knowing and voluntary waiver in Delaware

10 Delaware opinions name it 4 courts 1978–2026 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
Hooks v. Stategreen del · 1980 · cited in 2 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 1996–2016 2 sentences 2016DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION WAS NOT VIOLATED The right to self-representation is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. 13 Before permitting a defendant to proceed as his own representative, the court must (1) determine that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to counsel; and (2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in 10 Id. at 555. 11 Id. 12 See Webster v. State, 604 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Del. 1992). 13 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1975) 1996Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 ; Briscoe v. State, Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 103, 107-108 (1992); see Hooks, 416 A.2d at 197 .	2	2
Hartman v. Stategreen del · 2007 · cited in 2 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2019 2 sentences 2019To the extent Woods attempts to argue 7 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 8 Id. 9 Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138 , 1140–41 (Del. 2007). 6 the basis of his request for an acquittal here, we will not consider his claim in the first instance.10 Woods will have to make the argument in a postconviction proceeding. (13) Because none of the other claims on appeal were raised at trial, we have reviewed the claims for plain error.11 Plain error is error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”12 (14) Woods c 2016DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION WAS NOT VIOLATED The right to self-representation is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. 13 Before permitting a defendant to proceed as his own representative, the court must (1) determine that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to counsel; and (2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in 10 Id. at 555. 11 Id. 12 See Webster v. State, 604 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Del. 1992). 13 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1975)	1	2
Faretta v. Californiagreen scotus · 1975 · cited in 2 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 1996–2016 2 sentences 2016DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION WAS NOT VIOLATED The right to self-representation is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. 13 Before permitting a defendant to proceed as his own representative, the court must (1) determine that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to counsel; and (2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in 10 Id. at 555. 11 Id. 12 See Webster v. State, 604 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Del. 1992). 13 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1975) 1996Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 ; Briscoe v. State, Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 103, 107-108 (1992); see Hooks, 416 A.2d at 197 .	1	2
Davis v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1994 · cited in 2 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 1998–2015 2 sentences 2015Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the Superior Court’s ruling on this issue. (23) Additionally, Restrepo argues that the detective’s failure to advise him of his consular rights under Article 36 of The Vienna Convention on Consular 26 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (“[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”). 27 See State v. Sumner, 2003 WL 21963008 , at 20 (Del. 1998*In Davis , the United States Supreme Court held that, under the federal constitution, police officers are not required to ask clarifying questions and, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, “may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” 512 U.S. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. at 2356 .	1	2
Desmond v. Stategreen del · 1994 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019To the extent Woods attempts to argue 7 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 8 Id. 9 Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138 , 1140–41 (Del. 2007). 6 the basis of his request for an acquittal here, we will not consider his claim in the first instance.10 Woods will have to make the argument in a postconviction proceeding. (13) Because none of the other claims on appeal were raised at trial, we have reviewed the claims for plain error.11 Plain error is error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”12 (14) Woods c 2019To the extent Woods attempts to argue 7 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 8 Id. 9 Hartman v. State, 918 A.2d 1138 , 1140–41 (Del. 2007). 6 the basis of his request for an acquittal here, we will not consider his claim in the first instance.10 Woods will have to make the argument in a postconviction proceeding. (13) Because none of the other claims on appeal were raised at trial, we have reviewed the claims for plain error.11 Plain error is error that is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”12 (14) Woods c	1	1
Webster v. Stategreen del · 1992 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION WAS NOT VIOLATED The right to self-representation is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. 13 Before permitting a defendant to proceed as his own representative, the court must (1) determine that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to counsel; and (2) inform the defendant of the risks inherent in 10 Id. at 555. 11 Id. 12 See Webster v. State, 604 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Del. 1992). 13 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816-19 (1975)	1	1
United States v. Welty, John Jacobgreen ca3 · 1982 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016In Morrison v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 135 A.3d 69, 73-74 (Del. 2016) (citing United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1982)).	1	1
Morrison v. Stategreen del · 2016 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016In Morrison v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 135 A.3d 69, 73-74 (Del. 2016) (citing United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1982)).	1	1
Leroy Buhl v. Mr. Cooksey, Warden Attorney General of the State of New Jerseygreen ca3 · 2000 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent	1	1
Zuppo v. Stategreen del · 2002 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent 2016Nov. 25, 2015) (citing Zuppo, 807 A.2d at 547 ). 13 potential disruption of proceedings already in progress.34 “The trial judge need not expressly mention the timeliness of the request to proceed pro se so long as the ‘record reflect[s] clear findings and logical reasoning underlying the ruling denying the request.’”35 “[T]he State’s interest in ‘ensuring integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.’”36 A sufficiently thorough inquiry is required to satisfy the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to coun	1	1
Flamer v. Stategreen del · 1990 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015Super. 2006). 22 Stone v. State, 690 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1996) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990)). 5 must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. 23 Instead, the court must evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 24 During his statement to the police, Rivera admitted to using about 13 or more bags of heroin per day and that he used about 15 bags of heroin that morning. 25 Prior to trial, Rivera filed his own motion to suppress his confession, claiming he was incapable of giving a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights bec	1	1
Stone v. Stategreen del · 1996 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015Super. 2006). 22 Stone v. State, 690 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1996) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990)). 5 must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. 23 Instead, the court must evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 24 During his statement to the police, Rivera admitted to using about 13 or more bags of heroin per day and that he used about 15 bags of heroin that morning. 25 Prior to trial, Rivera filed his own motion to suppress his confession, claiming he was incapable of giving a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights bec	1	1
Briscoe v. Stategreen del · 1992 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct. at 2541 ; Briscoe v. State, Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 103, 107-108 (1992); see Hooks, 416 A.2d at 197 .	1	1
State v. Rooksgreen del · 1979 · cited in 1 Delaware opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979 1 sentence 1979See State v. Rooks, Del.Supr., 401 A.2d 943 (1979).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

Case	Cited	Years
Wainwright v. State green del · 1986 1 sentence 2026When a party has knowingly and intelligently waived a right – such as a procedurally proper guilty plea or strategic decision not to object – we cease further review.24 The State bears the burden to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver.25 Furthermore, we will “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver[.]”26 22 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 . 23 Swanson v. State, __ A.3d __, 2025 WL 3778943 , at *3 (Del.	1	2026–2026
Stigars v. State green del · 1996 2 sentences 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent	1	2016–2016
Christopher v. State green del · 2007 2 sentences 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent	1	2016–2016
Williams v. State green del · 2012 1 sentence 2016The Denial of Defendant’s Request for Self-Representation During the February 1994 Hearing Was Not Prejudicial in Light of Defendant’s Subsequent Waiver Even where a defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel, the right to self-representation is not unqualified. 33 Once proceedings have commenced, a trial judge may address self-representation by weighing the legitimate interests of the defendant against the prejudice that may result from 30 See Zuppo v. State, 807 A.2d 545, 547 (Del. 2002) (citing Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 797 (3d Cir. 2000)) (“[T]he right to self-represent	1	2016–2016
Strickland v. Washington green scotus · 1984 2 sentences 2015Super. 2006). 22 Stone v. State, 690 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1996) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990)). 5 must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. 23 Instead, the court must evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 24 During his statement to the police, Rivera admitted to using about 13 or more bags of heroin per day and that he used about 15 bags of heroin that morning. 25 Prior to trial, Rivera filed his own motion to suppress his confession, claiming he was incapable of giving a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights bec 2015Super. 2006). 22 Stone v. State, 690 A.2d 924, 925 (Del. 1996) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990)). 5 must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. 23 Instead, the court must evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. 24 During his statement to the police, Rivera admitted to using about 13 or more bags of heroin per day and that he used about 15 bags of heroin that morning. 25 Prior to trial, Rivera filed his own motion to suppress his confession, claiming he was incapable of giving a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights bec	1	2015–2015
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 2007The Constitutional Provisions of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) extend to both adults and juveniles. 1 Confessions and admissions of a juvenile require our special scrutiny. 2 However, the standard for determining whether there is a knowing and voluntary waiver is the same for adults and juveniles. 2007The Constitutional Provisions of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) extend to both adults and juveniles. 1 Confessions and admissions of a juvenile require our special scrutiny. 2 However, the standard for determining whether there is a knowing and voluntary waiver is the same for adults and juveniles.	1	2007–2007
Johnson v. Zerbst green scotus · 1938 2 sentences 1978Waiver has been defined by the U. S. Supreme Court as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (emphasis added). 1978Waiver has been defined by the U. S. Supreme Court as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (emphasis added).	1	1978–1978

Where else courts name it

NY 139 (1974–2026) CA 118 (1980–2026) LA 110 (1981–2025) IL 85 (1975–2026) GA 77 (1979–2023) IN 65 (1972–2020) PA 55 (1969–2025) MD 54 (1965–2026) TX 54 (1979–2026) NJ 53 (1988–2026) FL 50 (1978–2025) SC 43 (1992–2025) MS 43 (1984–2025) OH 41 (1989–2026) WA 40 (1977–2025) OR 38 (1978–2026) TN 37 (1993–2026) CT 32 (1972–2025) MA 32 (1973–2024) NC 30 (1977–2024) KS 25 (1992–2026) WI 25 (1979–2026) HI 23 (1992–2025) MO 22 (1980–2023) OK 21 (1982–2023) UT 20 (1989–2024) VA 19 (1991–2024) ID 19 (2000–2022) IA 18 (2002–2024) MI 17 (1982–2025) NM 16 (1981–2020) AR 13 (2002–2015) SD 12 (1987–2019) DC 11 (1978–2024) AL 11 (1972–2013) AZ 11 (1973–2023) DE 10 (1978–2026) KY 9 (1995–2026) NE 9 (1999–2025) MT 8 (1995–2025) NV 7 (1987–2025) WY 7 (1986–2021) VT 7 (1994–2021) AK 6 (1987–2020) RI 6 (1974–2011) MN 6 (1988–2015) ME 5 (1979–2003) NH 5 (2001–2018) CO 4 (1995–2014) ND 4 (1997–2021) WV 3 (1982–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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