ruling error in Michigan

1972Ayers cited and followed People v Davis, 175 Mich 594 (1913); a prosecution of male and female for adultery The following quotation, taken from Ayers , discloses fairly the primary reason for reversal of the Ayers and Da vis convictions (pp 243-244): *95 "The following question was asked by the prosecution: " 'Did he have intercourse with you after you knew you were in the family way?’ "An objection to this was overruled, and she answered 'Yes.’ This ruling was error.

1972People v Davis, 175 Mich. 594 ( 141 N.W. 667 ), and cases there cited.” The apparent if not actual conflict between Gen-gels and Trzil on the one hand, and Ayers and Davis on the other, led to our order granting leave to review the instant defendant’s conviction for statutory rape ( 385 Mich 778 ).

1936It is enough to say that the declaration contains a statement of ownership sufficient to support proof of a holding by Field in fee simple, and if we admit a failure to allege the title with the directness and certainty dictated by the rules of pleading ( Achey v. Hull , 7 Mich. 423 , 430 ), still the objection is purely technical, and is not well raised.

1880It is enough to say that the declaration contains a statement of ownership sufficient to support proof of a holding by Field in fee simple, and if we admit a failure to allege the title with the directness and certainty dictated by the rules of pleading (Achey v. Hull, 7 Mich., 423 -430), still the objection is purely technical, and is not well raised.

2025There are “three ‘requirements’ that must be met before a court grants a criminal defendant’s request for self-representation.” Id. at 350, quoting People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368 ; 247 NW2d 857 (1976).

2025There are “three ‘requirements’ that must be met before a court grants a criminal defendant’s request for self-representation.” Id. at 350, quoting People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361, 367-368 ; 247 NW2d 857 (1976).

2025Defendant merely states, without further elaboration, “This ruling was in error as this question was merely an attempt to delve into the state of mind of Ms. Sutton and to support her defense of self-defense.” “An appellant may not merely announce [her] position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor may [she] give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641 ; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

2025Defendant merely states, without further elaboration, “This ruling was in error as this question was merely an attempt to delve into the state of mind of Ms. Sutton and to support her defense of self-defense.” “An appellant may not merely announce [her] position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for [her] claims, nor may [she] give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641 ; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

2023To support a claim of unjust enrichment, one must establish: “(l) the receipt of a benefit by defendant from plaintiff, and (2) an inequity resulting to plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by defendant.” Belle Isle Grill Corp v City of Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 478 ; 666 NW2d 271 (2003).

2023To support a claim of unjust enrichment, one must establish: “(l) the receipt of a benefit by defendant from plaintiff, and (2) an inequity resulting to plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by defendant.” Belle Isle Grill Corp v City of Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 478 ; 666 NW2d 271 (2003).

2021Again, the trial court’s ruling and instruction were correct, see MRE 401; MRE 402, and nothing about the exchange suggested that the trial court was deliberately undermining the defense or otherwise pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, see Stevens, 498 Mich at 170-171 .

2015But “[t]he mere fact that a judge ruled against a litigant... is not sufficient to require disqualification,” and the trial court’s opinion on immunity did not reflect “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible . . . .” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2015But “[t]he mere fact that a judge ruled against a litigant... is not sufficient to require disqualification,” and the trial court’s opinion on immunity did not reflect “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible . . . .” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 680 ; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2015People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 177 ; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). -3- must have intended to “defraud or cheat” complainant, i.e., he must have knowingly intended to unlawfully keep the $4,000.

2015People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 177 ; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). -3- must have intended to “defraud or cheat” complainant, i.e., he must have knowingly intended to unlawfully keep the $4,000.

2009The prosecuting attorney’s office employed only two attorneys, McLennan and Steiger, and McLennan prosecuted Davenport in the trial court. *194 In our prior opinion, People v Davenport, 280 Mich App 464, 470-471 ; 760 NW2d 743 (2008), we addressed Davenport’s claim that his trial counsel, Janet Frederick-Wilson, provided ineffective assistance 2 for failing to raise the issue of Steiger’s move to the prosecutor’s office: We affirm the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel’s failure to raise this matter constitutes an objectively unreasonable error.

2009The prosecuting attorney’s office employed only two attorneys, McLennan and Steiger, and McLennan prosecuted Davenport in the trial court. *194 In our prior opinion, People v Davenport, 280 Mich App 464, 470-471 ; 760 NW2d 743 (2008), we addressed Davenport’s claim that his trial counsel, Janet Frederick-Wilson, provided ineffective assistance 2 for failing to raise the issue of Steiger’s move to the prosecutor’s office: We affirm the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel’s failure to raise this matter constitutes an objectively unreasonable error.

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2007See MCR 2.613(A): “An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” See Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388 ; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (“we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion standard in Babcock to the Spalding test”); Wood

2003While there does not appear to be collusion between plaintiff and defendant in this case (I note, however, that although paternity was not challenged by defendant, plaintiff did not attach evidence of the paternity test results to his complaint), the majority's ruling provides no bar to such collusion between a claimed putative father and a woman married to someone else, who, for whatever reason, wish to rebut, without notice, the legal presumption of fatherhood bestowed on the husband. [3] I note that unlike a motion to dismiss for lack of standing under MCR 2.116(C)(5), a motion for summary

2003While there does not appear to be collusion between plaintiff and defendant in this case (I note, however, that although paternity was not challenged by defendant, plaintiff did not attach evidence of the paternity test results to his complaint), the majority's ruling provides no bar to such collusion between a claimed putative father and a woman married to someone else, who, for whatever reason, wish to rebut, without notice, the legal presumption of fatherhood bestowed on the husband. [3] I note that unlike a motion to dismiss for lack of standing under MCR 2.116(C)(5), a motion for summary

1998The merc affirmed the ruling of the hearing referee 6 with the exception that it disagreed that there was a waiver of the right to bargain over a modification or unilateral action by respondents MBA and messa. 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed the MERC decision, 218 Mich App 734 ; 555 NW2d 267 (1996), holding that, in bargaining for the Messa Super Care II policy, the Charging Party bargained for the specific contents of the policy when the collective bargaining agreement was entered and that the school district was denied its opportunity to renegotiate before unilateral change of the policy was

1998The merc affirmed the ruling of the hearing referee 6 with the exception that it disagreed that there was a waiver of the right to bargain over a modification or unilateral action by respondents MBA and messa. 7 The Court of Appeals affirmed the MERC decision, 218 Mich App 734 ; 555 NW2d 267 (1996), holding that, in bargaining for the Messa Super Care II policy, the Charging Party bargained for the specific contents of the policy when the collective bargaining agreement was entered and that the school district was denied its opportunity to renegotiate before unilateral change of the policy was

1998In support of its claim, plaintiff relies on Davidson v Secretary of State, 351 Mich 4 ; 87 NW2d 131 (1957).

1998In support of its claim, plaintiff relies on Davidson v Secretary of State, 351 Mich 4 ; 87 NW2d 131 (1957).

1987On retrial, cross-examination of Elva Rushton on the matter is appropriate cross-examination to credit under MRE 608(b); People v Mitchell, 402 Mich 506, 515 ; 265 NW2d 163 (1978).

1987On retrial, cross-examination of Elva Rushton on the matter is appropriate cross-examination to credit under MRE 608(b); People v Mitchell, 402 Mich 506, 515 ; 265 NW2d 163 (1978).

1975People v Burks, 48 Mich App 484 ; 210 NW2d 495 (1973); People v Carter, 54 Mich App 69 ; 220 NW2d 330 (1974).

1975People v Burks, 48 Mich App 484 ; 210 NW2d 495 (1973); People v Carter, 54 Mich App 69 ; 220 NW2d 330 (1974).

1975People v Burks, 48 Mich App 484 ; 210 NW2d 495 (1973); People v Carter, 54 Mich App 69 ; 220 NW2d 330 (1974).

1975People v Burks, 48 Mich App 484 ; 210 NW2d 495 (1973); People v Carter, 54 Mich App 69 ; 220 NW2d 330 (1974).

1974In Western Michigan University Board of Trustees v Slavin, 381 Mich 23, 26 ; 158 NW2d 884, 885 (1968), citing Detroit v Fidelity Realty Co, 213 Mich 448 ; 182 NW 140 (1921), our Supreme Court said: "It is a recognized rule of this Court in condemnation cases that strict rules as to the admissibility of testimony are not always enforced, that ordinarily this Court will not set aside the award because of the introduction of improper evidence or improper rulings of a trial judge where one attends, but that where prejudicial, inadmissible testimony was received and acted upon by the jury, or where

1974In Western Michigan University Board of Trustees v Slavin, 381 Mich 23, 26 ; 158 NW2d 884, 885 (1968), citing Detroit v Fidelity Realty Co, 213 Mich 448 ; 182 NW 140 (1921), our Supreme Court said: "It is a recognized rule of this Court in condemnation cases that strict rules as to the admissibility of testimony are not always enforced, that ordinarily this Court will not set aside the award because of the introduction of improper evidence or improper rulings of a trial judge where one attends, but that where prejudicial, inadmissible testimony was received and acted upon by the jury, or where

1974In Western Michigan University Board of Trustees v Slavin, 381 Mich 23, 26 ; 158 NW2d 884, 885 (1968), citing Detroit v Fidelity Realty Co, 213 Mich 448 ; 182 NW 140 (1921), our Supreme Court said: "It is a recognized rule of this Court in condemnation cases that strict rules as to the admissibility of testimony are not always enforced, that ordinarily this Court will not set aside the award because of the introduction of improper evidence or improper rulings of a trial judge where one attends, but that where prejudicial, inadmissible testimony was received and acted upon by the jury, or where

1974In Western Michigan University Board of Trustees v Slavin, 381 Mich 23, 26 ; 158 NW2d 884, 885 (1968), citing Detroit v Fidelity Realty Co, 213 Mich 448 ; 182 NW 140 (1921), our Supreme Court said: "It is a recognized rule of this Court in condemnation cases that strict rules as to the admissibility of testimony are not always enforced, that ordinarily this Court will not set aside the award because of the introduction of improper evidence or improper rulings of a trial judge where one attends, but that where prejudicial, inadmissible testimony was received and acted upon by the jury, or where

1925In support of that ruling counsel for defendants cites Bissell v. Ford, 176 Mich. 64, 78 , quoting from its concluding paragraph that— “The use which is being made of the property at the time the injury occurs is a proper basis for estimating the damages.” That language was used supplemental to a ruling that the claim for compensation there made could not be successfully met by showing that if the injured property was devoted to some other use than it was the damages would be diminished.

1922The reasons for the rule have been so often discussed in text books and published decisions that it seems unnecessary to repeat them, but for those not familiar with the subject and of inquiring mind a lead may be found in the following citations: Duncan v. Seeley, 34 Mich. 369 ; People v. Lyons, 49 Mich. 78; Cortland Manfg.

1922The reasons for the rule have been so often discussed in text books and published decisions that it seems unnecessary to repeat them, but for those not familiar with the subject and of inquiring mind a lead may be found in the following citations: Duncan v. Seeley, 34 Mich. 369 ; People v. Lyons, 49 Mich. 78; Cortland Manfg.

1906The memorandum was made in the immediate presence of the plaintiff with whom the contract was made, and, while not conclusive, was a part of the res gestae, and as such admissible testimony. 1 Current Law, p. 1149; Bennett v. Smith, 40 Mich. 211 ; Freese v. Arnold, 99 Mich. 13 ; Place v. Baugher, 159 Ind. 232 .

1906The memorandum was made in the immediate presence of the plaintiff with whom the contract was made, and, while not conclusive, was a part of the res gestae, and as such admissible testimony. 1 Current Law, p. 1149; Bennett v. Smith, 40 Mich. 211 ; Freese v. Arnold, 99 Mich. 13 ; Place v. Baugher, 159 Ind. 232 .