Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1963–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Domingues v. Stategreen2 sentences2020NRS 47.120(1) (When any part of a writing or recorded staternent is introduced by a party, the party may be required at that time to introduce any other part of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other relevant parts."); see Domingues v. State. 112 Nev. 683, 693-94, 917 P.2d 1364, 1372 (1996). 2020NRS 47.120(1) (When any part of a writing or recorded staternent is introduced by a party, the party may be required at that time to introduce any other part of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other relevant parts."); see Domingues v. State. 112 Nev. 683, 693-94, 917 P.2d 1364, 1372 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.green1 sentence2011See Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that it is a party’s responsibility to “present relevant authority” in support of any arguments raised on appeal). 7 “The learned intermediary doctrine derives from § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurantgreen2 sentences2011See Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that it is a party’s responsibility to “present relevant authority” in support of any arguments raised on appeal). 7 “The learned intermediary doctrine derives from § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). 2011See Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317 , 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280 , 1288 n.38 (2006) (noting that it is a party’s responsibility to “present relevant authority” in support of any arguments raised on appeal). 7 “The learned intermediary doctrine derives from § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Benjamin Franklin Freeman v. Joseph Class, Warden, South Dakota State Penitentiary Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General for the State of South Dakotagreen1 sentence2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 1 |
People v. Overbygreen2 sentences2005People v. Overby, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 236 (Ct. App. 2004). 35 Standard 15-2.7(a) of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury provides: All challenges . . . should be addressed to the court outside of the presence of the jury, in a manner so that the jury panel is not aware of the nature of the challenge, the party making the challenge, or the basis of the court’s ruling on the challenge. 2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 1 |
Tavares v. Stategreen2 sentences2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe 2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen2 sentences1994Williams now argues that this ruling was in error because, under Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 27 , 588 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1979), the question of sanity is one for the trier of fact and the testimony which Dr. Howie was prepared to provide, though not conclusive, was relevant to the issue of Williams’ sanity. 1994Williams now argues that this ruling was in error because, under Clark v. State, 95 Nev. 24, 27 , 588 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1979), the question of sanity is one for the trier of fact and the testimony which Dr. Howie was prepared to provide, though not conclusive, was relevant to the issue of Williams’ sanity. | 1 | 1 |
Sloan v. Stearnsgreen1 sentence1982Co., 152 F.Supp. 158 (S.D.Cal. 1957); Sloan v. Stearns, 290 P.2d 382, 392 (Cal.App. 1955). *449 Therefore, while the district court may have reasoned incorrectly, the ruling was not in error and shall not be reversed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe 2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Marshall v. State
green
1 sentence2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Champion v. State
green
1 sentence2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Meek v. State
green
2 sentences2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe 2005As the commentary to this standard suggests, such a procedure avoids any potential risk that counsel’s remarks may offend the challenged juror. 36 Foster v. State, Docket No. 32872 (Order Dismissing Appeal, January 26, 2000). 37 Id. 38 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 39 The tendered instruction read as follows: “If you the jury decide that it was reasonable, from the point of view of Mr. Foster, to conclude that [the victim] had manifested consent, you must find him not guilty.” 40 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314 , 535 P.2d 797 (1975). 41 NRS 48.035(3) provides: Evidence of anothe | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Larcher v. Wanless
green
1 sentence1984All parties appear to agree that the trial court’s ruling was error if this court construes NRS 41A.097 in accordance with the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Larcher v. Wanless, 557 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1976). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Parrish v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1982Co., 152 F.Supp. 158 (S.D.Cal. 1957); Sloan v. Stearns, 290 P.2d 382, 392 (Cal.App. 1955). *449 Therefore, while the district court may have reasoned incorrectly, the ruling was not in error and shall not be reversed. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ormachea v. Ormachea
green
2 sentences1982See NRCP 61; Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 295 , 217 P.2d 355 (1950). 1982See NRCP 61; Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 295 , 217 P.2d 355 (1950). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Henry v. Baber
red
1 sentence1963Had plaintiff won his case in the trial court, and had the defendant perfected an appeal assigning the court’s ruling as error, we would have to decide whether or not the questions and answers quoted come within the rule *202 announced in Henry v. Baber, 75 Nev. 59 , 384 P.2d 839 . 2 However, here the plaintiff lost his case and appealed. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.