ruling error in Virginia

2014Thus, the requirement that an appellant state the reasons why a ruling was in error is necessarily limited to those reasons the appellant has raised before the lower court, not the rationale given by the lower court in making its ruling as the majority claims. 11 “[t]he purpose of assignments of error is point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct [the] court and opposing counsel to the points on which appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit discussion to these points.” Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 290 , 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1995) (quoting Harlow

2014Thus, the requirement that an appellant state the reasons why a ruling was in error is necessarily limited to those reasons the appellant has raised before the lower court, not the rationale given by the lower court in making its ruling as the majority claims. 11 “[t]he purpose of assignments of error is point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct [the] court and opposing counsel to the points on which appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit discussion to these points.” Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 290 , 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1995) (quoting Harlow

2014Thus, the requirement that an appellant state the reasons why a ruling was in error is necessarily limited to those reasons the appellant has raised before the lower court, not the rationale given by the lower court in making its ruling as the majority claims. 11 “[t]he purpose of assignments of error is point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct [the] court and opposing counsel to the points on which appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit discussion to these points.” Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 290 , 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1995) (quoting Harlow

2014Thus, the requirement that an appellant state the reasons why a ruling was in error is necessarily limited to those reasons the appellant has raised before the lower court, not the rationale given by the lower court in making its ruling as the majority claims. 11 “[t]he purpose of assignments of error is point out the errors with reasonable certainty in order to direct [the] court and opposing counsel to the points on which appellant intends to ask a reversal of the judgment, and to limit discussion to these points.” Yeatts v. Murray, 249 Va. 285, 290 , 455 S.E.2d 18, 21 (1995) (quoting Harlow

2023“It is well-settled that ‘[d]ecisions regarding the admissibility of evidence “lie within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”’” Nottingham v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 221 , 231 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692, 697 (2019)).

2019“A non-constitutional error is harmless if it plainly appears from the record that the parties had ‘a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.’” Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 268 (2011) (quoting Code § 8.01-678).

2018See McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490 , 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); Hill v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 610 , 616-17, 812 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2018). 7 To the extent appellant asserts that this ruling was error, it is not part of the granted assignment of error and we will not consider it.

2018See McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490 , 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); Hill v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 610 , 616-17, 812 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2018). 7 To the extent appellant asserts that this ruling was error, it is not part of the granted assignment of error and we will not consider it.

2018See McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490 , 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); Hill v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 610 , 616-17, 812 S.E.2d 452, 455 (2018). 7 To the extent appellant asserts that this ruling was error, it is not part of the granted assignment of error and we will not consider it.

2013“In order to constitute reversible error, a trial court’s ruling ‘must be material and prejudicial to the interests of the party complaining of it.’” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Casale, 247 Va. - 20 - 180, 183, 441 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1994) (quoting Taylor v. Turner, 205 Va. 828, 831 , 140 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1965)).

2013“In order to constitute reversible error, a trial court’s ruling ‘must be material and prejudicial to the interests of the party complaining of it.’” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Casale, 247 Va. - 20 - 180, 183, 441 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1994) (quoting Taylor v. Turner, 205 Va. 828, 831 , 140 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1965)).

2013“In order to constitute reversible error, a trial court’s ruling ‘must be material and prejudicial to the interests of the party complaining of it.’” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Casale, 247 Va. - 20 - 180, 183, 441 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1994) (quoting Taylor v. Turner, 205 Va. 828, 831 , 140 S.E.2d 641, 643 (1965)).

2012See, e.g., Currie v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 58, 72 , 515 S.E.2d 335, 342 (1999) (holding that if a witness admits making a prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence confirming the prior inconsistent statement is not admissible for impeachment purposes).

2012See, e.g., Currie v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 58, 72 , 515 S.E.2d 335, 342 (1999) (holding that if a witness admits making a prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic evidence confirming the prior inconsistent statement is not admissible for impeachment purposes).

2012We agree. *647 "A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting his theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to support that theory." Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 85 , 466 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1996); see also Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-14 , 357 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987).

2012We agree. *647 "A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting his theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to support that theory." Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 85 , 466 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1996); see also Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-14 , 357 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987).

2012We agree. *647 "A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting his theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to support that theory." Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 85 , 466 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1996); see also Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-14 , 357 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987).

2012We agree. *647 "A litigant is entitled to jury instructions supporting his theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to support that theory." Price v. Taylor, 251 Va. 82, 85 , 466 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1996); see also Bowers v. May, 233 Va. 411, 413-14 , 357 S.E.2d 29, 30 (1987).

2011Whether an absolute or qualified privilege applies under the circumstances of this case "is a question of law that, like all questions of law, we review de novo." Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 131 , 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009) (citation omitted).

2011Whether an absolute or qualified privilege applies under the circumstances of this case "is a question of law that, like all questions of law, we review de novo." Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 131 , 670 S.E.2d 720, 722 (2009) (citation omitted).

2006The law is well-settled that there is “a legal presumption that the testator intended to dispose of his entire estate” and “there is a strong presumption against partial intestacy.” Neblett v. Smith, 142 Va. 840, 847 (1925) (quoting from Coffman’s Adm’r v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 466 (1921)).

2006The law is well-settled that there is “a legal presumption that the testator intended to dispose of his entire estate” and “there is a strong presumption against partial intestacy.” Neblett v. Smith, 142 Va. 840, 847 (1925) (quoting from Coffman’s Adm’r v. Coffman, 131 Va. 456, 466 (1921)).

2004Board of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 532 (2003) (citing Board of Supervisors v. McDonald’s Corp., 261 Va. 583, 590 (2001)). “[The BZA’s] action is reasonable if the matter in issue is fairly debatable.” Board of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va 30, 34 (1980).

2004Board of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 532 (2003) (citing Board of Supervisors v. McDonald’s Corp., 261 Va. 583, 590 (2001)). “[The BZA’s] action is reasonable if the matter in issue is fairly debatable.” Board of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va 30, 34 (1980).

2003McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197 , 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). “[W]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. at 198 , 487 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

2003McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197 , 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). “[W]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. at 198 , 487 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

2003McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197 , 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). “[W]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. at 198 , 487 S.E.2d at 261 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

2003Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 287 , 402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991).

2003Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 287 , 402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991).

1997“As a general rule, a prior consistent statement of a witness is inadmissible hearsay.” Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 404 , 417 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1992).

1997“As a general rule, a prior consistent statement of a witness is inadmissible hearsay.” Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 404 , 417 S.E.2d 305, 309 (1992).

1995See Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005 , 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991).

1995See Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005 , 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991).

1992See Worrells v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 270, 271-72 , 183 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1971).

1992See Worrells v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 270, 271-72 , 183 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1971).

1987Turner v. Burford Buick Corp., 201 Va. 693, 696-97 , 112 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1960). *133 Directed verdicts were expressly prohibited by statute in Virginia prior to 1958.

1987Turner v. Burford Buick Corp., 201 Va. 693, 696-97 , 112 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1960). *133 Directed verdicts were expressly prohibited by statute in Virginia prior to 1958.