ruling error (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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ruling error in Ohio

30 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1928–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

CaseFollowedCited
Allen King v. Eric Taylorgreen
ca6 · 2012 · cited in 2 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2023–2024
2 sentences

2024The federal courts have also applied this principle in cases like the present one: “Even where a defendant properly preserves [an insufficiency-of-service-of-process] defense [under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)] by including it in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on the defense at a later juncture through his conduct during the litigation.” King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir. 2012).

2024The federal courts have also applied this principle in cases like the present one: “Even where a defendant properly preserves [an insufficiency-of-service-of-process] defense [under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)] by including it in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on the defense at a later juncture through his conduct during the litigation.” King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir. 2012).

22
Johnson v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth.green
ohioctapp · 2021 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Another of plaintiff-appellee’s cases, Johnson v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 2021-Ohio-938, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.), stands for the proposition that “R.C. 2744.02(C) grants appellate courts jurisdiction to review a trial court order denying a motion for summary judgment based upon immunity.” Id. at ¶ 50.

11
Hungler v. City of Cincinnatigreen
ohio · 1986 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024A remand, however, “must be premised on a determination that error occurred below and a ruling on that error.” Hungler v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio St.3d 338, 342 (1986).

2024A remand, however, “must be premised on a determination that error occurred below and a ruling on that error.” Hungler v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio St.3d 338 , 342 (1986).

11
Cordova v. Emergency Professional Servs., Inc.green
ohioctapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023“This court, along with others, has held that a ruling on a challenge to a juror for cause, pursuant to R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) or 2313.17(D), will not be overturned on appeal unless it appears that the trial court abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Cordova v. Emergency Professional Servs., 2017-Ohio-7245 , 96 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.).

2023“This court, along with others, has held that a ruling on a challenge to a juror for cause, pursuant to R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) or 2313.17(D), will not be overturned on appeal unless it appears that the trial court abused its discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Cordova v. Emergency Professional Servs., 2017-Ohio-7245 , 96 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.).

11
Linda Hamilton, Individually and as of the Estate of George Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc.green
ca2 · 1999 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023This is referred to as “waiver by conduct.” See Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir.2019) (explaining that, even where a defendant preserves a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) defense in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on the defense at a later point through his conduct in the litigation); see also King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir.2012), citing Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir.1999) (“Even where a defendant properly preserves [a defense of insufficient service of process] by including it in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on

11
Portia Boulger v. James Woodsgreen
ca6 · 2019 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023This is referred to as “waiver by conduct.” See Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir.2019) (explaining that, even where a defendant preserves a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) defense in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on the defense at a later point through his conduct in the litigation); see also King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir.2012), citing Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir.1999) (“Even where a defendant properly preserves [a defense of insufficient service of process] by including it in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on

11
State v. Fannongreen
ohctapp4athens · 2018 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020See App.R. 16(A)(3) (an appellant’s brief “shall include * * * [a] statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected”); App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) (an appellate court “shall * * * [d]etermine the appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App. R. 16”); State v. Fannon, 2018-Ohio-5242 , 117 N.E.3d 10, ¶ 135 (4th Dist.) (an appellate court is “charged with deciding assignments of error, not mere arguments”).

11
In Re Ettergreen
ohioctapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Absent error below, it is axiomatic that the juvenile court could not have committed plain error, which in this context contemplates, as a prerequisite, an error of such magnitude that, if left uncorrected, “would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.” See Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997); see also In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484, 492 , 731 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist.1998).

2018Absent error below, it is axiomatic that the juvenile court could not have committed plain error, which in this context contemplates, as a prerequisite, an error of such magnitude that, if left uncorrected, “would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.” See Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997); see also In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484, 492 , 731 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist.1998).

11
Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnershipgreen
ohio · 2013 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Highland No. 13CA14, 2014-Ohio-239, ¶14-17 (appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the propriety of trial court’s denial of village’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract stated a claim for relief); Riscatti, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio-4530 , 998 N.E.2d 437, at ¶ 19-21 (denial of motion for judgment on the pleadings predicated on a statute-of-limitations defense under R.C. 2744.04(A) does not deny the benefit of immunity and is not a final, appealable order “even though it arose along with a political subdivision’s immunity c

2016Highland No. 13CA14, 2014-Ohio-239, ¶14-17 (appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the propriety of trial court’s denial of village’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract stated a claim for relief); Riscatti, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio-4530 , 998 N.E.2d 437, at ¶ 19-21 (denial of motion for judgment on the pleadings predicated on a statute-of-limitations defense under R.C. 2744.04(A) does not deny the benefit of immunity and is not a final, appealable order “even though it arose along with a political subdivision’s immunity c

11
Today & Tomorrow Heating & Cooling v. Greenfieldgreen
ohioctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Highland No. 13CA14, 2014-Ohio-239, ¶14-17 (appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the propriety of trial court’s denial of village’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract stated a claim for relief); Riscatti, 137 Ohio St.3d 123 , 2013-Ohio-4530 , 998 N.E.2d 437, at ¶ 19-21 (denial of motion for judgment on the pleadings predicated on a statute-of-limitations defense under R.C. 2744.04(A) does not deny the benefit of immunity and is not a final, appealable order “even though it arose along with a political subdivision’s immunity c

11
York v. City of Cincinnatigreen
ohioctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See R.C. 124.44; see also York, 194 Ohio App.3d 517 , 2011-Ohio-3921 , 957 N.E.2d 67, at ¶ 27 (plaintiffs prevailed in a failure-to-promote mandamus action where they established that vacancies had occurred before the original expiration date and that they had been next in line for promotion when those vacancies had arisen); McCarter v. Cincinnati, 3 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Ohio App.3d 244, 246, 444 N.E.2d 1053 (1st Dist.1981) (prevailing plaintiff was entitled to a vacancy that occurred during the pendency of the promotion list). {¶17} While the city assigned this portion of th

2012See R.C. 124.44; see also York, 194 Ohio App.3d 517 , 2011-Ohio-3921 , 957 N.E.2d 67, at ¶ 27 (plaintiffs prevailed in a failure-to-promote mandamus action where they established that vacancies had occurred before the original expiration date and that they had been next in line for promotion when those vacancies had arisen); McCarter v. Cincinnati, 3 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Ohio App.3d 244, 246, 444 N.E.2d 1053 (1st Dist.1981) (prevailing plaintiff was entitled to a vacancy that occurred during the pendency of the promotion list). {¶17} While the city assigned this portion of th

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (25)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Vails green
ohio · 1970
2 sentences

2016State v. Vails, 22 Ohio St.2d 103 , 258 N.E.2d 225 (1970).

2016State v. Vails, 22 Ohio St.2d 103 , 258 N.E.2d 225 (1970).

21972–2016
Nakoff v. Fairview General Hospital green
ohio · 1996
2 sentences

2005Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 256 , 662 N.E.2d 1 . {¶ 9} The trial court’s ruling at bar, as recorded in its journal entry dated August 12, 2004, reads: “Defendants Plain Dealer Publishing Company, Roy Hewitt, and Maxine Lynch’s motion for sanctions and recovery of attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11, filed 04/05/2004, is denied.

2005Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 256 , 662 N.E.2d 1 . {¶ 9} The trial court’s ruling at bar, as recorded in its journal entry dated August 12, 2004, reads: “Defendants Plain Dealer Publishing Company, Roy Hewitt, and Maxine Lynch’s motion for sanctions and recovery of attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11, filed 04/05/2004, is denied.

22005–2005
Ronnie L. Chatman v. James Slagle, Richard Unger green
ca6 · 1997
2 sentences

1999Heck v. Humphrey (1994), 512 U.S. 477 , 486-87 ; Chatman v. Slagle (6th Cir. 1997), 107 F.3d 380 , 382 .

1999Heck v. Humphrey (1994), 512 U.S. 477 , 486-87 ; Chatman v. Slagle (6th Cir. 1997), 107 F.3d 380 , 382 .

21999–1999
Heck v. Humphrey green
scotus · 1994
2 sentences

1999Heck v. Humphrey (1994), 512 U.S. 477 , 486-87 ; Chatman v. Slagle (6th Cir. 1997), 107 F.3d 380 , 382 .

1999Heck v. Humphrey (1994), 512 U.S. 477 , 486-87 ; Chatman v. Slagle (6th Cir. 1997), 107 F.3d 380 , 382 .

21999–1999
State v. Fannon green
ohioctapp · 2018
1 sentence

2020See App.R. 16(A)(3) (an appellant’s brief “shall include * * * [a] statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected”); App.R. 12(A)(1)(b) (an appellate court “shall * * * [d]etermine the appeal on its merits on the assignments of error set forth in the briefs under App. R. 16”); State v. Fannon, 2018-Ohio-5242 , 117 N.E.3d 10, ¶ 135 (4th Dist.) (an appellate court is “charged with deciding assignments of error, not mere arguments”).

12020–2020
State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle green
ohio · 2013
2 sentences

2019Vanni v. McMonagle, 137 Ohio St.3d 568 , 2013-Ohio-5187, ¶ 4 ; Triton Servs., Inc. v. Reed, 12th Dist.

2019Vanni v. McMonagle, 137 Ohio St.3d 568 , 2013-Ohio-5187, ¶ 4 ; Triton Servs., Inc. v. Reed, 12th Dist.

12019–2019
Fortner v. Thomas green
ohio · 1970
2 sentences

2018But, as the Ohio Supreme Court stated nearly 50 years ago: “It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by judgment of premature declarations or advice upon potential controversies.” Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).

2018But, as the Ohio Supreme Court stated nearly 50 years ago: “It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by judgment of premature declarations or advice upon potential controversies.” Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).

12018–2018
Goldfuss v. Davidson green
ohio · 1997
2 sentences

2018Absent error below, it is axiomatic that the juvenile court could not have committed plain error, which in this context contemplates, as a prerequisite, an error of such magnitude that, if left uncorrected, “would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.” See Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997); see also In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484, 492 , 731 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist.1998).

2018Absent error below, it is axiomatic that the juvenile court could not have committed plain error, which in this context contemplates, as a prerequisite, an error of such magnitude that, if left uncorrected, “would have a material adverse effect on the character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.” See Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 , 679 N.E.2d 1099 (1997); see also In re Etter, 134 Ohio App.3d 484, 492 , 731 N.E.2d 694 (1st Dist.1998).

12018–2018
Jack F. Neff Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Great Lakes Crushing, Ltd. green
ohioctapp · 2014
1 sentence

2017Lake No. 2012-L-145, 2014-Ohio-2875, ¶23 . {¶69} The lead opinion notes that the “trial court found Dyer’s identity reasonably related to medical diagnosis or treatment” when it issued a ruling at a hearing on a motion in limine.

12017–2017
Timmins v. Russomano green
ohio · 1968
2 sentences

2016As a result of the trial court’s ruling that claim was dismissed, and it is not directly at issue on appeal. {¶5} Granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the trial court reasoned that it was “undisputed” that Middleton failed to yield the right-of-way to Holbrook “and that this was a proximate cause of the crash.” (R. at 25, at 5.) The trial court then concluded that Holbrook’s failure to see Middleton was “immaterial” because “a driver that has the right of way [does not] have a duty to look for other drivers violating her right of way.” (Id. at 5-6, citing Timmins v. Russomano, 14

2016As a result of the trial court’s ruling that claim was dismissed, and it is not directly at issue on appeal. {¶5} Granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the trial court reasoned that it was “undisputed” that Middleton failed to yield the right-of-way to Holbrook “and that this was a proximate cause of the crash.” (R. at 25, at 5.) The trial court then concluded that Holbrook’s failure to see Middleton was “immaterial” because “a driver that has the right of way [does not] have a duty to look for other drivers violating her right of way.” (Id. at 5-6, citing Timmins v. Russomano, 14

12016–2016
Lumaye v. Johnson green
ohioctapp · 1992
2 sentences

2016As a result of the trial court’s ruling that claim was dismissed, and it is not directly at issue on appeal. {¶5} Granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the trial court reasoned that it was “undisputed” that Middleton failed to yield the right-of-way to Holbrook “and that this was a proximate cause of the crash.” (R. at 25, at 5.) The trial court then concluded that Holbrook’s failure to see Middleton was “immaterial” because “a driver that has the right of way [does not] have a duty to look for other drivers violating her right of way.” (Id. at 5-6, citing Timmins v. Russomano, 14

2016As a result of the trial court’s ruling that claim was dismissed, and it is not directly at issue on appeal. {¶5} Granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the trial court reasoned that it was “undisputed” that Middleton failed to yield the right-of-way to Holbrook “and that this was a proximate cause of the crash.” (R. at 25, at 5.) The trial court then concluded that Holbrook’s failure to see Middleton was “immaterial” because “a driver that has the right of way [does not] have a duty to look for other drivers violating her right of way.” (Id. at 5-6, citing Timmins v. Russomano, 14

12016–2016
Riscatti v. Prime Properties Ltd. Partnership green
ohioctapp · 2012
1 sentence

2013Chapter 2744 immunity, there is no exception to the general rule that a denial of summary judgment is a non-final appealable [sic] order,” and accordingly, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of summary judgment on the basis of a statute-of-limitations defense). {¶21} The court of appeals in this case correctly held that the fact that a political subdivision is the party that raises a statute-of-limitations defense does not change the general rule that the ruling on that defense is not a final, *129 appealable order. 2012-Ohio-2921 , 2012 WL 2458294 , ¶ 17.

12013–2013
McCarter v. City of Cincinnati green
ohioctapp · 1981
1 sentence

2012See R.C. 124.44; see also York, 194 Ohio App.3d 517 , 2011-Ohio-3921 , 957 N.E.2d 67, at ¶ 27 (plaintiffs prevailed in a failure-to-promote mandamus action where they established that vacancies had occurred before the original expiration date and that they had been next in line for promotion when those vacancies had arisen); McCarter v. Cincinnati, 3 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Ohio App.3d 244, 246, 444 N.E.2d 1053 (1st Dist.1981) (prevailing plaintiff was entitled to a vacancy that occurred during the pendency of the promotion list). {¶17} While the city assigned this portion of th

12012–2012
Vaughn Industries, Inc. v. Dimech Services green
ohioctapp · 2006
2 sentences

2008Vaughn then filed a combined motion for reconsideration/motion for summary judgment of the court's ruling on the violation of R.C. 4115.071 (C) claim based upon our decision in Vaughn Industries, Inc. v. Dimech Serv. , 167 Ohio App.3d 634 , 2006-Ohio-3381 .

2008Vaughn then filed a combined motion for reconsideration/motion for summary judgment of the court's ruling on the violation of R.C. 4115.071 (C) claim based upon our decision in Vaughn Industries, Inc. v. Dimech Serv. , 167 Ohio App.3d 634 , 2006-Ohio-3381 .

12008–2008
State v. Cook green
ohio · 1998
1 sentence

2007State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404 , 411 .

12007–2007
Slife v. Kundtz Properties, Inc. green
ohioctapp · 1974
1 sentence

2006Id. at 186 .

12006–2006
State v. Murphy green
ohio · 2001
1 sentence

2005Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d at 526 .

12005–2005
St. Anthony Hospital v. United States Department of Health & Human Services green
ca10 · 2002
1 sentence

2004(C.A. 10, 2002), 309 F.3d 680 , 711 , the court appositely observed: "Due process entitles an individual in an administrative proceeding to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal." * * *" However, a substantial showing of personal bias is required to disqualify a hearing officer or to obtain a ruling that the hearing is unfair." * * * In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that a presiding judge may, consistent with due process, be "exceedingly ill disposed towards [a party] who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person." 510 U.S. 540 , 550-51 , 114 S.Ct. 1147

12004–2004
Liteky v. United States green
scotus · 1994
2 sentences

2004(C.A. 10, 2002), 309 F.3d 680 , 711 , the court appositely observed: "Due process entitles an individual in an administrative proceeding to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal." * * *" However, a substantial showing of personal bias is required to disqualify a hearing officer or to obtain a ruling that the hearing is unfair." * * * In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that a presiding judge may, consistent with due process, be "exceedingly ill disposed towards [a party] who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person." 510 U.S. 540 , 550-51 , 114 S.Ct. 1147

2004(C.A. 10, 2002), 309 F.3d 680 , 711 , the court appositely observed: "Due process entitles an individual in an administrative proceeding to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal." * * *" However, a substantial showing of personal bias is required to disqualify a hearing officer or to obtain a ruling that the hearing is unfair." * * * In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court observed that a presiding judge may, consistent with due process, be "exceedingly ill disposed towards [a party] who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person." 510 U.S. 540 , 550-51 , 114 S.Ct. 1147

12004–2004
State v. Collins green
ohio · 1993
11996–1996
City of Columbus v. Fraley green
ohio · 1975
11989–1989
State v. Scott green
ohio · 1986
11988–1988
State v. Williams green
ohio · 1983
11988–1988
Pokorny v. Local 310 green
ohioctapp · 1973
11982–1982
McKenzie v. Industrial Commission neutral
ohioctapp · 1926
11928–1928

Where else courts name it

TX 261 (1891–2026) CA 206 (1867–2026) GA 203 (1900–2026) LA 124 (1925–2024) NY 105 (1862–2022) IL 90 (1893–2026) AL 87 (1880–2025) FL 63 (1893–2023) PA 56 (1842–2024) IA 56 (1879–2026) MA 50 (1894–2026) MO 49 (1891–2024) OR 35 (1914–2026) UT 31 (1989–2026) IN 30 (1876–2026) OH 30 (1928–2025) NM 29 (1927–2024) CT 28 (1963–2021) TN 27 (1899–2025) MD 26 (1883–2025) MI 26 (1880–2025) CO 26 (1918–2025) NC 25 (1889–2024) NJ 24 (1935–2021) WA 24 (1905–2025) AZ 24 (1935–2023) VA 21 (1901–2024) DC 21 (1947–2022) KS 20 (1897–2026) AR 16 (1989–2025) MS 14 (1985–2017) SC 14 (1916–2025) ME 14 (1959–2019) WI 14 (1900–2017) AK 13 (1978–2018) KY 12 (1960–2020) OK 12 (1916–2021) WV 11 (1956–2022) ID 9 (1885–2019) WY 8 (1931–2015) NV 8 (1963–2020) VT 8 (1905–2000) SD 8 (1909–2025) MT 8 (1978–2022) NH 7 (1970–2020) MN 6 (1906–2009) NE 5 (1948–2024) RI 4 (2000–2016) HI 4 (1928–2014) DE 2 (1966–1966)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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