ruling error in California

2026Proc.,2 §§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii); 170.3, subd. (c)(1)); 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) If the party’s effort to disqualify the judge is unsuccessful, the only avenue for 2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 review is a writ petition. (§ 170.3, subd. (d); People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444 [“As we have repeatedly held, the statute means what it says: . . . section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides the exclusive means for seeking review of a ruling on a challenge to a judge, whether the challenge is for cause or peremptory.”].) Grandfather’s failur

2026Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d) provides, “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 444 .) Our Supreme Court has further elaborated that “the statute means what it says: Code of Civil Procedure 170.3, subdivision (d) provides the exclusive 4 means for seeking review of a ruling on a challeng

2023(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 (Celis).) The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unwarranted governmental intrusion.

2021(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 (Celis); People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 ; People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529 [“We judge the legality of the search by ‘measur[ing] the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness’ ”].) “We may sustain the trial court’s decision without embracing its reasoning.” (McDonald, at p. 529, original italics.) Thus, we may affirm the ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress if it is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling is based on an incorrect reas

2024(People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 776, fn. 6 .) A party may be precluded from seeking to set aside such a ruling because of waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.” (Id. at p. 287.) Victims of crime have a right to restitution under the California Constitution, which provides, “Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” (Cal. Const., art.

2015(People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 776, fn. 6 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 14 P.3d 207 ].) A party may be precluded from seeking to set aside such a ruling because of waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.

2023(See People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944 [“It is axiomatic that we review the trial court’s rulings”]; Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc v. Ricoh (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1666, 1676 [“It is axiomatic we review judicial action”].) The juvenile correctly stated the law as set forth in Caden C., and made a factual finding that mother had not satisfied the first prong of that test—a factual finding that is supported by substantial evidence.

2020(People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944 [“It is axiomatic that we review the trial court’s ruling”]; Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc v. Ricoh (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1666, 1676 [“It is axiomatic we review judicial action”].) Accordingly, we do not address the merits of Hudack’s criticisms of defendants’ trial court arguments.

2023(See People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944 [“It is axiomatic that we review the trial court’s rulings”]; Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc v. Ricoh (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1666, 1676 [“It is axiomatic we review judicial action”].) The juvenile correctly stated the law as set forth in Caden C., and made a factual finding that mother had not satisfied the first prong of that test—a factual finding that is supported by substantial evidence.

2020(People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944 [“It is axiomatic that we review the trial court’s ruling”]; Cal-State Business Products & Services, Inc v. Ricoh (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1666, 1676 [“It is axiomatic we review judicial action”].) Accordingly, we do not address the merits of Hudack’s criticisms of defendants’ trial court arguments.

2022(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652 [‘statutory judicial disqualification claim is not properly before us on this automatic appeal following a judgment of death’]; People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 333 [‘section 170.3[, subdivision] (d) creates an exception to the general rule that interlocutory rulings are reviewable on appeal from a final judgment’].)” (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665 , 671–672 (Brown).) There is no evidence in the record that Father complied with the statutory procedures to request disqualification under section 170.1 and 170.3

2004She acknowledges that in People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 334 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710 , 862 P.2d 710 ], we held that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 10 precludes appellate review of a ruling on a statutory motion for disqualification, but contends her nonstatutory claims arising under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of reliability in penalty determinations in capital cases are cognizable on appeal.

2022(People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652 [‘statutory judicial disqualification claim is not properly before us on this automatic appeal following a judgment of death’]; People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 333 [‘section 170.3[, subdivision] (d) creates an exception to the general rule that interlocutory rulings are reviewable on appeal from a final judgment’].)” (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665 , 671–672 (Brown).) There is no evidence in the record that Father complied with the statutory procedures to request disqualification under section 170.1 and 170.3

2005(People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 271-276 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 , 820 P.2d 1036 ]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ] [where defendant failed to seek review via writ of mandate, his “statutory judicial disqualification claim is not properly before us on this automatic appeal following a judgment of death”]; People v. Superior Court (Jimenez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 802 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 31 , 50 P.3d 743 ]; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 50-51 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710 , 96 P.3d 30 ].) *445 Here, defendant filed a writ petition in

2022As for Prospective Juror Ann I., the test for Witt error is the same whether it involves “ ‘erroneous juror exclusion or inclusion.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 564.) As outlined above, a prospective juror must be excused for holding views on capital punishment that would “ ‘ “substantially impair” ’ ” the juror’s ability to serve.

2022As for Prospective Juror Ann I., the test for Witt error is the same whether it involves “ ‘erroneous juror exclusion or inclusion.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 564.) As outlined above, a prospective juror must be excused for holding views on capital punishment that would “ ‘ “substantially impair” ’ ” the juror’s ability to serve.

2022Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1004.) Defendants challenge the trial court’s order denying their anti-SLAPP motion. 1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1250, fn. 1 (Jackson).) 2 We apply the required two-step framework in determining whether the trial court’s ruling was error.

2022Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1004.) Defendants challenge the trial court’s order denying their anti-SLAPP motion. 1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1250, fn. 1 (Jackson).) 2 We apply the required two-step framework in determining whether the trial court’s ruling was error.

2017(Hung Thanh Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 769 [for constitutional speedy trial claims that are not based on section 1382, “a demonstration of prejudice is required whether the trial court determines the issue before or after trial or verdict, and the standard of review for a ruling on such a claim is the same whether appellate review occurs before or after judgment”].) Bona also fails to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the challenged continuances.

2017(Hung Thanh Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009 ; see also Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 769 [for constitutional speedy trial claims that are not based on section 1382, “a demonstration of prejudice is required whether the trial court determines the issue before or after trial or verdict, and the standard of review for a ruling on such a claim is the same whether appellate review occurs before or after judgment”].) Bona also fails to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the challenged continuances.

2015(See Tennison v. California Victim Comp. & Government Claims Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1180 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ] (Tennison).) The trial court reviews the denial of a claim for compensation under section 4900 by examining the entire administrative record to determine whether the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in support of the findings.

2015(See Tennison v. California Victim Comp. & Government Claims Bd. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1180 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 88 ] (Tennison).) The trial court reviews the denial of a claim for compensation under section 4900 by examining the entire administrative record to determine whether the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in support of the findings.

2005Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 306, 315-316 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ].) Our review of the liquidation court’s factual determinations is likewise circumscribed.

2005Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 306, 315-316 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 ].) Our review of the liquidation court’s factual determinations is likewise circumscribed.

2005Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 307, 329 [ 74 P.2d 761 ]] court put the ruling standard, ‘The only restriction on the exercise of this power [to administer liquidation proceedings under the Insurance Code] is that the state’s action shall be reasonably *485 related to the public interest and shall not be arbitrary or improperly discriminatory.’ (Ibid.) [f] That seminal formulation has since been glossed repeatedly to mean the measure of judicial review in such proceedings is the familiar ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.” (Low v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2005Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 307, 329 [ 74 P.2d 761 ]] court put the ruling standard, ‘The only restriction on the exercise of this power [to administer liquidation proceedings under the Insurance Code] is that the state’s action shall be reasonably *485 related to the public interest and shall not be arbitrary or improperly discriminatory.’ (Ibid.) [f] That seminal formulation has since been glossed repeatedly to mean the measure of judicial review in such proceedings is the familiar ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.” (Low v. Golden Eagle Ins.

2016I would reverse the trial court's order awarding defendant its costs and remand for a ruling under the standard announced in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97 , 99-100, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 *211 "an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant's fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit").

2016I would reverse the trial court's order awarding defendant its costs and remand for a ruling under the standard announced in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97 , 99-100, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 826 , 347 P.3d 976 *211 "an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff should not be ordered to pay the defendant's fees or costs unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit").

2013(See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196 .) In addition, defendant does not contend that the ruling was error; she merely complains that it was not fair.

2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego.

2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego.

2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego.

2011To support its argument, Land Rover relies on the decision in Culpepper, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d 510 , in which the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling allowing evidence of testing performed on a Ford Pinto for the purpose of disputing causation in an accident involving a Volkswagen Beetle.

1990A party who seeks to introduce experimental evidence must show as foundational facts that the experiment was relevant, that it was conducted under conditions the same as or substantially similar to those of the actual occurrence, and that it “will not consume undue time, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury [citation].” (Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 510, 521 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 110 ].) The party need not, however, show that the conditions were absolutely identical.