ruling error in Florida

2016We reasoned: A probationer’s probation period is tolled when certain criteria are met, “Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging a violation of probation or community control and following issuance of a warrant under s. 901.02, a warrantless arrest under this section, or a notice to appear under this section, the probationary period is tolled until the court enters a ruling on the violation.” § 948.06(1)(f), Fla. Stat. In a situation where there is no warrantless arrest or notice to appear, as is true in this case, “[b]oth the filing of an affidavit of violation and the issuance of an arrest w

2016“Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging a violation of probation or community control and following issuance of a warrant under s. 901.02, a warrantless arrest under this section, or a notice to appear under this section, the probationary period is tolled until the court enters a ruling on the violation.” § 948.06(l)(f), Fla. Stat. In a situation where there is no warrantless arrest or notice to appear, as is true in this case, “[b]oth the filing of an affidavit of violation and the issuance of an arrest warrant are required to toll the probationary period.” Sepulveda v. State, 909 So.2d 568

2015“In conducting our review, we are guided by the principles that ‘peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner’ and that a ruling on such a challenge ‘turns primarily on an assessment of credibility.’ ” Id. (quoting Cobb v. State, 825 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)).

2012In conducting our review, we are guided by the principles that “peremptory challenges are presumed to be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner” and that a ruling on such a challenge “turns primarily on an assessment of credibility.” Cobb v. State, 825 So.2d 1080, 1086 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2005See Howard v. State, 883 So.2d 879, 880 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). [1] "The filing of the affidavit and issuance of the warrant toll the probationary period `until the court enters a ruling on the violation.' § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)." Id.; see also State v. Boyd, 717 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla.1998).

2004State v. Boyd, 717 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla.1998). [1] The filing of the affidavit and issuance of the warrant toll the probationary period "until the court enters a ruling on the violation." § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).

2019"To obtain certiorari relief from a pretrial evidentiary ruling, the [S]tate must show that the ruling was a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." State v. Sandoval , 125 So.3d 213 , 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing State v. Pettis , 520 So.2d 250 , 254 (Fla. 1988) ).

2019"To obtain certiorari relief from a pretrial evidentiary ruling, the [S]tate must show that the ruling was a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." State v. Sandoval , 125 So.3d 213 , 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing State v. Pettis , 520 So.2d 250 , 254 (Fla. 1988) ).

2019"To obtain certiorari relief from a pretrial evidentiary ruling, the [S]tate must show that the ruling was a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." State v. Sandoval , 125 So.3d 213 , 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing State v. Pettis , 520 So.2d 250 , 254 (Fla. 1988) ).

2019"To obtain certiorari relief from a pretrial evidentiary ruling, the [S]tate must show that the ruling was a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." State v. Sandoval , 125 So.3d 213 , 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing State v. Pettis , 520 So.2d 250 , 254 (Fla. 1988) ).

2019“Rather than forming a basis to reverse the order, however, the lack of a ruling on this claim deprives this court of jurisdiction.” Bachman v. State, 253 So. 3d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); Hanner v. State, 228 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (dismissing where “[o]n appeal, Appellant argues that the postconviction court erred by failing to address all of the claims in his motion”).

2018See Hanner v. State, 228 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (dismissing where “[o]n appeal, Appellant argues that the postconviction court erred by failing to address all of the claims in his motion”).

2023See, e.g., Betancourt v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 693 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[I]n regard to cases involving claims that are ripe for adjudication at the time of the hearing, for which claimant failed to produce evidence or obtain a ruling, this court will consider the claim abandoned and the issue waived, and will consider the order final and appealable.”); Edwards v. State, 193 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (holding defendant abandoned motion and its contents where motion was filed but defendant failed to present motion to the trial court for consideration and ruling).

2023See, e.g., Betancourt v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 693 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“[I]n regard to cases involving claims that are ripe for adjudication at the time of the hearing, for which claimant failed to produce evidence or obtain a ruling, this court will consider the claim abandoned and the issue waived, and will consider the order final and appealable.”); Edwards v. State, 193 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (holding defendant abandoned motion and its contents where motion was filed but defendant failed to present motion to the trial court for consideration and ruling).

2021P. 3.800(a)(1) (requiring affirmative allegations “that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to . . . relief”); see also Chesson v. State, 729 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“[A]n illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines.”) (citations omitted); § 948.06(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (“Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging a violation of probation or community control and following issuance of a warrant for such violation, a warrantless arrest under this section, or a notice to appear und

2019“It is well-settled that an order disposing of some, but not all of the claims in a motion for postconviction relief is not an appealable final order.” Lake v. State, 53 So. 3d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

2017Co. v. Harrington, 187 So.3d 879, 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); see also Leach v. Salehpour, 19 So.3d 342, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (explaining the same and that a ruling on a rule 1.530 motion is likewise reviewed for an abuse of direction, unless it involves a pure question of law).

2017Co. v. Harrington, 187 So.3d 879, 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016); see also Leach v. Salehpour, 19 So.3d 342, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (explaining the same and that a ruling on a rule 1.530 motion is likewise reviewed for an abuse of direction, unless it involves a pure question of law).

2017Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) provides in relevant part that pursuant to a timely filed motion, a trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment based on “newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing.” “[R]ule 1.540(b), however, ‘does not have as its purpose or intent the reopening of lawsuits to allow parties to state new claims or offer new evidence omitted by oversight or inadvertence.’ ” Hooks v. Quaintance, 71 So.3d 908, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citation omitted).

2013See State v. Pettis, 520 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla.1988) (“While some pretrial evidentiary rulings may qualify for certiorari, it must be remembered that the extraordinary writ is reserved for those situations where there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”) (citation and quotations omitted); State v. Sealy-Doe, 861 So.2d 530, 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (‘We have the authority to grant such a writ where the state establishes a violation of a clearly established principle of law, resulting in a miscarriage of justice, if the pretrial rul

2011See Gosney v. State, 55 So.3d 728, 729 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

2011See Mourning v. Ballast Nedam Constr., Inc., 964 So.2d 889, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (normally a court’s ruling on a rule 1.540 motion is for abuse of discretion, however, where there is no factual dispute upon which the trial court based its determination to vacate the judgment the order is reviewed de novo).

2010See Sepulveda v. State, 909 So.2d 568, 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“Sepulveda’s allegations that he was convicted and sentenced based on a violation of probation when the term of his probation had expired state a facially sufficient claim of an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a).”); Slingbaum v. State, 751 So.2d 89, 89-90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that “where it can be determined without an evidentiary hearing that a sentence has been imposed by a court without jurisdiction, that sentence is illegal, whatever its length”).

2010See Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.2001) (citing Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999)).

2010See Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.2001) (citing Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999)).

2010See Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.2001) (citing Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999)).

2010See Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 61 (Fla.2001) (citing Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999)).

2010The Florida Supreme Court said that this ruling was error: Here, as in Swafford [v. State, 679 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996),] the State’s only argument to dispute due diligence was that defense counsel had “years” to find the witness.

2010The Florida Supreme Court said that this ruling was error: Here, as in Swafford [v. State, 679 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996),] the State's only argument to dispute due diligence was that defense counsel had "years" to find the witness.

2010When Shenfeld was placed on probation, section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provided that “[u]pon the filing of an affidavit alleging a violation of probation or community control and following issuance of a warrant under s. 901.02, the probationary period is tolled until the court enters a ruling on the violation.” Florida district courts of appeal held that under the 2001 version of section 948.06(1), “[b]oth the filing of an affidavit of violation and the issuance of an arrest warrant are required to toll the probationary period, and the mere filing of the affidavit is insufficient.”