knowing and voluntary waiver in New Jersey

2020Additionally, the goal of the court's colloquy with a defendant is not to explore whether he possesses any particular "technical legal knowledge," State v. King, 210 N.J. 2, 19 (2012), and a defendant need not demonstrate "the skill and experience of a lawyer" before a knowing and voluntary waiver is found , Reddish, 181 N.J. at 595 .

2020Additionally, the goal of the court's colloquy with a defendant is not to explore whether he possesses any particular "technical legal knowledge," State v. King, 210 N.J. 2, 19 (2012), and a defendant need not demonstrate "the skill and experience of a lawyer" before a knowing and voluntary waiver is found.

2019Use of Defendant's Statement at Trial Defendant unsuccessfully moved pretrial to exclude his March 7, 2011, statement on the grounds that his agreement to speak to Brazofsky and Fisco without counsel present was not a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2019Use of Defendant's Statement at Trial Defendant unsuccessfully moved pretrial to exclude his March 7, 2011, statement on the grounds that his agreement to speak to Brazofsky and Fisco without counsel present was not a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

1999Our concern for “ ‘a reliable penalty determination’ ” has persuaded us that “a defendant in a capital case [may not] execute even a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.” Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 330, 548 A.2d 939 (quoting People v. Deere, 41 Cal.3d 353 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925, 931 (1985)). 3 In this case, however, the evidence put forward by the Public Defender contains at best some mitigation potential balanced by a concomitant and substantial damaging effect.

1999Our concern for “ ‘a reliable penalty determination’ ” has persuaded us that “a defendant in a capital case [may not] execute even a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.” Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 330, 548 A.2d 939 (quoting People v. Deere, 41 Cal.3d 353 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925, 931 (1985)). 3 In this case, however, the evidence put forward by the Public Defender contains at best some mitigation potential balanced by a concomitant and substantial damaging effect.

2026To reflect a mutual assent to arbitrate, the terms must be "sufficiently clear to place a[n] [individual] on notice that [they are] waiving a constitutional or statutory right . . . ." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 . "[A]lthough a waiver-of-rights provision need not 'list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights,' employees should at least know that they have 'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.'" Id. at 447 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ).

2026To reflect a mutual assent to arbitrate, the terms must be "sufficiently clear to place a[n] [individual] on notice that [they are] waiving a constitutional or statutory right . . . ." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 . "[A]lthough a waiver-of-rights provision need not 'list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights,' employees should at least know that they have 'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.'" Id. at 447 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ).

2026To reflect a mutual assent to arbitrate, the terms must be "sufficiently clear to place a[n] [individual] on notice that [they are] waiving a constitutional or statutory right . . . ." Atalese, 219 N.J. at 443 . "[A]lthough a waiver-of-rights provision need not 'list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights,' employees should at least know that they have 'agree[d] to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination.'" Id. at 447 (second alteration in original) (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ).

2024A-1368-23 18 cover the waiver of Law Against Discrimination (LAD) claims even when LAD was not expressly identified. 173 N.J. at 96 . 4 Accordingly, the Court explained we [do] not require a party to "refer specifically to the LAD or list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. . . ." Instead, we instructed that "a waiver-of- rights provision should at least provide that the employee agrees to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination." [Id. at 95 (quoting Garfinkel, 168 N.J. at 135 ).] Followin

2021Defendant correctly points out that this statement "informed [defendant] only that police wanted to talk to him about a homicide, not that he had in fact A-0437-18 11 already been charged with one." Defendant asserts that this is "precisely the type of incomplete disclosure that our Supreme Court found did not satisfy the requirement of a knowing and voluntary waiver in A.G.D." In A.G.D., the Court found that the detectives' explanation that they sought to interview the defendant about allegations of sexual abuse asserted against him, without specifying the charges, impeded the defendant's abi

2020Relying on A.G.D., Wade contends that he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right against self-incrimination because Maldonado and Petrazzuolo did not inform him of the nature of the charges against him or that he had been arrested. 178 N.J. 56 .

2020Additionally, the goal of the court's colloquy with a defendant is not to explore whether he possesses any particular "technical legal knowledge," State v. King, 210 N.J. 2, 19 (2012), and a defendant need not demonstrate "the skill and experience of a lawyer" before a knowing and voluntary waiver is found , Reddish, 181 N.J. at 595 .

2006See State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 587 , 859 A.2d 1173 (2004) (“A defendant may invoke the right to self-representation only if he makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.”); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509 , 608 A.2d 317 (1992) ("A defendant can exercise the right to self-representation only by first knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel.”) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173 , 104 S.Ct. 944, 948 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 130 (1984)).

2025Provided that the stipulation is a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, placed on the record in defendant's presence, the prosecution is limited to announcing to the jury that the defendant has committed an offense that satisfies the statutory predicate-offense element. [State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 488 (2018) (citations reformatted).] The jury heard not only "that the conviction admitted by defendant falls within the class of crimes" but needlessly learned the specific nature of the crimes and the dates of the offenses in direct contravention of established case law.

2021"Provided that the stipulation is a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, placed on the record in defendant's presence, the prosecution is limited to announcing to the jury that the defendant has committed an offense that satisfies the statutory predicate - offense element." Ibid. (emphasis added). 10 Our Evidence Rules provide that facts may be established by stipulation.

1997Justice O’Hern aptly reminded us that [w]hat is required at the capital sentencing stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime____ The record before us does not disclose how or whether the jury was informed of the essential information concerning the character of the defendant that should precede the jury’s judgment. [Koedatich, supra, 98 N.J. at 554 , 489 A.2d 659 (Order) (O’Hem, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] Thus, the Court concluded that “[i]t is self-evident that the state and its citizens ha

1997Justice O’Hern aptly reminded us that [w]hat is required at the capital sentencing stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime____ The record before us does not disclose how or whether the jury was informed of the essential information concerning the character of the defendant that should precede the jury’s judgment. [Koedatich, supra, 98 N.J. at 554 , 489 A.2d 659 (Order) (O’Hem, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).] Thus, the Court concluded that “[i]t is self-evident that the state and its citizens ha

2022The "'routine booking question' exception . . . exempts A-0537-19 26 from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.'" Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990); State v. Mallozzi, 246 N.J.

2022The "'routine booking question' exception . . . exempts A-0537-19 26 from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.'" Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990); State v. Mallozzi, 246 N.J.

2021R. 3:16(b); see Taimanglo, 403 N.J.

2021State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56, 68 (2003); see also State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 134 (2019).

2021In Faretta v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment affords defendants the right to represent themselves when the decision to do so is made knowingly and intelligently. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).

2019Without a realistic opportunity to understand the nature and scope of the particular issues to be addressed, a party cannot be said to have the requisite basis for making a knowing and voluntary waiver of available remedies for resolution of those issues." Ibid. (quoting Spolitback v. Cyr Corp., 295 N.J.

2018Defendant retained Johnson to explore the question of whether his mental state at the time of the offense supported a diminished capacity defense 3 and, further, rendered 3 As set forth in State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 160-61 (2016): A defendant may raise a diminished capacity defense if (1) he or she "has presented evidence of a mental disease or defect that interferes with cognitive ability sufficient to prevent or interfere with the formation of the requisite intent or mens rea[,]" and (2) "the record contains evidence that the claimed deficiency did affect the defendant's cognitive capacity

2017Looking at the totality of the circumstances and acknowledging that it was the State's burden to prove the statement's admissibility, the judge found "there is no reasonable doubt that would yield to the conclusion that this was nothing other than a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights." We review a trial judge's factual findings in support of granting or denying a motion to suppress to determine whether "those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014).

2014There’s no judge or jury, and review is limited, but an arbitrator can award the same damages and relief, and must honor the same limitations stated in the agreement as a court would. [Id. at 31, 992 A.2d 795 (emphasis omitted).] Martindale, Griffin, and Curtis show that, without difficulty and in different ways, the point can be made that by choosing arbitration one gives up the “time-honored right to sue.” See Garfinkel, supra, 168 N.J. at 135 , 773 A.2d 665 (declining to “suggest that a party need refer specifically to the [Law Against Discrimination] or list every imaginable statute by nam