105 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1862–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Graygreen2 sentences2017As with other questions of law concerning a ruling or instruction, a challenge based on a Sandoval error must be preserved for appellate review by a specific, timely objection (People v Cantave, 21 NY3d 374, 378 [2013]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 20-21 [1995]; CPL 470.05 [2]). 2017As with other questions of law concerning a ruling or instruction, a challenge based on a Sandoval error must be preserved for appellate review by a specific, timely objection (People v Cantave, 21 NY3d 374, 378 [2013]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10 , 20–21 [1995]; CPL 470.05 [2]). | 5 | 5 |
People v. Gilesgreen2 sentences2007In any event, the defendant’s request for a Dunaway hearing (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]) was properly denied since his supporting papers were conclusory and failed to set forth factual allegations sufficient to warrant such a hearing (see People v Scott, 182 AD2d 649 [1992]). “ 'It was this ruling by the hearing court and not a failure of proof by the People that resulted in evidence of the legality of the [arrest] remaining undeveloped’ ” (People v Fountaine, 269 AD2d 748 [2000], quoting People v Giles, 73 NY2d 666, 671 [1989]). 2000“It was this ruling by the hearing court and not a failure of proof by the People that resulted in evidence of the legality of the [arrest] remaining undeveloped” (People v Giles, 73 NY2d 666, 671 ; see, People v Havelka, 45 NY2d 636, 642-643 ), and this Court may not rely upon the record of the Huntley hearing to decide the merits of the unlitigated ground for suppression raised in defendant’s motion (see, People v Giles, supra, at 670-671). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Crimminsgreen2 sentences2019Even assuming, arguendo, that the court's ruling was error, that error was harmless ( see generally People v Crimmins , 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]). 1986In any event, if the court’s ruling was error it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 ; People v Perez, 36 NY2d 848 ). | 1 | 4 |
People v. Rosengreen2 sentences2016As an initial matter, there is no merit to the People’s contention that certain of the defendant’s arguments on this issue are not preserved for appellate review. “[A] party who without success has either expressly or impliedly sought or requested a particular ruling or instruction, is deemed to have thereby protested the court’s ultimate disposition of the matter or failure to rule or instruct accordingly sufficiently to raise a question of law with respect to such disposition or failure regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered” (CPL 470.05 [2]; see People v Rosen, 81 N 1997Defense counsel’s motion to share defense responsibilities with her colleague preserves for appellate review the propriety of the court’s disposition of the application despite counsel’s failure to register “any actual protest” (ibid.; People v Rosen, 81 NY2d 237, 245 ). | 1 | 2 |
Farhart v. Matuljakgreen2 sentences2011This case is distinguishable from Duffy v Vogel ( 12 NY3d 169, 172 ), where the request to poll the jury was explicitly “denied as ‘unnecessary[,]’ and the jury [was] discharged.” Rather, here, defense counsel was afforded an opportunity to clarify her request prior to the jury being discharged “and[,] when [defense] counsel immediately abandoned the subject[,] the court might well have assumed that [defense] counsel acquiesced that the polling was unnecessary” (Farhart v Matuljak, 283 App Div 977, 978 ). 2011This case is distinguishable from Duffy v Vogel ( 12 NY3d 169, 172 [2009]), where the request to poll the jury was explicitly “denied as ‘unnecessary[,]’ and the jury [was] discharged.” Rather, here, defense counsel was afforded an opportunity to clarify her request prior to the jury being discharged “and[,] when [defense] counsel immediately abandoned the subject[,] the court might well have assumed that [defense] counsel acquiesced that the polling was unnecessary” (Farhart v Matuljak, 283 App Div 977, 978 [1954]). | 1 | 2 |
Duffy v. Vogelgreen2 sentences2011This case is distinguishable from Duffy v Vogel ( 12 NY3d 169, 172 ), where the request to poll the jury was explicitly “denied as ‘unnecessary[,]’ and the jury [was] discharged.” Rather, here, defense counsel was afforded an opportunity to clarify her request prior to the jury being discharged “and[,] when [defense] counsel immediately abandoned the subject[,] the court might well have assumed that [defense] counsel acquiesced that the polling was unnecessary” (Farhart v Matuljak, 283 App Div 977, 978 ). 2011This case is distinguishable from Duffy v Vogel ( 12 NY3d 169, 172 [2009]), where the request to poll the jury was explicitly “denied as ‘unnecessary[,]’ and the jury [was] discharged.” Rather, here, defense counsel was afforded an opportunity to clarify her request prior to the jury being discharged “and[,] when [defense] counsel immediately abandoned the subject[,] the court might well have assumed that [defense] counsel acquiesced that the polling was unnecessary” (Farhart v Matuljak, 283 App Div 977, 978 [1954]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Pavaogreen2 sentences1999The defendant’s previous convictions were probative on the issues of his credibility and his willingness to place his interests above those of society (People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455 ; People v Pavao, supra). 1990It is well settled that a defendant cannot shield himself from impeachment on the basis of the very frequency of his offenses, or his tendency to specialize in his criminal endeavors (see, People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 292 [1983]; People v Rahman, 62 AD2d 968 [1st Dept 1978], affd 46 NY2d 882 [1979]). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Conagreen2 sentences1988To present a question of law, reviewable by either this court or the Court of Appeals, regarding the correctness of the trial court’s ruling or instruction, usually the defendant must, by request or protest, alert the court to his argument and specific objection (CPL 470.05 [2]; 470.15, 470.35; see, People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 441 [1985]; People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 472-474 [1980]; People v Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 32-33 [1979]; People v Bronson, 127 AD2d 776 [2d Dept 1987]; People v Graham, 111 AD2d 831 [2d Dept 1985]). 1981The first two sentences are addressed to the situation in which a ruling or instruction has affirmatively been made by the court at nisi prius, and the issue affecting appealability is whether a timely and sufficient protest has been registered thereto (see, e.g., People v Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 33 ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1988To present a question of law, reviewable by either this court or the Court of Appeals, regarding the correctness of the trial court’s ruling or instruction, usually the defendant must, by request or protest, alert the court to his argument and specific objection (CPL 470.05 [2]; 470.15, 470.35; see, People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 441 [1985]; People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 472-474 [1980]; People v Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 32-33 [1979]; People v Bronson, 127 AD2d 776 [2d Dept 1987]; People v Graham, 111 AD2d 831 [2d Dept 1985]). 1981Thus, while our courts have deemed a certain coterie of constitutional rights so fundamental that they may be raised in the first instance .at any time and at any level of the proceedings either because they are bound up so intimately with the defendant’s right to a fair trial (e.g., People v Banks, 53 NY2d 819 ; People v Carmine A., 53 NY2d 816 ; People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 [right to counsel] ; People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288 , affd 432 US 197 [burden of proof]; but see People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467 ) or because the right involved is one, such as the prohibition a | 1 | 2 |
People v. Parkergreen1 sentence2022Pursuant to CPL 470.05(2), "[f]or purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same." However, CPL 470.05(2) provides that "[s]uch protest need not be in the form of an 'exception' but is sufficient if . . . in re[s]ponse to a protest by a party, the court expressly decided the question raised on appeal." | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cantonigreen1 sentence2022Pursuant to CPL 470.05(2), "[f]or purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same." However, CPL 470.05(2) provides that "[s]uch protest need not be in the form of an 'exception' but is sufficient if . . . in re[s]ponse to a protest by a party, the court expressly decided the question raised on appeal." | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2022Here, "[r]egardless of whether defendant's objection . . . was sufficiently explicit," it cannot reasonably be disputed that the trial court "expressly decided the question raised on appeal" ( People v Smith , 22 NY3d 462, 465 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPL 470.05[2]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hawkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cantavegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Seabrookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mezongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Medinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Department of Correctional Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moro v. Millsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brennan v. New York State & Local Employees Retirement Systemgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. D'Alessandrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hinesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Investors Insurance of America v. Hartford Fire Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gilmoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harrington v. Harringtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Havelkagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Adamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1988To present a question of law, reviewable by either this court or the Court of Appeals, regarding the correctness of the trial court’s ruling or instruction, usually the defendant must, by request or protest, alert the court to his argument and specific objection (CPL 470.05 [2]; 470.15, 470.35; see, People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 441 [1985]; People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 472-474 [1980]; People v Cona, 49 NY2d 26, 32-33 [1979]; People v Bronson, 127 AD2d 776 [2d Dept 1987]; People v Graham, 111 AD2d 831 [2d Dept 1985]). 1981Thus, while our courts have deemed a certain coterie of constitutional rights so fundamental that they may be raised in the first instance .at any time and at any level of the proceedings either because they are bound up so intimately with the defendant’s right to a fair trial (e.g., People v Banks, 53 NY2d 819 ; People v Carmine A., 53 NY2d 816 ; People v Ermo, 47 NY2d 863 ; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325 [right to counsel] ; People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288 , affd 432 US 197 [burden of proof]; but see People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467 ) or because the right involved is one, such as the prohibition a | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Matiash
green
2 sentences2016Unlike in People v Matiash ( 197 AD2d 794 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 899 [1993]), where the trial court made a thorough record explaining why the alleged juror misconduct was innocuous and thus did not warrant further inquiry (id. at 795), here the court did not explain on the record its reasons for denying defendant’s request. 2016Unlike in People v Matiash ( 197 AD2d 794 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 899 [1993]), where the trial court made a thorough record explaining why the alleged juror misconduct was innocuous and thus did not warrant further inquiry (id. at 795), here the court did not explain on the record its reasons for denying defendant’s request. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Sandoval
green
2 sentences2007Since the defendant expressly requested that portion of the trial court’s Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) that pertained to his prior felony conviction, the defendant’s Sandoval claim was waived to the extent that he argues that this part of the court’s ruling was in error, as well as being unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Jones, 256 AD2d 30, 31 [1998]; People v Lugo, 233 AD2d 197, 198 [1996]; People v Medina, 171 AD2d 559 [1991]). 1981In our opinion the ruling was error because of the remoteness in time of the offenses (see People v Sandoval, supra, p 376 ; People v Daniels, 77 AD2d 745 ) coupled with the limited probative value of the type of offense involved (see People v Sandoval, supra, p 377 ). | 3 | 1981–2007 |
Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co.
green
2 sentences1935What was said in that opinion as to the effect of a reletting was unnecessary to the decision (cf. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 9 App. Div. 115, 118 ; reversed, but on other grounds, in 162 N. Y. 388 ). 1933What was said in that opinion as to the effect of a reletting was unnecessary to the decision (cf. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 9 App. Div. 115, 118 ; reversed, but on other grounds, in 162 N. Y. 388 ). | 3 | 1926–1935 |
Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co.
green
2 sentences1935What was said in that opinion as to the effect of a reletting was unnecessary to the decision (cf. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 9 App. Div. 115, 118 ; reversed, but on other grounds, in 162 N. Y. 388 ). 1933What was said in that opinion as to the effect of a reletting was unnecessary to the decision (cf. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy & Ice Cream Co., 9 App. Div. 115, 118 ; reversed, but on other grounds, in 162 N. Y. 388 ). | 3 | 1926–1935 |
Wesselmann v. International Images, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Regarding the ownership of the unsold prints, the court granted Scher’s mo tion to the extent of declaring that Scher “is the owner of and entitled to immediate possession of all of the approximately 320 unsold prints of her artwork.” At the same time, the court granted the Gallery’s cross motion “to the extent of ruling that [the Gallery] is entitled by contract to 90% of the re-[sale] value of the unsold prints, either gross or net of expenses, and the amount, if any, owed to [the Gallery] shall be determined at the plenary trial of this action.” In determining that Scher owns the prints, th 2014Regarding the ownership of the unsold prints, the court granted Scher’s mo tion to the extent of declaring that Scher “is the owner of and entitled to immediate possession of all of the approximately 320 unsold prints of her artwork.” At the same time, the court granted the Gallery’s cross motion “to the extent of ruling that [the Gallery] is entitled by contract to 90% of the re-[sale] value of the unsold prints, either gross or net of expenses, and the amount, if any, owed to [the Gallery] shall be determined at the plenary trial of this action.” In determining that Scher owns the prints, th | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Wesselmann v. International Images, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Regarding the ownership of the unsold prints, the court granted Scher’s mo tion to the extent of declaring that Scher “is the owner of and entitled to immediate possession of all of the approximately 320 unsold prints of her artwork.” At the same time, the court granted the Gallery’s cross motion “to the extent of ruling that [the Gallery] is entitled by contract to 90% of the re-[sale] value of the unsold prints, either gross or net of expenses, and the amount, if any, owed to [the Gallery] shall be determined at the plenary trial of this action.” In determining that Scher owns the prints, th 2014Regarding the ownership of the unsold prints, the court granted Scher’s mo tion to the extent of declaring that Scher “is the owner of and entitled to immediate possession of all of the approximately 320 unsold prints of her artwork.” At the same time, the court granted the Gallery’s cross motion “to the extent of ruling that [the Gallery] is entitled by contract to 90% of the re-[sale] value of the unsold prints, either gross or net of expenses, and the amount, if any, owed to [the Gallery] shall be determined at the plenary trial of this action.” In determining that Scher owns the prints, th | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences1990Nor is defendant persuasive that the ruling was in error either as to the number (seven) of the crimes (see, e.g., People v Torres, 110 AD2d 794 [2d Dept 1985]) or as to their predominantly larcenous nature (see, People v Williams, supra). 1987While the lapse of time may to some extent affect the materiality of a prior conviction (People v Williams, 56 NY2d 236, 239 ; People v Sandoval, supra, at 376 ), the fact that a conviction is temporally remote does not, by itself, mandate preclusion of cross-examination with respect thereto (see, People v Emmons, 123 AD2d 475 , lv denied 69 NY2d 827 ; People v Scott, 118 AD2d 881 , lv denied 67 NY2d 1056 ; People v Crandall, 108 AD2d 413 ). | 2 | 1987–1990 |
In re the County of Nassau
green
2 sentences1983There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). 1981There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v. State
green
2 sentences1983There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). 1981There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
Van Kleeck v. State
green
2 sentences1983There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). 1981There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
Spano v. State
green
2 sentences1983There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). 1981There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
In re the County of Nassau
green
2 sentences1983There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). 1981There is substantial support for the proposition that the value of improvements which interfere with the judicially determined best use of condemned property, and which consequently must be destroyed, is not compensable (see Van Kleeck v State of New York, 18 NY2d 897 ; Matter of County of Nassau [Colony Beach Club of Lido], 43 AD2d 45 , affd 39 NY2d 958 ; Irv-Ceil Realty Corp. v State of New York, 43 AD2d 775 ; Spano v State of New York, 22 AD2d 757 ). | 2 | 1981–1983 |
People v. Le Mieux
green
2 sentences1983The Legislature has specially provided for preserving such issues for appellate review: “In addition, a party who without success has either expressly or impliedly sought or requested a particular ruling or instruction, is deemed to have thereby protested the court’s ultimate disposition of the matter or failure to rule or instruct accordingly sufficiently to raise a question of law with respect to such disposition or failure regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered.” (CPL 470.05, subd 2.) In People v Le Mieux ( 51 NY2d 981 ), this court held that an objection was preser 1983In face of the court's refusal to charge any definition, defendant "without success * * * expressly or impliedly sought or requested a particular ruling or instruction" and thus "is deemed to have thereby protested the court's ultimate disposition of the matter * * * sufficiently to raise a question of law with respect to such disposition * * * regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered" (CPL 470.05, subd 2; see People v Cobos , 57 N.Y.2d 798, 800 , supra; People v Le Mieux , supra ). | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Yates v. . Yates
green
2 sentences1935But in later cases in the Court of Appeals it is pointed out that the rule laid down in Moller v. Moller is too broadly stated, or at least that it was “ ‘ not a rule of evidence, but one for the guidance of the judicial conscience.’ ” (See Yates v. Yates, 211 N. Y. 163, 171 , and cases therein cited.) And this dictum is found in the opinion in McKeon v. Van Slyck ( 223 N. Y. 392, at p. 398 ): “ In like manner, we have sometimes said that divorces ought not to be granted on the uncorroborated evidence of private detectives (Moller v. Moller, 115 N. Y. 466 ), but when a trial judge put before a 1927The latest view of the Court of Appeals, as evidenced in Yates v. Yates ( 211 N. Y. 163 ) and McKeon v. Van Slyck (223 id. 392, 398), is that such theory is not a rule of evidence but is one for the guidance of the judicial conscience, and that while justices and jurors are justified in looking with suspicion upon such evidence, the Court of Appeals “ has not determined as matter of law that such evidence could not be considered,” and that “ when a trial judge put before a jury as a rule of law this caution designed to guide the judicial conscience, we pronounced the ruling error.” Manning, Yo | 2 | 1927–1935 |
Denning v. Roome
neutral
2 sentences1898(Denning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 651 .) The record was the best evidence of the fact. 1898Denning v. Boome, 6 Wend. 651 . | 2 | 1898–1898 |
People v. Fernandez
green
1 sentence2019County Court erred when it determined that the proposed testimony failed to establish a proper foundation for admission of testimony regarding the victim's bad reputation for truthfulness; in fact, the offer of proof contained each element required by People v Fernandez ( 17 NY3d at 76-77 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Buckley
green
1 sentence2018CPL 470.05 (2)" follows from the language and purpose of the statute ( 75 NY2d at 846 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Rivera v. Prack
green
1 sentence2018The ruling of the hearing officer, denying the petitioner's request to call a character witness, did not violate the petitioner's right to call witnesses and complied with the relevant regulations, since such testimony would not have been material to the issues before the hearing officer ( see 7 NYCRR 254.5[a]; Matter of Navarro v Prack , 156 AD3d 994, 995 ; Matter of Rivera v Prack , 97 AD3d 879, 880 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Matter of Navarro v. Prack green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Bailey green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Ferguson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Givens neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Dunaway v. New York green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Medina green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Sallitto neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Melvin neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Sabin green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Bronstein-Becher v. Becher green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. McGill green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| McCarthy v. Klein green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Marten v. Eden Park Health Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Fehlhaber Corp. & Horn Construction Co. v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Walker green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Lewis neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Franklin Associates v. GSL Enterprises Inc. neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Wheaton neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Greene green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Peterkin green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Layer green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| People v. Etienne green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.