knowing and voluntary waiver in District of Columbia

11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

Case	Followed	Cited
Cassandra Lynn Hayes v. United Statesgreen dc · 2015 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 1 sentence 2024Moreover, there is a further question on this record whether Staton, in his medically 26 Young, 143 A.3d at 759 . 27 Carter, 684 A.2d at 342; see also, e.g., Hayes v. United States, 109 A.3d 1110, 1112, 1116-18 (D.C. 2015) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the prosecution did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant use immunity to a witness “after finding potential for perjury during a debriefing procedure pursuant to Carter”). 30 compromised state, could have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights even had he been inclined to do so. 28 For these r	1	1
Jones v. United Statesgreen dc · 2000 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 1 sentence 2003We sustained as reasonable the Director’s conclusion that 1991 changes in the statutory language of § 32-1503(a-1)’s predecessor eliminated any requirement of notice (or of a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights) before receipt of payments elsewhere bars compensation here — changes that effectuated the legislature’s intent to “decrease the costs of doing business in the District by extending and broadening the bar against the injured worker recovering benefits in more than one jurisdiction for the same injury.” Springer, supra note 4, 743 A.2d at 1222 (emphasis added) (quoting Director’s dec	1	1
K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Companygreen ca6 · 1985 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 1 sentence 2002Co., 757 F.2d at 756 (citations omitted).	1	1
Cowan v. United Statesgreen dc · 1988 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998See Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; Cowan v. United States, 547 A.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C.1988) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ). 1998See Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; Cowan v. United States, 547 A.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C.1988) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ).	1	1
Oregon v. Elstadgreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998See Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; Cowan v. United States, 547 A.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C.1988) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ). 1998See Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at 318 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ; Cowan v. United States, 547 A.2d 1011, 1015 (D.C.1988) (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 ).	1	1
Martinez v. United Statesgreen dc · 1989 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993 2 sentences 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest “in promoting truth at trial” justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson. 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest "in promoting truth at trial" justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson.	1	1
Culberson v. Stategreen miss · 1982 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. [13] We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, [14] that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. [15] See LaVigne v. Alaska, 679 supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the "only cl 1991*If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. 13 We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, 14 that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. 15 See LaVigne v. Alaska, supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the “only clear way to	1	1
United States v. Bruce Ernest Bernloehrgreen ca8 · 1987 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (discussing defendant's waiver of right to trial by jury, right to confront accusers, and right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing defendant's waiver of right to counsel). 1991United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to trial by jury, right to confront accusers, and right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to counsel).	1	1
LaVigne v. Stategreen alaskactapp · 1990 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991 2 sentences 1991If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. [13] We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, [14] that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. [15] See LaVigne v. Alaska, 679 supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the "only cl 1991*If the trial judge finds that Boyd did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver, then she is entitled to a new trial. 13 We take this occasion, however, to advise the trial court and the Bar, 14 that while we do not today hold that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to inquire of a non-testifying defendant before the defendant rests whether the defendant has waived the right to testify, it behooves the trial court to make such an on-the-record inquiry in order to avoid issues on appeal and collateral attacks. 15 See LaVigne v. Alaska, supra, 788 P.2d at 54-55 (the “only clear way to	1	1
Miranda v. Arizonagreen scotus · 1966 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981 2 sentences 1981See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 1981See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

Case	Cited	Years
KEVIN YOUNG v. UNITED STATES green dc · 2016 1 sentence 2024Moreover, there is a further question on this record whether Staton, in his medically 26 Young, 143 A.3d at 759 . 27 Carter, 684 A.2d at 342; see also, e.g., Hayes v. United States, 109 A.3d 1110, 1112, 1116-18 (D.C. 2015) (affirming the trial court’s finding that the prosecution did not abuse its discretion when it declined to grant use immunity to a witness “after finding potential for perjury during a debriefing procedure pursuant to Carter”). 30 compromised state, could have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights even had he been inclined to do so. 28 For these r	1	2024–2024
Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., Inc. green dc · 1982 1 sentence 2011Cf. Cobb, 453 A.2d at 111 .	1	2011–2011
Michigan v. Harvey green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 1993Both parties agree that the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 354 , 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1182 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) left open the issue of impeachment use of a statement taken in violation of the "core" Sixth Amendment right to counsel, i.e., "the admissibility for impeachment purposes of a voluntary statement obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel." Appellant's Brief, p. 30; Appellee's Brief, p. 37. 1993Both parties agree that the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 354 , 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1182 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990) left open the issue of impeachment use of a statement taken in violation of the "core" Sixth Amendment right to counsel, i.e., "the admissibility for impeachment purposes of a voluntary statement obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel." Appellant's Brief, p. 30; Appellee's Brief, p. 37.	1	1993–1993
Boyd v. United States green dc · 1991 2 sentences 1993Appellant also contends that he is entitled to a hearing before the trial judge in order for the judge to determine whether he "made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to testify." Specifically, appellant claims that Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670 (D.C.1991), requires that a trial judge engage in an on-the-record colloquy with a non-testifying defendant in order to ensure that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify. 1993Appellant also contends that he is entitled to a hearing before the trial judge in order for the judge to determine whether he “made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to testify.” Specifically, appellant claims that Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670 (D.C.1991), requires that a trial judge engage in an on-the-record colloquy with a non-testifying defendant in order to ensure that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify.	1	1993–1993
Martinez v. United States green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest “in promoting truth at trial” justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson. 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest "in promoting truth at trial" justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson.	1	1993–1993
Jones v. Office of Personnel Management green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest “in promoting truth at trial” justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson. 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest "in promoting truth at trial" justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson.	1	1993–1993
Manns v. United States green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest “in promoting truth at trial” justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson. 1993The government nevertheless makes a vigorous argument here, in purported reliance upon Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1059 (D.C.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 , 111 S.Ct. 685 , 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991), that the case before us only involves the violation of a prophylactic rule and therefore a compelling interest "in promoting truth at trial" justified the admissibility for impeachment purposes of the pretrial statements taken from Mr. Simpson.	1	1993–1993
Johnson v. Zerbst green scotus · 1938 2 sentences 1991United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to trial by jury, right to confront accusers, and right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to counsel). 1991United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to trial by jury, right to confront accusers, and right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to counsel).	1	1991–1991
Boykin v. Alabama green scotus · 1969 2 sentences 1991United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to trial by jury, right to confront accusers, and right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to counsel). 1991United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-12 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to trial by jury, right to confront accusers, and right against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing defendant’s waiver of right to counsel).	1	1991–1991
Brewer v. Williams green scotus · 1977 2 sentences 1978As Mr. Justice Powell made clear in his concurrence, the Court was not disposed to find a valid waiver where the incriminating statement had been elicited by “interrogation.” He concluded that “as both federal courts below found, . there was no evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to have counsel present beyond the fact that Williams ultimately confessed.” Id., at 412 , 97 S.Ct. at 1246 . 1978As Mr. Justice Powell made clear in his concurrence, the Court was not disposed to find a valid waiver where the incriminating statement had been elicited by “interrogation.” He concluded that “as both federal courts below found, . there was no evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to have counsel present beyond the fact that Williams ultimately confessed.” Id., at 412 , 97 S.Ct. at 1246 .	1	1978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

DC § D.C. Code § 22-2403 (3) DC § D.C. Code § 23-110 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 139 (1974–2026) CA 118 (1980–2026) LA 110 (1981–2025) IL 85 (1975–2026) GA 77 (1979–2023) IN 65 (1972–2020) PA 55 (1969–2025) MD 54 (1965–2026) TX 54 (1979–2026) NJ 53 (1988–2026) FL 50 (1978–2025) SC 43 (1992–2025) MS 43 (1984–2025) OH 41 (1989–2026) WA 40 (1977–2025) OR 38 (1978–2026) TN 37 (1993–2026) CT 32 (1972–2025) MA 32 (1973–2024) NC 30 (1977–2024) KS 25 (1992–2026) WI 25 (1979–2026) HI 23 (1992–2025) MO 22 (1980–2023) OK 21 (1982–2023) UT 20 (1989–2024) VA 19 (1991–2024) ID 19 (2000–2022) IA 18 (2002–2024) MI 17 (1982–2025) NM 16 (1981–2020) AR 13 (2002–2015) SD 12 (1987–2019) DC 11 (1978–2024) AL 11 (1972–2013) AZ 11 (1973–2023) DE 10 (1978–2026) KY 9 (1995–2026) NE 9 (1999–2025) MT 8 (1995–2025) NV 7 (1987–2025) WY 7 (1986–2021) VT 7 (1994–2021) AK 6 (1987–2020) RI 6 (1974–2011) MN 6 (1988–2015) ME 5 (1979–2003) NH 5 (2001–2018) CO 4 (1995–2014) ND 4 (1997–2021) WV 3 (1982–1993)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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