stategreen sc · 1990 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019See, e.g. , Gardner , 351 S.C. at 412 , 570 S.E.2d at 186 ("In a PCR action, if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be remanded for a new trial."); Prince , 301 S.C. at 424 , 392 S.E.2d at 463 (finding no valid waiver because the record "[did] not demonstrate petitioner was sufficiently aware of the dangers of self-representation"). 2019See, e.g. , Gardner , 351 S.C. at 412 , 570 S.E.2d at 186 ("In a PCR action, if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with 'eyes open,' then the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the case should be remanded for a new trial."); Prince , 301 S.C. at 424 , 392 S.E.2d at 463 (finding no valid waiver because the record "[did] not demonstrate petitioner was sufficiently aware of the dangers of self-representation").	1	1
Tisdale v. Stategreen sc · 2004 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo 2019As to Issue 2: Tisdale v. State, 357 S.C. 474, 476 , 594 S.E.2d 166, 167 (2004) ("A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel."); Bennett v. State, 383 S.C. 303, 309 , 680 S.E.2d 273, 276 (2009) ("Generally, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this [c]ourt applies the Strickland[2] test just as it would when analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel."); id. ("Thus, . . . we ask 1) whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) whether [the defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient perfo	1	1
Moore v. Stategreen sc · 2012 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014	1	1
Sims v. Stategreen sc · 1993 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014	1	1
Brady v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014	1	1
Washington v. Washingtongreen sc · 1992 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013	1	1
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.green sc · 1999 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011	1	1
Boykin v. Alabamagreen scotus · 1969 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011	1	1
State v. Rikardgreen scctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011	1	1
Anderson v. Stategreen sc · 2000 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011	1	1
State v. Armstronggreen sc · 1975 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011	1	1
State v. Pattersongreen sc · 1997 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Kennedygreen scctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Martuccigreen scctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Shulergreen sc · 2003 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Dobygreen sc · 1979 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. McLaurengreen scctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Burtongreen sc · 2003 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Prioleaugreen · 2001 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Kennedygreen sc · 1998 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Passarogreen sc · 2002 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006	1	1
State v. Rochevillegreen sc · 1993 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994	1	1
State v. Norrisgreen sc · 1985 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (20)

Case	Cited	Years
Spoone v. State green sc · 2008 2 sentences 2015The State therefore argues this Court is bound by its previous holding in Spoone v. State, 379 S.C. 138 , 665 S.E.2d 605 (2008), where we held a knowing and voluntary waiver of PCR is enforceable. 2015The State therefore argues this Court is bound by its previous holding in Spoone v. State, 379 S.C. 138 , 665 S.E.2d 605 (2008), where we held a knowing and voluntary waiver of PCR is enforceable.	3	2012–2015
State v. Charping green sc · 1993 2 sentences 2001Additionally, in State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), State v. Charping, 313 S.C. 147 , 437 S.E.2d 88 (1993), and State v. Cooper, 312 S.C. 90 , 439 S.E.2d 276 (1994), we held that failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the statutory rights under section 16-3-28 was alone ground for reversal. 2001Additionally, in State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991), State v. Charping, 313 S.C. 147 , 437 S.E.2d 88 (1993), and State v. Cooper, 312 S.C. 90 , 439 S.E.2d 276 (1994), we held that failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the statutory rights under section 16-3-28 was alone ground for reversal.	3	1994–2002
Godinez v. Moran green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 2014We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1997) (holding that the fact that a plea was "motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law" does not render the plea invalid); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 397–400 (1993) (holding that a defendant must be competent in order to knowingly and voluntarily enter into an agreement); Spoone v. State, 379 S 1993In addition ... a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of constitutional rights is know *424 ing and voluntary.” Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2687 . 2 While there is no distinction in levels of competency throughout the trial process, there is a distinction between the standard for competency and the standard to determine a knowing and voluntary waiver.	2	1993–2014
Hughes v. State green sc · 2006 2 sentences 2008Id. at 395-96 , 626 S.E.2d at 808 . 2008Id. at 395-96 , 626 S.E.2d at 808 .	2	2007–2008
Bridwell v. State green sc · 1991 2 sentences 2002See Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399 , 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001); Wroten; Prince; Bridwell v. State, 306 S.C. 518 , 413 S.E.2d 30 (1992). 2002See Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399 , 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001); Wroten; Prince; Bridwell v. State, 306 S.C. 518 , 413 S.E.2d 30 (1992).	2	2001–2002
State v. Reed green sc · 1987 2 sentences 1998S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-28 requires “in any criminal trial where the maximum penalty is death or in a separate 133 sentencing proceeding following such trial, the defendant and his counsel shall have the right to make the last argument.” We have repeatedly held there must be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to final argument on-the-record. 6 See State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991); State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987). 1998S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-28 requires “in any criminal trial where the maximum penalty is death or in a separate 133 sentencing proceeding following such trial, the defendant and his counsel shall have the right to make the last argument.” We have repeatedly held there must be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to final argument on-the-record. 6 See State v. Orr, 304 S.C. 185 , 403 S.E.2d 623 (1991); State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515 , 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987).	2	1993–1998
Strickland v. Washington green scotus · 1984 1 sentence 2024Furthermore, the right to testify issue was not objected to at trial as trial counsel and the trial court appeared to have been working in concert in 3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). obtaining the waiver.	1	2024–2024
White v. State green sc · 1974 2 sentences 2024The PCR court granted Bryan a belated direct appeal pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110 , 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974), specifically regarding whether his decision not to testify at trial was knowingly and voluntarily made. 2024The PCR court granted Bryan a belated direct appeal pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C. 110 , 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974), specifically regarding whether his decision not to testify at trial was knowingly and voluntarily made.	1	2024–2024
Dalton v. State green scctapp · 2007 1 sentence 2023"A defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional rights which accompany a guilty plea may be accomplished by colloquy between the Court and the defendant, between the Court and defendant's counsel, or both." Id. (quoting Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 600 , 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999)).	1	2023–2023
Davis v. United States green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 2016In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” “Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney.” Id. 2016In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” “Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney.” Id.	1	2016–2016
Wroten v. State green sc · 1990 2 sentences 2015See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107 , 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (holding the issue of whether there was an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel should be raised by way of PCR, not appeal, where the issue of sufficiency of the waiver was not presented to the trial court); see also Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407 , 570 S.E.2d 184 (2002) (stating if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with "eyes open," the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399 , 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001) (stati 2015See State v. Dixon, 269 S.C. 107 , 236 S.E.2d 419 (1977) (holding the issue of whether there was an intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel should be raised by way of PCR, not appeal, where the issue of sufficiency of the waiver was not presented to the trial court); see also Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407 , 570 S.E.2d 184 (2002) (stating if the record fails to demonstrate the petitioner made an informed choice to proceed pro se, with "eyes open," the petitioner did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Watts v. State, 347 S.C. 399 , 556 S.E.2d 368 (2001) (stati	1	2015–2015
State v. Torrence green sc · 1996	1	2006–2006
State v. Torrence green sc · 1991	1	2005–2005
State v. Cooper green sc · 1986	1	2005–2005
Butler v. State green sc · 1990	1	2005–2005
State v. Gunter green sc · 1985	1	2005–2005
State v. Pierce green sc · 1986	1	2005–2005
Carter v. State green sc · 1987	1	2001–2001
State v. Cooper green sc · 1994	1	2001–2001
Whitehead v. State green sc · 1992	1	2001–2001

Statutes the citing opinions construe

SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (6) SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (5) SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-28 (4) SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-910 (3) SC § S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 139 (1974–2026) CA 118 (1980–2026) LA 110 (1981–2025) IL 85 (1975–2026) GA 77 (1979–2023) IN 65 (1972–2020) PA 55 (1969–2025) MD 54 (1965–2026) TX 54 (1979–2026) NJ 53 (1988–2026) FL 50 (1978–2025) SC 43 (1992–2025) MS 43 (1984–2025) OH 41 (1989–2026) WA 40 (1977–2025) OR 38 (1978–2026) TN 37 (1993–2026) CT 32 (1972–2025) MA 32 (1973–2024) NC 30 (1977–2024) KS 25 (1992–2026) WI 25 (1979–2026) HI 23 (1992–2025) MO 22 (1980–2023) OK 21 (1982–2023) UT 20 (1989–2024) VA 19 (1991–2024) ID 19 (2000–2022) IA 18 (2002–2024) MI 17 (1982–2025) NM 16 (1981–2020) AR 13 (2002–2015) SD 12 (1987–2019) DC 11 (1978–2024) AL 11 (1972–2013) AZ 11 (1973–2023) DE 10 (1978–2026) KY 9 (1995–2026) NE 9 (1999–2025) MT 8 (1995–2025) NV 7 (1987–2025) WY 7 (1986–2021) VT 7 (1994–2021) AK 6 (1987–2020) RI 6 (1974–2011) MN 6 (1988–2015) ME 5 (1979–2003) NH 5 (2001–2018) CO 4 (1995–2014) ND 4 (1997–2021) WV 3 (1982–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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