77 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2023 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Phipps v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Additionally, a defendant’s “insistence upon the appointment of counsel who [will] accede to his demands and pursue a frivolous and baseless line of defense” may amount to “the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Phipps v. State, 200 Ga. App. 18, 19 ( 406 SE2d 493 ) (1991). 2011Additionally, a defendant’s “insistence upon the appointment of counsel who [will] accede to his demands and pursue a frivolous and baseless line of defense” may amount to “the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Phipps v. State, 200 Ga. App. 18, 19 ( 406 SE2d 493 ) (1991). | 4 | 4 |
Bryant v. Stategreen2 sentences2010However, the record authorized the trial court to conclude that Walker’s expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was “the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel.” Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 616, 617 ( 491 SE2d 320 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted). 2010However, the record authorized the trial court to conclude that Walker’s expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was “the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel.” Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 616, 617 ( 491 SE2d 320 ) (1997) (punctuation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Hobson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 177-178 (2) (a) ( 702 SE2d 415 ) (2010) (trial court was authorized to conclude that defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel); Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 638-639 (2) ( 469 SE2d 188 ) (1996) (trial court was authorized to find that defendant’s discharge and employment of counsel was a dilatory tactic that amounted to the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Staples v. 2011See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 177-178 (2) (a) ( 702 SE2d 415 ) (2010) (trial court was authorized to conclude that defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel); Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 638-639 (2) ( 469 SE2d 188 ) (1996) (trial court was authorized to find that defendant’s discharge and employment of counsel was a dilatory tactic that amounted to the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Staples v. | 3 | 5 |
Staples v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 177-178 (2) (a) ( 702 SE2d 415 ) (2010) (trial court was authorized to conclude that defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel); Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 638-639 (2) ( 469 SE2d 188 ) (1996) (trial court was authorized to find that defendant’s discharge and employment of counsel was a dilatory tactic that amounted to the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Staples v. 2011See also Walker v. State, 288 Ga. 174, 177-178 (2) (a) ( 702 SE2d 415 ) (2010) (trial court was authorized to conclude that defendant’s expression of dissatisfaction with his third lawyer on the day of trial was a dilatory tactic that was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appointed counsel); Hobson v. State, 266 Ga. 638, 638-639 (2) ( 469 SE2d 188 ) (1996) (trial court was authorized to find that defendant’s discharge and employment of counsel was a dilatory tactic that amounted to the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Staples v. | 3 | 3 |
Mercier v. Stategreen2 sentences1999We recognize that the trial court might have been authorized in this case to conclude that Coppolla’s repeated rejection of Sumner as counsel in addition to his insistence on representation by counsel of his own choosing “was the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 494-495 (2). 1998See, e.g., Mercier v. State, 203 Ga. App. 494 (2) ( 417 SE2d 430 ) (1992) (trial court authorized to *782 find that defendant’s rejection of the assistance of the public defender, coupled with his insistence upon the appointment of counsel of his own choosing, was functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel); Phipps v. State, 200 Ga. App. 18, 19 ( 406 SE2d 493 ) (1991) (“defendant in a criminal action has ‘the right to the effective assistance of counsel, not the right to the assistance of counsel satisfactory to the defendant.’ ”). | 3 | 3 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2021Volkova raises this challenge specifically with regard to the statement she made on November 3, 2015 to Detective John Cleland rules for testing the believability of witnesses and decide what weight should be given to any or all of that evidence. 5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 6 Volkova argues that the trial court should have included the following language in its charge: If you find that the statement was made while in custody and as a result of police questioning, you must also determine whether the defendant was advised of his/her constitution 2010Heard contends that the trial court erroneously admitted his custodial statements, because the State failed to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). | 2 | 5 |
Bedford v. Stategreen2 sentences2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f 2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f | 2 | 2 |
Murray v. Stategreen2 sentences2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f 2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f | 2 | 2 |
State v. McBridegreen2 sentences2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f 2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f | 2 | 2 |
Rowland v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 (738 SE2d 74) (2013). 10 some degree, “the [detective’s] testimony and the recorded interview indicate that . . . [Huffman’s] mind was nevertheless clear enough to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and to speak to the [detective] without an attorney.” Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59, 64 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019). 2021See Butler v. State, 292 Ga. 400, 404 (2) n.7 (738 SE2d 74) (2013). 10 some degree, “the [detective’s] testimony and the recorded interview indicate that . . . [Huffman’s] mind was nevertheless clear enough to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights and to speak to the [detective] without an attorney.” Rowland v. State, 306 Ga. 59, 64 (2) (829 SE2d 81) (2019). | 2 | 2 |
Raines v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Given the significant problems Stewart faced trying to represent himself, we cannot conclude that Stewart’s convictions were “independent of his decision to represent himself,” Raines v. State, 242 Ga. App. 727, 730 (1) ( 531 SE2d 158 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted) , and so the trial court’s failure to ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 17 Given these conclusions, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial.3 When the case returns to the trial court, Stewart may choose to be represented by cou 2021Given the significant problems Stewart faced trying to represent himself, we cannot conclude that Stewart’s convictions were “independent of his decision to represent himself,” Raines v. State, 242 Ga. App. 727, 730 (1) ( 531 SE2d 158 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted) , and so the trial court’s failure to ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 17 Given these conclusions, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and this case remanded for a new trial.3 When the case returns to the trial court, Stewart may choose to be represented by cou | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Jones , 294 Ga. App. at 170 (1), 670 S.E.2d 104 . *113 3. 2018See Jones , 294 Ga. App. at 170 (1), 670 S.E.2d 104 . *113 3. | 2 | 2 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Harris v. State, 269 Ga. App. 92, 93 (1) ( 603 SE2d 490 ) (2004). 2014See Harris v. State, 269 Ga. App. 92, 93 (1) ( 603 SE2d 490 ) (2004). | 2 | 2 |
Stevens v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Stevens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 563, 566 (2) ( 405 SE2d 713 ) (1991). 2014Stevens v. State, 199 Ga. App. 563, 566 (2) ( 405 SE2d 713 ) (1991). | 2 | 2 |
Salinas-Gomez v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Salinas-Gomez v. State, 287 Ga. App. 384, 386 (1) ( 651 SE2d 501 ) (2007). 2013Salinas-Gomez v. State, 287 Ga. App. 384, 386 (1) ( 651 SE2d 501 ) (2007). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal *766 request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. 10 Id. at 461-462 (II). 2008We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests [that they cease to do so]. *200 Davis v. United States, supra at 461 (II). | 2 | 2 |
Hasty v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In Hasty v. State, 213 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 445 SE2d 836 ) (1994), there was also “no evidence indicating that failure to file a timely appeal rested with defendant after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights of appeal.” Id. 2006In Hasty v. State, 213 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 445 SE2d 836 ) (1994), there was also “no evidence indicating that failure to file a timely appeal rested with defendant after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights of appeal.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Reinhardt v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115 (3)(b), 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993). 1997Reinhardt v. State, 263 Ga. 113, 115 (3)(b), 428 S.E.2d 333 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Riley v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Riley v. State, 237 Ga. at 128 . 1993Whether a juvenile has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights depends on the totality of the circumstances, with consideration given to nine specific factors. 2 Id. at 128 . | 1 | 4 |
Norris v. Stategreen2 sentences2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f 2010Even where, as here, a juvenile is involved, the question of whether there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding a police interrogation. [Cits.] “Among the factors to be considered are the accused’s age and education; his knowledge of the charge and his constitutional rights; his ability to consult with family, friends, or an attorney; the length, method, and time of the interrogation; and whether he previously had refused to give a statement *557 or repudiated the statement later. [Cits.] On appeal, we accept the | 1 | 2 |
McKoon v. Stategreen2 sentences2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f 2018McKoon v. State , 266 Ga. 149 , 150, 465 S.E.2d 272 (1996). | 1 | 2 |
Oregon v. Elstadgreen2 sentences2021He argues that his confession was therefore inadmissible under former OCGA § 24-3-50 (“To make a confession admissible, it must 5 See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 317 (III) ( 105 SCt 1285 , 84 LE2d 222) (1985) (discussing the absence of precedent that “the sine qua non for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent is a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from the nature and the quality of the evidence in the case”); United States v. Farley, 607 F3d 1294, 1328-1329 (III) (C) (1) (11th Cir. 2010) (“Generally, courts have held statements i 2021He argues that his confession was therefore inadmissible under former OCGA § 24-3-50 (“To make a confession admissible, it must 5 See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 317 (III) ( 105 SCt 1285 , 84 LE2d 222) (1985) (discussing the absence of precedent that “the sine qua non for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent is a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from the nature and the quality of the evidence in the case”); United States v. Farley, 607 F3d 1294, 1328-1329 (III) (C) (1) (11th Cir. 2010) (“Generally, courts have held statements i | 1 | 2 |
McDaniel v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See McDaniel, 327 Ga. App. at 682 (1) (c). 2019In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court expressly found that "the totality of the record demonstrates that [Rutledge] made this decision freely, voluntarily, and intelligently." This Court has held that "a trial court's determination of a knowing and voluntary waiver within an order denying a motion for new trial qualifies as a finding on the record." McDaniel v. State , 327 Ga. App. 673 , 675 (a), 761 S.E.2d 82 (2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Philmore v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The Court held that, in ruling that the defendant had freely and voluntarily made the incriminating statement, the trial court was authorized to base its ruling solely on the testimony and credibility of the officer who testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing.); Philmore v. State , 263 Ga. 67 , 68 (2), 428 S.E.2d 329 (1993) (The Court ruled that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant gave a voluntary statement and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, even though the defendant had used crack cocaine and may have still been under the drug's effect 2018The Court held that, in ruling that the defendant had freely and voluntarily made the incriminating statement, the trial court was authorized to base its ruling solely on the testimony and credibility of the officer who testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing.); Philmore v. State , 263 Ga. 67 , 68 (2), 428 S.E.2d 329 (1993) (The Court ruled that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant gave a voluntary statement and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, even though the defendant had used crack cocaine and may have still been under the drug's effect | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013And in Jackson, supra, the record showed only an oral waiver by counsel with no additional supporting facts, and we held that “[t]he record’s silence prevents the [S]tate from meeting its burden of demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver.” 253 Ga. App. at 560 . 2011Jackson v. State, 253 Ga. App. 559, 560 ( 560 SE2d 62 ) (2002). | 1 | 2 |
Kirkland v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Here, as in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357 (1) ( 414 SE2d 502 ) (1991), the record does not “show a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 1997Here, as in Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 356, 357 (1) ( 414 SE2d 502 ) (1991), the record does not “show a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. | 1 | 2 |
| Brooks v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oubre v. Woldemichaelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gilliam v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| James v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Stategreen1 sentence2023W. v. State, 256 Ga. 464, 467 ( 349 SE2d 713 ) (1986) (saying that in Riley, we held that the question of waiver “depends on the totality of the circumstances to be analyzed by a consideration of nine factors” and then listing the Riley factors) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. McBride, 261 Ga. 60, 63 ( 401 SE2d 484 ) (1991) (mentioning that the trial court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether the juvenile defendants waived their rights under Miranda, but saying that “[i]n determining this issue nine factors are to be considered” and listing the Riley f | 1 | 1 |
| Nhek v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Green v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| JEW v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nashgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Powellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Burtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seitman v. State
green
2 sentences2018"While a colloquy with the trial court may establish a knowing and voluntary waiver, it is not required when the State presents other extrinsic evidence sufficient to establish a waiver." Seitman , 320 Ga. App. at 649 , 740 S.E.2d 368 . 2018"While a colloquy with the trial court may establish a knowing and voluntary waiver, it is not required when the State presents other extrinsic evidence sufficient to establish a waiver." Seitman , 320 Ga. App. at 649 , 740 S.E.2d 368 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences2009Johnson, R J., and Barnes, J., concur. 1 The state also brought charges of child molestation and cruelty to a child, but they were dead docketed. 2 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). 3 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). 4 268 Ga. 108 ( 485 SE2d 492 ) (1997). 5 “To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” 6 Ritter, supra at 110 (1). 7 Id. at 111 . 8 See Pittman v. State, 277 Ga. 475, 477-478 (2) ( 592 SE2d 1983These statements were admitted after a Jackson v. Denno hearing (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908)) in which testimony was offered by the officers that the defendants were advised of their Miranda rights and then made a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights; and a specific finding was then made by the court with reference to that hearing that the statements had been freely and voluntarily given. | 2 | 1983–2009 |
In Re Ama
green
2 sentences2007Regardless of the juvenile court’s understandable frustration with the father’s lack of initiative and its concern about wasting public funds by continuing the hearing, the court was required “to exercise its affirmative duty of determining on the record whether [the father] exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to retain . . . counsel” or “whether the absence of an attorney was attributable to reasons beyond [his] control.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. 4 With due regard to the juvenile court’s opportunity to judge the father’s credibility, we find the record insufficient to justify a findi 2007Regardless of the juvenile court's understandable frustration with the father's lack of initiative and its concern about wasting public funds by continuing the hearing, the court was required "to exercise its affirmative duty of determining on the record whether [the father] exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to retain . . . counsel" or "whether the absence of an attorney was *641 attributable to reasons beyond [his] control." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. [4] With due regard to the juvenile court's opportunity to judge the father's credibility, we find the record insufficient to justify | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Lester v. State green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In re Pak green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| MARTIN-ARGAW v. the STATE. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Mincey v. Arizona green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Brockman v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Sanders v. State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In the Interest of R. J. C. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Haywood v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Ritter green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.