knowing and voluntary waiver in Connecticut

2007“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the *600 record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the *600 record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the *600 record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the *600 record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the *600 record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2006“Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 580 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2024The defendant argues that this court’s prior decisions in State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 641 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986), and State v. Golodner, 305 Conn. 330 , 359, 46 A.3d 71 (2012), require that a waiver of a criminal defendant’s rights under the statute of limitations be express, knowing, and volun- tary.

2024The defendant argues that this court’s prior decisions in State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 641 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986), and State v. Golodner, 305 Conn. 330 , 359, 46 A.3d 71 (2012), require that a waiver of a criminal defendant’s rights under the statute of limitations be express, knowing, and volun- tary.

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2007Although the issue of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver is ultimately factual, the usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified in this area by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 288 , 897 A.2d 554 (2006).

2007Although the issue of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver is ultimately factual, the usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified in this area by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas, 278 Conn. 267, 288 , 897 A.2d 554 (2006).

2007In considering the validity of a waiver, we look to the totality of the circumstances of the claimed waiver.....Although the issue of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver is ultimately factual, the usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified in this area by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613, 654 , 916 A.2d 17 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 868 , 128 S. Ct. 164 , 169 L.

2007In considering the validity of a waiver, we look to the totality of the circumstances of the claimed waiver.....Although the issue of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver is ultimately factual, the usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified in this area by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613, 654 , 916 A.2d 17 , cert. denied, 552 U.S. 868 , 128 S. Ct. 164 , 169 L.

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 14 ,0 0 Conn. 1 State v. Cooper by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 , 50–51, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 , 124 S. Ct. 1614 , 1

2025We affirm the judg- ment of the trial court. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2025We affirm the judg- ment of the trial court. 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2021Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andino, 173 Conn. App. 851, 861 , 162 A.3d 736 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is sup

2021Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andino, 173 Conn. App. 851, 861 , 162 A.3d 736 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is sup

2021Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andino, 173 Conn. App. 851, 861 , 162 A.3d 736 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is sup

2021Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andino, 173 Conn. App. 851, 861 , 162 A.3d 736 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is sup

2021Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andino, 173 Conn. App. 851, 861 , 162 A.3d 736 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is sup

2021Whether a purported waiver satisfies those requirements is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances of the particular case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andino, 173 Conn. App. 851, 861 , 162 A.3d 736 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 906 , 170 A.3d 3 (2017). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is sup

2017Moreover, the waiver must be accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone , 292 Conn. 187 , 207, 972 A.2d 666 (2009). 6 In the absence of a clear and unequivocal waiver of alimony in the premarital agreement, we decline to infer a knowing and voluntary waiver on the basis of the language contained in paragraph 5.13 of that agreement.

2017Moreover, the waiver must be accomplished with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perricone v. Perricone , 292 Conn. 187 , 207, 972 A.2d 666 (2009). 6 In the absence of a clear and unequivocal waiver of alimony in the premarital agreement, we decline to infer a knowing and voluntary waiver on the basis of the language contained in paragraph 5.13 of that agreement.

2016Ed. 2d 254 (2004). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evi- dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn. App. 591 , 599–600, 915 A.2d 327 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 , 919 A.2d 1037 (2007). ‘‘Moreover, an express written or oral statement of waiver of the right t

2016Ed. 2d 254 (2004). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evi- dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn. App. 591 , 599–600, 915 A.2d 327 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 , 919 A.2d 1037 (2007). ‘‘Moreover, an express written or oral statement of waiver of the right t

2016Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).

2016Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 , 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993).

2016Ed. 2d 254 (2004). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evi- dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn. App. 591 , 599–600, 915 A.2d 327 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 , 919 A.2d 1037 (2007). ‘‘Moreover, an express written or oral statement of waiver of the right t

2016Ed. 2d 254 (2004). ‘‘Although the issue [of whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver] is . . . ultimately factual, our usual deference to fact-finding by the trial court is qualified, on questions of this nature, by the necessity for a scru- pulous examination of the record to ascertain whether such a factual finding is supported by substantial evi- dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stephenson, 99 Conn. App. 591 , 599–600, 915 A.2d 327 , cert. denied, 282 Conn. 903 , 919 A.2d 1037 (2007). ‘‘Moreover, an express written or oral statement of waiver of the right t

2015Id.; cf. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 , 124 S. Ct. 1379 , 158 L.

2015Id.; cf. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 , 124 S. Ct. 1379 , 158 L.

2015The focus of a competency inquiry, by con- trast, is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceed- ings.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Ducharme, 134 Conn. App. 595, 599 , 39 A.3d 1183 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 905 , 44 A.3d 181 (2012). ‘‘We review the court’s determination of competency under an abuse of discretion standard.’’ Id., 600.

2015The focus of a competency inquiry, by con- trast, is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceed- ings.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Ducharme, 134 Conn. App. 595, 599 , 39 A.3d 1183 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 905 , 44 A.3d 181 (2012). ‘‘We review the court’s determination of competency under an abuse of discretion standard.’’ Id., 600.

2015The focus of a competency inquiry, by con- trast, is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceed- ings.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Ducharme, 134 Conn. App. 595, 599 , 39 A.3d 1183 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 905 , 44 A.3d 181 (2012). ‘‘We review the court’s determination of competency under an abuse of discretion standard.’’ Id., 600.

2015The focus of a competency inquiry, by con- trast, is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceed- ings.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State v. Ducharme, 134 Conn. App. 595, 599 , 39 A.3d 1183 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 905 , 44 A.3d 181 (2012). ‘‘We review the court’s determination of competency under an abuse of discretion standard.’’ Id., 600.

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make

2014State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 287 , 542 A.2d 299 (1988). ‘‘[I]n criminal matters involving defendants . . . subject to an enhanced sentence . . . a trial judge may properly determine the defendant’s prior conviction status only after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial by the defendant.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Velasco, supra, 253 Conn. 223–24; see also State v. Michael A., 297 Conn. 808 , 819–21, 1 A.3d 46 (2010) (defendant who pleads guilty to sentence enhancement under persistent felony offender statute, § 53a-40, nec- essarily waives right to have jury make