knowing and voluntary waiver in Maryland

2013Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32 , 590 A.2d 550, 551-52 (1991) (ordering a new trial where the record did not indicate that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver); Martinez, 309 Md. at 136 , 522 A.2d at 956 (ordering a new trial when the record did not indicate that the waiver was voluntary).

2013Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32 , 590 A.2d 550, 551-52 (1991) (ordering a new trial where the record did not indicate that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver); Martinez, 309 Md. at 136 , 522 A.2d at 956 (ordering a new trial when the record did not indicate that the waiver was voluntary).

2025Other rights that may be waived only by a knowing and voluntary waiver include the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149-52 (2011), the right to decide whether to plead guilty, Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962), and the right to appeal, Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237, 240-48 (1985).

2020Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 161 (2011) (citing Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153 (1979) (emphasis added).

2025Other rights that may be waived only by a knowing and voluntary waiver include the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149-52 (2011), the right to decide whether to plead guilty, Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962), and the right to appeal, Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237, 240-48 (1985).

2015See, e.g., Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237 , 498 A.2d 632 (1985) ("[T]he better rule is to hold the defendant to the knowing and voluntary waiver which he made.

2023See Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 321 (2006) (defendant’s waiver of a jury trial was knowing and voluntary because his behavior did not indicate that he had been coerced or forced, and his defense counsel had advised him about his right to a jury trial prior to the waiver); Hall, 321 Md. at 183–84 (“defendant’s demeanor, tone, facial expressions, gestures, or other indicia . . . may be indicative of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right.”).

2013See Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 317 , 893 A.2d 1018, 1034 (2006) (citing Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124 , 133 n. 9, 522 A.2d 950 , 954 n. 9 (1987)).

2026CP § 7-106(b). 15 When interpreting a similar statutory provision,8 the Supreme Court of Maryland in Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132 (1978), explained that the core rights protected were those subject to the knowing and voluntary waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),9 and its progeny.

2026The claims “alleging a violation of a right so fundamental [as to be] governed by the knowing and voluntary waiver standard of Johnson v. Zerbst” are subject to a rebuttable presumption of waiver “if not raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Id. (citing 12 Hunt’s original death sentence had been vacated, and a second jury had subsequently reimposed the death penalty.

2010Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 377-80 , 825 A.2d 1055, 1063 (2003).” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 316 , 893 A.2d 1018, 1033-34 (2006)(footnote omitted); see also Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 183 , 522 A.2d 950, 954 (1987) (“The election to waive a jury trial may be made at any time before commencement of the trial.”).

2010Smith v. State, 375 Md. 365, 377-80 , 825 A.2d 1055, 1063 (2003).” Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 316 , 893 A.2d 1018, 1033-34 (2006)(footnote omitted); see also Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 183 , 522 A.2d 950, 954 (1987) (“The election to waive a jury trial may be made at any time before commencement of the trial.”).

2006Baker, 367 Md. at 690 , 790 A.2d at 654 (Citation omitted); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 262 , 582 A.2d 794, 801 (1990). 19 When examining whether a defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver, the court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the court’s colloquy with the defendant.

2006Baker, 367 Md. at 690 , 790 A.2d at 654 (Citation omitted); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 262 , 582 A.2d 794, 801 (1990). 19 When examining whether a defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver, the court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the court’s colloquy with the defendant.

1991Quoting from the case of State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash.App. 380, 397-98 , 568 P.2d 808, 818 (1977), the Barnett Court then held: [W]hen a criminal defendant is present at arraignment, enters a plea, receives actual notice of the time, date and *63 place of the trial, deliberately absconds without a compelling reason, is represented by counsel at trial, and never offers a satisfactory explanation for his absence, a trial court may find such actions on the part of a defendant to amount to a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to be present and may conduct the trial in his absence.

1991Quoting from the case of State v. LaBelle, 18 Wash.App. 380, 397-98 , 568 P.2d 808, 818 (1977), the Barnett Court then held: [W]hen a criminal defendant is present at arraignment, enters a plea, receives actual notice of the time, date and *63 place of the trial, deliberately absconds without a compelling reason, is represented by counsel at trial, and never offers a satisfactory explanation for his absence, a trial court may find such actions on the part of a defendant to amount to a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to be present and may conduct the trial in his absence.

2011The Davis Court’s holding is expressed as follows: “We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect *491 clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .

2011The Davis Court’s holding is expressed as follows: “We therefore hold that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect *491 clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 .

2014By adding the phrase, “the court determines and announces on the record,” the Court clearly directed circuit court judges to make an explicit determination of a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver, or lack thereof, on the record. 431 Md. at 561-62 , 66 A.3d at 666-67 (footnote omitted).

2014By adding the phrase, “the court determines and announces on the record,” the Court clearly directed circuit court judges to make an explicit determination of a defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver, or lack thereof, on the record. 431 Md. at 561-62 , 66 A.3d at 666-67 (footnote omitted).

2013Therefore, trial courts are encouraged to “engage persons electing court trials in a dialogue as detailed as time, resources and circumstances permit so as to insulate jury trial waivers from successful direct or collateral attack.” Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 236 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1224 (1981).

2013Therefore, trial courts are encouraged to “engage persons electing court trials in a dialogue as detailed as time, resources and circumstances permit so as to insulate jury trial waivers from successful direct or collateral attack.” Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 236 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1224 (1981).

2013Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32 , 590 A.2d 550, 551-52 (1991) (ordering a new trial where the record did not indicate that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver); Martinez, 309 Md. at 136 , 522 A.2d at 956 (ordering a new trial when the record did not indicate that the waiver was voluntary).

2013Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32 , 590 A.2d 550, 551-52 (1991) (ordering a new trial where the record did not indicate that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver); Martinez, 309 Md. at 136 , 522 A.2d at 956 (ordering a new trial when the record did not indicate that the waiver was voluntary).

2006We reiterated that encouragement in Hall , in light of our recognition "that the cold record before us does not reflect a defendant’s demeanor, tone, facial expressions, gestures, or other indicia which, to a trial judge, may be indicative of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right.” Id. at 183-84 , 582 A.2d at 510 .

2006We reiterated that encouragement in Hall , in light of our recognition 'that the cold record before us does not reflect a defendant’s demeanor, tone, facial expressions, gestures, or other indicia which, to a trial judge, may be indicative of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the jury trial right.' ” Id. at 183-84 , 582 A.2d at 510 . .

2018But he ignores that trial counsel had affirmatively waived that freestanding claim of structural error by agreeing to the closure of the courtroom, as the postconviction court correctly recognized. 10 See Curtis v. State , 284 Md. 132 , 147, 395 A.2d 464 (1978) (observing that a "defendant may forego a broad spectrum of rights [indeed, all rights that do not require a knowing and voluntary waiver] which are deemed to fall within the category of tactical decisions by counsel or involve procedural defaults"); accord State v. Rose , 345 Md. 238 , 248-50, 691 A.2d 1314 (1997) (holding that a claim

2018But he ignores that trial counsel had affirmatively waived that freestanding claim of structural error by agreeing to the closure of the courtroom, as the postconviction court correctly recognized. 10 See Curtis v. State , 284 Md. 132 , 147, 395 A.2d 464 (1978) (observing that a "defendant may forego a broad spectrum of rights [indeed, all rights that do not require a knowing and voluntary waiver] which are deemed to fall within the category of tactical decisions by counsel or involve procedural defaults"); accord State v. Rose , 345 Md. 238 , 248-50, 691 A.2d 1314 (1997) (holding that a claim

2015See id. at 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 .

2015See id. at 242-43 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 .

1998See Walker, 338 Md. at 256, 259-61 , 658 A.2d at 240, 242 ; Barnett, 307 Md. at 207, 213 , 512 A.2d at 1077-78, 1080-81 ; see also Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1209 .

1998See Walker, 338 Md. at 256, 259-61 , 658 A.2d at 240, 242 ; Barnett, 307 Md. at 207, 213 , 512 A.2d at 1077-78, 1080-81 ; see also Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1209 .

1998See Walker, 338 Md. at 256, 259-61 , 658 A.2d at 240, 242 ; Barnett, 307 Md. at 207, 213 , 512 A.2d at 1077-78, 1080-81 ; see also Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1209 .

1998See Walker, 338 Md. at 256, 259-61 , 658 A.2d at 240, 242 ; Barnett, 307 Md. at 207, 213 , 512 A.2d at 1077-78, 1080-81 ; see also Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1209 .

1997As this Court explained in Suggs v. State, 52 Md.App. 287, 449 A.2d 424 (1982), the change in the rule was intended to “relax the requirement of the strict litany found in Countess , while, at the same time, assuring the defendant’s right to a knowing and voluntary waiver.” Id. at 291, 449 A.2d 424 .

1997As this Court explained in Suggs v. State, 52 Md.App. 287, 449 A.2d 424 (1982), the change in the rule was intended to “relax the requirement of the strict litany found in Countess , while, at the same time, assuring the defendant’s right to a knowing and voluntary waiver.” Id. at 291, 449 A.2d 424 .

2026Had the knowing and voluntary standard applied, Mr. Robb, on this record, has not rebutted the presumption that his waiver of trial rights was not knowing and voluntary under CP § 7-106(b)(1)(i)(3) because he failed to perfect a direct appeal. 24 v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 299-303 (2017); Ramirez, 464 Md. at 541 , 573 & n.11; Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356-57 (2017).

2026Had the knowing and voluntary standard applied, Mr. Robb, on this record, has not rebutted the presumption that his waiver of trial rights was not knowing and voluntary under CP § 7-106(b)(1)(i)(3) because he failed to perfect a direct appeal. 24 v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 299-303 (2017); Ramirez, 464 Md. at 541 , 573 & n.11; Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356-57 (2017).