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32 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1973–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015The Commonwealth contends that the defendant validly waived the Miranda rights on June 28 and that Haley was entitled to continue questioning where the defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. “[Ajfter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 285 (2012), quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). 2014Next, we consider the defendant’s argument that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during his interrogation after what he claims to have been an invocation of his right to remain silent. 13 Prior to any custodial questioning, a defendant must be warned, among other things, “that he has the right to remain silent.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney,” Davis v. United States, | 5 | 6 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2014Next, we consider the defendant’s argument that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during his interrogation after what he claims to have been an invocation of his right to remain silent. 13 Prior to any custodial questioning, a defendant must be warned, among other things, “that he has the right to remain silent.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney,” Davis v. United States, 2006This court has addressed this issue in criminal proceedings, where defendants intended to offer expert testimony in support of a defense of lack of criminal responsibility, a claim that mental impairment affected the ability to form the requisite intent, or that a mental disability precluded a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights subject to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and subsequent confession. | 3 | 7 |
Ciummei v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997The bright line rule earlier set forth in Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509-511 (1979), requiring both a colloquy and a written waiver in order to evidence a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to trial by jury, was not satisfied by the postconviction colloquy conducted by the trial judge in Pavao . 1991The testimony of the defendant, together with the closing statements of her counsel that she “had admitted to some of the charges” and “she’s not even contesting it,” can neither be considered a knowing and voluntary waiver of a jury trial, see Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509-510 (1979); Commonwealth v. Smith, 403 Mass. 489, 493 (1988), nor a guilty plea, see Commonwealth v. Duquette, 386 Mass. 834, 841-842 (1982). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Yardley Y.green1 sentence2024See Yardley Y., 464 Mass. at 230 n.11 (although "special caution" is required "when reviewing juvenile's decision to waive a right," "we defer to the judge who bears the responsibility to ensure the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver"). 27 For these reasons, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise err in denying the juvenile's motion to withdraw guilty plea. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. a Juvenilegreen1 sentence2020This court held in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 133-134 (1983), that juveniles undergoing interrogation by the police were entitled to the presence of an "interested adult" who would offset the inherent imbalance present during police and juvenile interactions. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Lewis , 399 Mass. 761 , 763-764, 506 N.E.2d 891 (1987). 2018See Commonwealth v. Lewis , 399 Mass. 761 , 763-764, 506 N.E.2d 891 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sayyidgreen1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Sayyid , 86 Mass. App. Ct. 479 , 489 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Morgantigreen1 sentence2015“To invoke the right to counsel, ‘the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.’ ” Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 396-397 (2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 (2014), quoting Davis, supra at 459 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Santosgreen1 sentence2015The Commonwealth contends that the defendant validly waived the Miranda rights on June 28 and that Haley was entitled to continue questioning where the defendant did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. “[Ajfter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 285 (2012), quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ortizgreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 435 Mass. 569, 577 (2002) (defendant may make valid oral waiver). | 1 | 1 |
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen1 sentence2014See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 387-388 (2010) (“Any waiver, express or implied, may be contradicted by an invocation at any time”). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen1 sentence2014Next, we consider the defendant’s argument that the motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during his interrogation after what he claims to have been an invocation of his right to remain silent. 13 Prior to any custodial questioning, a defendant must be warned, among other things, “that he has the right to remain silent.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney,” Davis v. United States, | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Quinonesgreen1 sentence2013Commonwealth v. Quinones, 414 Mass. 423, 431 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Leahygreen1 sentence2012In Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 488-489 (2005), the defendant’s post-waiver statement, “Not right now, in a minute. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Downeygreen1 sentence2010See also Commonwealth v. Downey, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 599-600 (2003) (remanding for hearing into whether there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of attorney-client privilege where defendant’s assent “possible” and “record is silent on the topic”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Woodardgreen1 sentence2009See also United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 106 (1st Cir. 2002) (it is “well-established” that it is within discretion of judge “to force a defendant to choose between proceeding to trial with an unwanted attorney and representing herself” [emphasis added]); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983) (“persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel ... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gray Moore, Jr.green1 sentence2009See also United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 106 (1st Cir. 2002) (it is “well-established” that it is within discretion of judge “to force a defendant to choose between proceeding to trial with an unwanted attorney and representing herself” [emphasis added]); United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1983) (“persistent, unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel ... is the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel”). | 1 | 1 |
Montanio v. Farwell, Wardengreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 351-355 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 23-26 (2001); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 828-830 (2000); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Diazgreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 351-355 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 23-26 (2001); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 828-830 (2000); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Ostrandergreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 351-355 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 23-26 (2001); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 828-830 (2000); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Contosgreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 351-355 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 23-26 (2001); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 828-830 (2000); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Blaisdell v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2006See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 351-355 , cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Contos, 435 Mass. 19, 23-26 (2001); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431 Mass. 822, 828-830 (2000); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. LeBlancgreen | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lambgreen1 sentence2003See G.L.c. 233, §20B; Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 270 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mageegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Meehangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Massachusetts v. Meehangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William Henry Taylor A/K/A Baldy Briley A/K/A William Briley Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Duquettered | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Hoseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Kasper Alexander, Robert Jones, Milford Davis, Milford Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Quarles
green
1 sentence2018The judge further ruled that in any event, the Miranda requirement did not apply to either interview because both fell within the public safety exception, as articulated in New York v. Quarles , 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ( Quarles ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Barnes
green
1 sentence2018Although there is no specific series of questions that a judge must ask to establish an adequate basis for a finding that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, see Commonwealth v. Barnes , 399 Mass. 385 , 390 (1987), in the present case the inquiry by the sentencing judge was woefully inadequate. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Garrity v. Conservation Commission
green
1 sentence2017That no one had thought to listen to the recording of the meeting does not mean the recording or the memory it might have prompted became "newly discovered evidence." Further, even if we were to treat the affidavit as "newly discovered evidence" and consider the waiver argument despite the commission's failure to cite Garrity v. Conservation Commn. of Hingham , 462 Mass. 779 , 787 (2012), to the motion judge, it is quite clear that the plaintiff's agent's inquiry as to when the decision could be picked up, without more, is not a knowing and voluntary waiver of the plaintiff's right to receive | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Hoose
green
1 sentence2016We have conducted our own “independent review of the judge’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found,” id. at 400 , including a review of all the video recordings and the translations of those recordings, and we conclude that in the totality of the circumstances, the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights on May 17, and that his statement of May 17, which included a piecemeal unfolding of his involvement in the crime, was given voluntarily. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Morganti
green
1 sentence2015“To invoke the right to counsel, ‘the suspect must unambiguously request counsel.’ ” Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 396-397 (2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 (2014), quoting Davis, supra at 459 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Hoyt
green
1 sentence2012This post-waiver test requires that the invocation be a sufficiently clear statement such ‘that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.’ ” Hoyt, supra at 149-150 , quoting from Davis, supra at 459 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Commonwealth v. Robidoux
green
1 sentence2012Moreover, a suspect’s unwillingness to answer questions on a particular topic does not unambiguously indicate that the suspect is unwilling to continue speaking with police or obligate them to inquire whether the suspect would “like to reassert his right to silence.” See Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144 , 161 n.7 (2007). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Commonwealth v. Rosario green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Brant green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Silver Creek Packing Co. v. Marshall green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Jackson green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Tavares green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.