9 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Watkins v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Ky. 2003) (requiring only a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right). | 1 | 1 |
Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systemsgreen2 sentences2023“CR 60.02, is a safety valve, error correcting device for trial courts.” Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002). “[CR 60.02] is designed to allow trial courts a measure of flexibility to achieve just results and thereby ‘provides the trial court with extensive power to correct a judgment.’” Id. (quoting Fortney v. Mahan, 302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1957)). 2023“CR 60.02, is a safety valve, error correcting device for trial courts.” Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002). “[CR 60.02] is designed to allow trial courts a measure of flexibility to achieve just results and thereby ‘provides the trial court with extensive power to correct a judgment.’” Id. (quoting Fortney v. Mahan, 302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1957)). | 1 | 1 |
Fortney v. Mahangreen1 sentence2023“CR 60.02, is a safety valve, error correcting device for trial courts.” Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002). “[CR 60.02] is designed to allow trial courts a measure of flexibility to achieve just results and thereby ‘provides the trial court with extensive power to correct a judgment.’” Id. (quoting Fortney v. Mahan, 302 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1957)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Wrightgreen1 sentence2018See Wright , 415 S.W.3d at 613 n.3 (clarifying that "[i]t is worth noting that even without a finding of necessity, a probationer may knowingly and voluntarily agree to an extension of probation beyond five years, for example to avoid revocation of probation."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holbachgreen1 sentence2012See also United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.1988) (“[A] persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel ... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”); North Dakota v. Holbach, 735 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (N.D.2007) (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel where the defendant’s “behavior [was] indicative of using pretrial motion practice and requesting different lawyers to obstruct the legal process”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sutcliffegreen1 sentence2012Next, in United States v. Sutcliffe, a criminal case, 4 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the appellant had implicitly waived his right to counsel under the knowing and voluntary standard. 505 F.3d 944, 955-56 (9th Cir.2007). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gray Moore, Jr.green1 sentence2012See also United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.1988) (“[A] persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel ... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”); North Dakota v. Holbach, 735 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (N.D.2007) (finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel where the defendant’s “behavior [was] indicative of using pretrial motion practice and requesting different lawyers to obstruct the legal process”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leonard Ageegreen1 sentence2003Cf. United States v. Agee, 83 F.3d 882, 887-8 (7th Cir.1996) (remanding in a case where the validity of the appellant’s waiver of his right to appeal was contested "since it may still be possible to glean further and more reliable information from either the defendant or defense counsel about the circumstances surrounding the agreement.”). . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Scottgreen1 sentence2003Id. ("However, we cannot say that the district court’s failure to follow [United States v.] Scottl, 583 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir.1978)] was harmless because there is nothing else in the record before us which satisfactorily demonstrates that Robinson personally gave a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to have a jury[.]”). .Id. at 425 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2018In interpreting an earlier version of KRS 533.020(4) which did not provide an extension of probation beyond five years for "the time necessary to complete restitution," the Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Griffin , 942 S.W.2d 289 , 291-92 (Ky. 1997), noted that although the five year period had the purpose of protecting a convicted defendant from being subject to a probationary status of indefinite duration, its purpose was "not served if it is interpreted to preclude a knowing and voluntary waiver of the five year limitation by a defendant in exchange for avoiding a revocation of hi 2002E.g., Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594 (2001) (waiver of KRS 532.110(1)(c) limitation on a maximum aggregate sentence); Malone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000) (waiver of Ky. Const. § 12 right to be prosecuted only by an indictment); Commonwealth v. Griffin, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 289 (1997) (waiver of KRS 533.020(4) limitation on a period of probation). | 2 | 2002–2018 |
Jones v. State
green
1 sentence2012It concluded that “[t]he trial court was authorized to find that [the appellant] was attempting to use the discharge and [appointment] of other counsel as a dilatory tactic, which was ‘the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bryant v. Georgia, 268 Ga. 616 , 491 S.E.2d 320 (1997)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bryant v. State
green
2 sentences2012It concluded that “[t]he trial court was authorized to find that [the appellant] was attempting to use the discharge and [appointment] of other counsel as a dilatory tactic, which was ‘the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bryant v. Georgia, 268 Ga. 616 , 491 S.E.2d 320 (1997)). 2012It concluded that “[t]he trial court was authorized to find that [the appellant] was attempting to use the discharge and [appointment] of other counsel as a dilatory tactic, which was ‘the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bryant v. Georgia, 268 Ga. 616 , 491 S.E.2d 320 (1997)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
The Prudential Insurance Co. Of America, a New Jersey Corporation v. Justine Lai Elvira Viernes
green
2 sentences2008We also noted that “both constitutional and statutory rights inuring to the benefit of a criminal defendant are subject to a knowing and voluntary waiver.” Id. 2008Thus, we concluded that, “[w]e know of no reason why the same principle should not apply to the statutory right of an employee to sue his/her employer for a civil rights violation.” Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Myers v. Commonwealth
red
2 sentences2002E.g., Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594 (2001) (waiver of KRS 532.110(1)(c) limitation on a maximum aggregate sentence); Malone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000) (waiver of Ky. Const. § 12 right to be prosecuted only by an indictment); Commonwealth v. Griffin, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 289 (1997) (waiver of KRS 533.020(4) limitation on a period of probation). 2002E.g., Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594 (2001) (waiver of KRS 532.110(1)(c) limitation on a maximum aggregate sentence); Malone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000) (waiver of Ky. Const. § 12 right to be prosecuted only by an indictment); Commonwealth v. Griffin, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 289 (1997) (waiver of KRS 533.020(4) limitation on a period of probation). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Malone v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2002E.g., Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594 (2001) (waiver of KRS 532.110(1)(c) limitation on a maximum aggregate sentence); Malone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000) (waiver of Ky. Const. § 12 right to be prosecuted only by an indictment); Commonwealth v. Griffin, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 289 (1997) (waiver of KRS 533.020(4) limitation on a period of probation). 2002E.g., Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 42 S.W.3d 594 (2001) (waiver of KRS 532.110(1)(c) limitation on a maximum aggregate sentence); Malone v. Commonwealth, Ky., 30 S.W.3d 180 (2000) (waiver of Ky. Const. § 12 right to be prosecuted only by an indictment); Commonwealth v. Griffin, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 289 (1997) (waiver of KRS 533.020(4) limitation on a period of probation). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Boatwright v. Walker
green
2 sentences1995This custody question is a corollary to the termination of parental rights question addressed in Van Wey v. Van Wey, supra, and Boatwright v. Walker, Ky.App., 715 S.W.2d 237 (1986), eases holding that once a voluntary petition agreeing to terminate parental rights to permit an adoption has been executed, withdrawal, while permissible, nevertheless waives the parent’s superior right to child custody, “and the best interests of the child [then] takes precedence.” Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d at 244 . 1995This custody question is a corollary to the termination of parental rights question addressed in Van Wey v. Van Wey, supra, and Boatwright v. Walker, Ky.App., 715 S.W.2d 237 (1986), eases holding that once a voluntary petition agreeing to terminate parental rights to permit an adoption has been executed, withdrawal, while permissible, nevertheless waives the parent’s superior right to child custody, “and the best interests of the child [then] takes precedence.” Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d at 244 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Van Wey v. Van Wey
green
2 sentences1995This custody question is a corollary to the termination of parental rights question addressed in Van Wey v. Van Wey, supra, and Boatwright v. Walker, Ky.App., 715 S.W.2d 237 (1986), eases holding that once a voluntary petition agreeing to terminate parental rights to permit an adoption has been executed, withdrawal, while permissible, nevertheless waives the parent’s superior right to child custody, “and the best interests of the child [then] takes precedence.” Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d at 244 . 1995This custody question is a corollary to the termination of parental rights question addressed in Van Wey v. Van Wey, supra , and Boatwright v. Walker, Ky.App., 715 S.W.2d 237 (1986), cases holding that once a voluntary petition agreeing to terminate parental rights to permit an adoption has been executed, withdrawal, while permissible, nevertheless waives the parent's superior right to child custody, "and the best interests of the child [then] takes precedence." Boat-wright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d at 244 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.