knowing and voluntary waiver in Texas

2025“In these circumstances, the judge has an independent duty to implement this right in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant.” 149 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 145 (trial judge has an independent duty to implement right to an interpreter when aware that defendant has problem understanding English, unless there is a knowing and voluntary waiver by defendant); Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 777 (citing Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 144–45, and applying duty to use of interpreter for material witness).

2007Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (“Such a conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.”) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134 , and Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609 ).

2007Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 ("Such a conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.") (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134 , and Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609 ).

2007Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (“Such a conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.”) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134 , and Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609 ).

2007The supreme court held that a contractual jury waiver provision that is conspicuous is “prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.” 8 Id. (citing Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609 ).

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). .

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2015Rather, we have found that the majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue have held that the public-trial right may be forfeited.8 In reaching that 5 See Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the federal habeas petitioner had not waived his public-trial complaint by failing to object because that right may be relinquished only upon showing of a knowing and voluntary waiver). 6 United States v. Gomez, 705 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2013); State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn. 2015); In re Coggin, 340 P.3d 810, 815 (Wash. 2014); State v. Cassano, 772 N.E.2d 81 , 9

2009First, a presumption against waiver would incorrectly place the initial burden of establishing a knowing and voluntary execution on Bank of America, which is inapposite to our burden-shifting rule as articulated in In re General Electric, 203 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.2006) (per curiam) (“[A] conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.”).

2007Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (“Such a conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.”) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134 , and Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609 ).

2009The Supreme Court has held that a waiver of the right to remain silent may be inferred from the actions and words of the suspect, and that "an explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary." North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1979).

2009The Supreme Court has held that a waiver of the right to remain silent may be inferred from the actions and words of the suspect, and that “an explicit statement of waiver is not invariably necessary.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1979).

2003See Ex parte Dickey , 543 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim.

2003See Ex parte Dickey, 543 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim.

2024A conspicuous jury waiver provision is “prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.” Bank of Am., 278 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Gen.

2021Instead, a “conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.” Id. (quoting In re Gen.

2024See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); TEX.

1997Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); U.S. Const, amends.

2026See Norton, 930 S.W.2d at 110 (record showing competent counsel who advised a strategy inconsistent with insanity defense and defendant’s agreement with that strategy shows a knowing and voluntary waiver of known rights).

2026See Norton, 930 S.W.2d at 110 (record showing competent counsel who advised a strategy inconsistent with insanity defense and defendant’s agreement with that strategy shows a knowing and voluntary waiver of known rights).

2025See Thacker v. State, No. 08-18-00085-CR, 2020 WL 1303555 , at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 19, 2020, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339 27 (holding that “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney, and declining “to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions” when a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel); see also Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339 (recognizing that “[t]o trigger law enforcement’s duty to termina

2025See Thacker v. State, No. 08-18-00085-CR, 2020 WL 1303555 , at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 19, 2020, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339 27 (holding that “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney, and declining “to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions” when a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel); see also Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339 (recognizing that “[t]o trigger law enforcement’s duty to termina