ruling defense in Maryland

2025App. at 716 , 912 A.2d at 44-45 , without mentioning whether the defendant had asked his counsel to file a motion for modification of sentence, the - 18 - Appellate Court affirmed a trial court’s ruling that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in not filing a motion for modification of sentence.

2020App. at 716 , 912 A.2d at 44-45 , the Court of Special Appeals affirmed a trial court’s ruling that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in not filing a motion for modification of sentence.

2019DISCUSSION The open door doctrine is based on principles of fairness and serves to "balance any unfair prejudice one party may have suffered." Little v. Schneider , 434 Md. 150 , 163, 73 A.3d 1074 , 1081 n.6 (2013).

2019DISCUSSION The open door doctrine is based on principles of fairness and serves to "balance any unfair prejudice one party may have suffered." Little v. Schneider , 434 Md. 150 , 163, 73 A.3d 1074 , 1081 n.6 (2013).

2025Id. at 405–06. 9 The case sub judice is the same.

2012Id. 10 Landlords argue that this ruling was in error, because evidence of the post-breach market is a necessary part of any lost profits claim.

2009Appellate Review of the Board’s Ruling The standard for appellate review of a ruling of an administrative agency was described as follows in Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185,192-93 , 950 A.2d 766 (2008) (footnote omitted): When reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, ... we review the agency’s decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court.

2009Appellate Review of the Board’s Ruling The standard for appellate review of a ruling of an administrative agency was described as follows in Comptroller v. Science Applications, 405 Md. 185,192-93 , 950 A.2d 766 (2008) (footnote omitted): When reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, ... we review the agency’s decision directly, not the decision of the circuit court.

2009After stating that the issue was not properly before the court, the court went on to explain that "to the extent the record reveals the basis for the court's exclusion ruling — that Dr. Debrun did not have the necessary foundation to offer whatever informed consent opinions he was going to give — the ruling was not error or an abuse of discretion." Waldt, 181 Md.App. at 262 , 956 A.2d at 249 .

2009After stating that the issue was not properly before the court, the court went on to explain that "to the extent the record reveals the basis for the court's exclusion ruling — that Dr. Debrun did not have the necessary foundation to offer whatever informed consent opinions he was going to give — the ruling was not error or an abuse of discretion." Waldt, 181 Md.App. at 262 , 956 A.2d at 249 .

2003In Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251 (1880), a grantor conveyed by absolute conveyance a portion of property that contained an alley and did not expressly reserve the right to use the alley in respect to the remainder of the parcel not conveyed.

2003In concluding our discussion of the cases, we opined in Carroll , quoting Angel on Water Courses, section 165: “ ‘A way of necessity to a water course would be, therefore, limited to the necessity which created it, and when such necessity ceases, the right of way will also cease.’ In the following section the writer treats of the difference between what is necessary, and what is merely convenient, or desirable, and shows that the former is the ruling principle, and not the latter.” Id. at 367 .

2002Id.

2001The Court continued: “And in addition to this it may be fairly said that the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff without making the defense now relied on.”; and added: “The following grounds or any one of them have been declared to be sufficient to constitute a waiver of any defect in, or defence arising out of failure to duly give notice and proof of death: ‘A proposal to settle’; ‘an absolute refusal to pay on the merits’; ‘a denial of all liability’; ‘a negotiation with the insured, without making the objection of defective proof of death.’ ” This case was relied on in Fidelity & Casual

2001The Court continued: "And in addition to this it may be fairly said that the defendant negotiated with the plaintiff without making the defense now relied on."; and added: "The following grounds or any one of them have been declared to be sufficient to constitute a waiver of any defect in, or defence arising out of failure to duly give notice and proof of death: `A proposal to settle'; `an absolute refusal to pay on the merits'; `a denial of all liability'; `a negotiation with the insured, without making the objection of defective proof of death.'" This case was relied on in Fidelity & Casualt

1999See also United States v. Kelley, 314 F.2d 461, 463-64 (6th Cir.1963) (holding that trial judge’s act of threatening defense lawyer twice with contempt “tended to belittle the lawyer in the eyes of the jury,” and “operated to prevent the defendant from having a fair trial.”); Neal v. State, 36 Ala.App. 156, 158 , 54 So.2d 613, 615 (holding as “improper and prejudicial” trial court’s statement to defense lawyer in front of jury, “I ought to send you to jail.”), cert. denied, 256 Ala. 373 , 54 So.2d 616 (1951); Alley v. State, 619 So.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993) (reversing conviction

1999See also United States v. Kelley, 314 F.2d 461, 463-64 (6th Cir.1963) (holding that trial judge’s act of threatening defense lawyer twice with contempt “tended to belittle the lawyer in the eyes of the jury,” and “operated to prevent the defendant from having a fair trial.”); Neal v. State, 36 Ala.App. 156, 158 , 54 So.2d 613, 615 (holding as “improper and prejudicial” trial court’s statement to defense lawyer in front of jury, “I ought to send you to jail.”), cert. denied, 256 Ala. 373 , 54 So.2d 616 (1951); Alley v. State, 619 So.2d 1013, 1014-15 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993) (reversing conviction

1999The standard of harmless error was explained in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). [W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent view of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated.

1999The standard of harmless error was explained in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). [W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent view of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a reversal is mandated.

1999Id. at 132 , 225 P.2d at 820 . *390 Likewise, in Meek v. State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1295-97 , 930 P.2d 1104, 1109 (1996), the Supreme Court of Nevada held, inter alia, that the defendant’s case had been prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling the defense counsel in contempt and fining him before the jury.

1999Id. at 132 , 225 P.2d at 820 . *390 Likewise, in Meek v. State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1295-97 , 930 P.2d 1104, 1109 (1996), the Supreme Court of Nevada held, inter alia, that the defendant’s case had been prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling the defense counsel in contempt and fining him before the jury.

1995While I agree that the ruling was error and, thus, the petitioner is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on that account, I also find merit in several of the other challenges, among them the double jeopardy argument and the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) contention.

1995While I agree that the ruling was error and, thus, the petitioner is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on that account, I also find merit in several of the other challenges, among them the double jeopardy argument and the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) contention.

1993We affirmed this ruling because the defense failed to produce expert testimony that explained the meaning of the *360 term “presumptive positive.” 97 Md.App. at 431 , 630 A.2d at 255 .

1993We affirmed this ruling because the defense failed to produce expert testimony that explained the meaning of the *360 term “presumptive positive.” 97 Md.App. at 431 , 630 A.2d at 255 .

1993Schizo-defective type depressed.” We affirmed this ruling because the defense failed to produce expert testimony that explained how this type of mental disorder would affect the victim’s credibility. 61 Md.App. at 267-268 , 486 A.2d at 238 .

1993Schizo-defective type depressed.” We affirmed this ruling because the defense failed to produce expert testimony that explained how this type of mental disorder would affect the victim’s credibility. 61 Md.App. at 267-268 , 486 A.2d at 238 .

1992Thus, in this opinion, we shall look only at the claims of Adams asserting causes of action for the repayment of loans made to Manown in her individual capacity. [4] In procedural terms, the Court of Special Appeals held "that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Manown's motion for summary judgment." 89 Md.

1992Prout v. State, supra, 311 Md. at 356 , 535 A.2d 445 .

1992Prout v. State, supra, 311 Md. at 356 , 535 A.2d 445 .

1988The lower court ruled “that the statute of limitations bars the suit, and ... that the filing of a third-party claim, later dismissed in a separate action, was not generally and did not in this case toll the statute of limitations.” Citing proper service, within the limitations period, of the third-party complaint on appellees and, hence, appellees’ knowledge of its pendency, and relying upon Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md.App. 231 , 488 A.2d 1016 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 471 , 494 A.2d 939 (1975) and Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 , 216 A.2d 723 (1966), appellants here maintain that the ruling was

1988The lower court ruled “that the statute of limitations bars the suit, and ... that the filing of a third-party claim, later dismissed in a separate action, was not generally and did not in this case toll the statute of limitations.” Citing proper service, within the limitations period, of the third-party complaint on appellees and, hence, appellees’ knowledge of its pendency, and relying upon Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md.App. 231 , 488 A.2d 1016 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 471 , 494 A.2d 939 (1975) and Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 , 216 A.2d 723 (1966), appellants here maintain that the ruling was

1988The lower court ruled “that the statute of limitations bars the suit, and ... that the filing of a third-party claim, later dismissed in a separate action, was not generally and did not in this case toll the statute of limitations.” Citing proper service, within the limitations period, of the third-party complaint on appellees and, hence, appellees’ knowledge of its pendency, and relying upon Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md.App. 231 , 488 A.2d 1016 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 471 , 494 A.2d 939 (1975) and Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 , 216 A.2d 723 (1966), appellants here maintain that the ruling was

1988The lower court ruled “that the statute of limitations bars the suit, and ... that the filing of a third-party claim, later dismissed in a separate action, was not generally and did not in this case toll the statute of limitations.” Citing proper service, within the limitations period, of the third-party complaint on appellees and, hence, appellees’ knowledge of its pendency, and relying upon Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md.App. 231 , 488 A.2d 1016 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 471 , 494 A.2d 939 (1975) and Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361 , 216 A.2d 723 (1966), appellants here maintain that the ruling was

1987Yet, “[t]he essence of discretionary power in a trial court is ‘that the judgment and discretion must be exercised in solving the exact problem of the law, upon all the considerations which properly enter into the problem, and form it.’ ” Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 214-15 , 395 A.2d 496 (1979), quoting Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 441 , 157 A. 723 (1931) (emphasis added).

1987Yet, “[t]he essence of discretionary power in a trial court is ‘that the judgment and discretion must be exercised in solving the exact problem of the law, upon all the considerations which properly enter into the problem, and form it.’ ” Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 214-15 , 395 A.2d 496 (1979), quoting Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 441 , 157 A. 723 (1931) (emphasis added).

1987Yet, “[t]he essence of discretionary power in a trial court is ‘that the judgment and discretion must be exercised in solving the exact problem of the law, upon all the considerations which properly enter into the problem, and form it.’ ” Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 214-15 , 395 A.2d 496 (1979), quoting Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 441 , 157 A. 723 (1931) (emphasis added).

1987Yet, “[t]he essence of discretionary power in a trial court is ‘that the judgment and discretion must be exercised in solving the exact problem of the law, upon all the considerations which properly enter into the problem, and form it.’ ” Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 214-15 , 395 A.2d 496 (1979), quoting Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 441 , 157 A. 723 (1931) (emphasis added).

1987E.g., Air Lift, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Worcester County, Maryland, 262 Md. 368, 400-01 , 278 A.2d 244 (1971); Wilhelm v. Hadley, 218 Md. 152, 158 , 146 A.2d 22 (1958).

1987E.g., Air Lift, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Worcester County, Maryland, 262 Md. 368, 400-01 , 278 A.2d 244 (1971); Wilhelm v. Hadley, 218 Md. 152, 158 , 146 A.2d 22 (1958).

1987E.g., Air Lift, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Worcester County, Maryland, 262 Md. 368, 400-01 , 278 A.2d 244 (1971); Wilhelm v. Hadley, 218 Md. 152, 158 , 146 A.2d 22 (1958).

1987E.g., Air Lift, Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Worcester County, Maryland, 262 Md. 368, 400-01 , 278 A.2d 244 (1971); Wilhelm v. Hadley, 218 Md. 152, 158 , 146 A.2d 22 (1958).