ruling error in Pennsylvania

2023See Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233 (concluding that “the trial court erred in sentencing [the a]ppellee as a first-time DUI offender without considering his acceptance of ARD for a prior DUI”); Hummel, 2023 PA Super 57 , *4 (same); see also Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that Pennsylvania appellate courts apply law in effect at time of decision and parties are entitled to benefit of changes in law while direct appeal is pending).

2023See Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233 (concluding that “the trial court erred in sentencing [the a]ppellee as a first-time DUI offender without considering his acceptance of ARD for a prior DUI”); Hummel, 2023 PA Super 57 , *4 (same); see also Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that Pennsylvania ____________________________________________ 2 Our Supreme Court addressed this issue more recently in Commonwealth v. Verbeck, 290 A.3d 260 (Pa. 2023), splitting evenly on the question of whether a DUI ARD falls within the “prior conviction” exception to the general rule that a

2023See Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233 (concluding that “the trial court erred in sentencing [the a]ppellee as a first-time DUI offender without considering his acceptance of ARD for a prior DUI”); Hummel, 2023 PA Super 57 , *4 (same); see also Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that Pennsylvania appellate courts apply law in effect at time of decision and parties are entitled to benefit of changes in law while direct appeal is pending).

2023See Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233 (concluding that “the trial court erred in sentencing [the a]ppellee as a first-time DUI offender without considering his acceptance of ARD for a prior DUI”); Hummel, 2023 PA Super 57 , *4 (same); see also Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that Pennsylvania ____________________________________________ 2 Our Supreme Court addressed this issue more recently in Commonwealth v. Verbeck, 290 A.3d 260 (Pa. 2023), splitting evenly on the question of whether a DUI ARD falls within the “prior conviction” exception to the general rule that a

2021Additionally, the Court erred in failing to analyze the damages through Restatement Second of Property; Landlord & Tenant 7.2 as prescribed in Teodori v. Werner, 415 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa. 1980). -7- J-A23039-18 c.

2019Additionally, the Court erred in failing to analyze the damages through Restatement Second of Property; Landlord & Tenant 7.2 as prescribed in Teodori v. Werner, 415 A.2d 31, 34 (Pa. 1980). c.

2024Accepting such an argument would render the Election Code’s 39 Id.; see also Oberneder, 696 A.2d at 150 (“By definition, ‘shall’ is mandatory.”). 40 845 A.2d 793 , 801-02 (Pa. 2004). 41 Id. at 801 (rejecting the argument that the Election Code requires write-in votes cast for listed candidates to be excluded; stating the Code “does not declare that such a write-in vote must be voided and may not be counted”). 42 237 A.3d 1006 , 1019 (Pa. 2020). 43 Id. (quoting Cianfrani, 359 A.2d at 384 ) [J-59-2024] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 9 clear language “meaningless and, ultimately, absurd.”44 Our analysis in PD

2024Accepting such an argument would render the Election Code’s 39 Id.; see also Oberneder, 696 A.2d at 150 (“By definition, ‘shall’ is mandatory.”). 40 845 A.2d 793 , 801-02 (Pa. 2004). 41 Id. at 801 (rejecting the argument that the Election Code requires write-in votes cast for listed candidates to be excluded; stating the Code “does not declare that such a write-in vote must be voided and may not be counted”). 42 237 A.3d 1006 , 1019 (Pa. 2020). 43 Id. (quoting Cianfrani, 359 A.2d at 384 ) [J-59-2024] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 9 clear language “meaningless and, ultimately, absurd.”44 Our analysis in PD

2024Accepting such an argument would render the Election Code’s 39 Id.; see also Oberneder, 696 A.2d at 150 (“By definition, ‘shall’ is mandatory.”). 40 845 A.2d 793 , 801-02 (Pa. 2004). 41 Id. at 801 (rejecting the argument that the Election Code requires write-in votes cast for listed candidates to be excluded; stating the Code “does not declare that such a write-in vote must be voided and may not be counted”). 42 237 A.3d 1006 , 1019 (Pa. 2020). 43 Id. (quoting Cianfrani, 359 A.2d at 384 ) [J-59-2024] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 9 clear language “meaningless and, ultimately, absurd.”44 Our analysis in PD

2024Servs., 139 A.3d 270, 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

2023Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 357 (Pa.Super. 2007).

2021See Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Pa. 2007) (“An error may be deemed harmless, inter alia, where the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”). - 17 - J-S19020-21 matter, where one of D.H.’s other children purportedly alleged abuse by a different perpetrator, not Appellant.

2020See id. -7- J-S65007-19 In rejecting Appellant’s claim that this ruling was in error, the trial court explained that evidence of the dog bite was simply not relevant to Appellant’s case.2 Appellant counters that the evidence of the dog bite was relevant because it explained why he acted the way he did.

2019See id. (discussing Judge Guido’s “inability to settle on a reason for admitting [] Nowe’s expert opinion” without alleging error).

2017We are bound by this ruling because of the doctrine of res judicata, and therefore, we denied [Coleman] relief. [FN] [FN]The doctrine of res judicata holds that ["a]n existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial -4 J -S01042-17 tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.["] Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1316 (Pa. Super. 1983) [(citation om

2017See id. at 1317 .

2016In re B.L.J., Jr., 938 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2016In re B.L.J., Jr., 938 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa.Super.2007).

2015See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 620 Pa. 218 , 67 A.3d 716, 726 (2013) (abuse of discretion not found based on mere error of judgment, but rather where ruling is manifestly unreasonable or result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will).

2015See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 726 (Pa. 2013) (abuse of discretion not found based on mere error of judgment, but rather where ruling is manifestly unreasonable or result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will).

2015See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 620 Pa. 218 , 67 A.3d 716, 726 (2013) (abuse of discretion not found based on mere error of judgment, but rather where ruling is manifestly unreasonable or result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will).

2005See Commonwealth v. Sanford, 580 Pa. 604 , 863 A.2d 428, 431-32 (2004) (appellate court must examine all evidence, regardless of admissibility, when determining sufficiency of the evidence claim because sufficiency of evidence is not assessed upon a diminished record) (citation omitted). 8 .

2005See Commonwealth v. Sanford, 580 Pa. 604 , 863 A.2d 428, 431-32 (2004) (appellate court must examine all evidence, regardless of admissibility, when determining sufficiency of the evidence claim because sufficiency of evidence is not assessed upon a diminished record) (citation omitted). 8 .

2004Jamison v. Johnson, 762 A.2d 1094, 1097 (Pa.Super.2000).

2000The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania defined the term “abuse of discretion” in Commonwealth v. Lane, 492 Pa. 544, 549 , 424 A.2d 1325, 1328 (1981), as follows: “An abuse of discretion is more than just an error of judgment and, on appeal, a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that ‘the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.’ ” Moreover, where a trial court’s ruling on evidence is the basis for the request for a new trial, as it is in this case, the complaining party must show not

2000The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania defined the term “abuse of discretion” in Commonwealth v. Lane, 492 Pa. 544, 549 , 424 A.2d 1325, 1328 (1981), as follows: “An abuse of discretion is more than just an error of judgment and, on appeal, a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion unless the record discloses that ‘the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.’ ” Moreover, where a trial court’s ruling on evidence is the basis for the request for a new trial, as it is in this case, the complaining party must show not

1991However, in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 271, n. 3 , 523 A.2d 728, 733, n. 3 (1987) the Supreme Court stated in a footnote: It is a rule of this Commonwealth that an appellate tribunal should not entertain a challenge to the weight of the evidence since their examination is confined to the “cold record.” This statement was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 315 , 561 A.2d 719, 728 (1989) wherein the court stated: “A challenge to the weight of the evidence is not appealable,” citing Commonwealth v. Nelson, supra. Q In Commonwealth v. Eddowes, 397 Pa

1991However, in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 271, n. 3 , 523 A.2d 728, 733, n. 3 (1987) the Supreme Court stated in a footnote: It is a rule of this Commonwealth that an appellate tribunal should not entertain a challenge to the weight of the evidence since their examination is confined to the “cold record.” This statement was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 315 , 561 A.2d 719, 728 (1989) wherein the court stated: “A challenge to the weight of the evidence is not appealable,” citing Commonwealth v. Nelson, supra. Q In Commonwealth v. Eddowes, 397 Pa

1991However, in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 271, n. 3 , 523 A.2d 728, 733, n. 3 (1987) the Supreme Court stated in a footnote: It is a rule of this Commonwealth that an appellate tribunal should not entertain a challenge to the weight of the evidence since their examination is confined to the “cold record.” This statement was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 315 , 561 A.2d 719, 728 (1989) wherein the court stated: “A challenge to the weight of the evidence is not appealable,” citing Commonwealth v. Nelson, supra. Q In Commonwealth v. Eddowes, 397 Pa

1991However, in Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 271, n. 3 , 523 A.2d 728, 733, n. 3 (1987) the Supreme Court stated in a footnote: It is a rule of this Commonwealth that an appellate tribunal should not entertain a challenge to the weight of the evidence since their examination is confined to the “cold record.” This statement was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 315 , 561 A.2d 719, 728 (1989) wherein the court stated: “A challenge to the weight of the evidence is not appealable,” citing Commonwealth v. Nelson, supra. Q In Commonwealth v. Eddowes, 397 Pa

1989Mistrials should be granted “only when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive appellant of a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169 , *480 176, 512 A.2d 603, 606 (1986); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 498 Pa. 405 , 446 A.2d 1268 (1982).

1989Mistrials should be granted “only when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive appellant of a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169 , *480 176, 512 A.2d 603, 606 (1986); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 498 Pa. 405 , 446 A.2d 1268 (1982).