ruling error in Oklahoma

2015Id. ' 116 Applying Johnson to the record evidence presented in the instant case, Special Judge Hiddle found the initial stop was illegal. 1 However, referring this Court to United States v. Burkley, 513 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir.2008), the State contends this ruling was in error and asserts the mere fact that Officer Turnbough's police car was on the roadway and may have been affected by Appel-lee's failure to signal was sufficient to prove a § 11-604 violation.

2015Id. ¶16 Applying Johnson to the record evidence presented in the instant case, Special Judge Hiddle found the initial stop was illegal. 1 However, referring this Court to United States v. Burkley , 513 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2008), the State contends this ruling was in error and asserts the mere fact that Officer Turnbough's police car was on the roadway and may have been affected by Appellee's failure to signal was sufficient to prove a § 11-604 violation.

2010Appellant complains in his first proposition that this ruling was in error and violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. ¶ 9 It is true, as Appellant asserts, that the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986).

2010Appellant complains in his first proposition that this ruling was in error and violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. ¶ 9 It is true, as Appellant asserts, that the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986).

2000In support of his argument Appellant cites Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) for its holding that a "jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense." Appellant correctly notes that this Court has addressed the issue of whether an accomplice's sentence is relevant to a defendant's character, record or is a circumstance of the offense: In the sentencing phase of the trial, the fact that an alleged accomplice did not receive the death pena

2000In support of his argument Appellant cites Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 , 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) for its holding that a "jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense." Appellant correctly notes that this Court has addressed the issue of whether an accomplice's sentence is relevant to a defendant's character, record or is a circumstance of the offense: In the sentencing phase of the trial, the fact that an alleged accomplice did not receive the death pena

1999Spunaitgle v. State, 1997 OKCR 47, ¶ 33, 946 P.2d 246, 253 .

1999He supports his argument by citing to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).

1999He supports his argument by citing to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985).

1998E.g., Cannon v. State, 1995 OK CR 45 , 904 P.2d 89, 97 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 , 116 S.Ct. 1272 , 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996).

1998E.g., Cannon v. State, 1995 OK CR 45 , 904 P.2d 89, 97 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 , 116 S.Ct. 1272 , 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996).

1998E.g., Cannon v. State, 1995 OK CR 45 , 904 P.2d 89, 97 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 , 116 S.Ct. 1272 , 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996).

1998E.g., Cannon v. State, 1995 OK CR 45 , 904 P.2d 89, 97 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 , 116 S.Ct. 1272 , 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996).

1998E.g., Cannon v. State, 1995 OK CR 45 , 904 P.2d 89, 97 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1176 , 116 S.Ct. 1272 , 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996).

1998Although Appellant acknowledges that this Court has not previously addressed the applicability of these instructions to witnesses who meet the definition of an accomplice with regard to uncharged crimes, he urges this Court to consider the issue now. ¶ 20 This Court has long held that, “[t]he test used to determine whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he or she could be indicted for the offense for which the accused is being tried.” Carter v. State, 879 P.2d 1234, 1246 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1172 , 115 S.Ct. 1149 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1107 (1995).

1998Although Appellant acknowledges that this Court has not previously addressed the applicability of these instructions to witnesses who meet the definition of an accomplice with regard to uncharged crimes, he urges this Court to consider the issue now. ¶ 20 This Court has long held that, “[t]he test used to determine whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he or she could be indicted for the offense for which the accused is being tried.” Carter v. State, 879 P.2d 1234, 1246 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1172 , 115 S.Ct. 1149 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1107 (1995).

1998Although Appellant acknowledges that this Court has not previously addressed the applicability of these instructions to witnesses who meet the definition of an accomplice with regard to uncharged crimes, he urges this Court to consider the issue now. ¶ 20 This Court has long held that, “[t]he test used to determine whether a witness is an accomplice is whether he or she could be indicted for the offense for which the accused is being tried.” Carter v. State, 879 P.2d 1234, 1246 (Okl.Cr.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1172 , 115 S.Ct. 1149 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1107 (1995).

1965Therefore, under the rule followed in Brown v. Brown, supra, this feature of the trial will not be •considered.

1923In Niccolls v. Esterly, 16 Kan. 32 , opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer, the court says: “While a party may not under sec. 322 of the Civil Code, testify in his own behalf as to any transaction had personally by him with a deceased partner or joint contractor, in the absence of his surviving partner or joint contractor, when such surviving partner or joint contractor is an adverse party, yet if he is called 'by such adverse party to testify as to a part of any such transaction he may at his own instance, and in his own behalf, testify as to the whole of such transaction.” *152 In the opinion in the

1923Rep. 50’.” In the case of Hartzell v. Hartzell, 42 Okla. 390 , 141 Pac. 772 , it is said in the syllabus: “An objection on the ground that the testimony is incompetent does not raise the question of the competency of the witness.” In case of Butler et al. v. Wilson, 54 Okla. 229 , 103 Pac. 823 , it is said in the first paragraph of the syllabus: “An objection to the witness on the ground of .competency must go to the competency of the witness, and is insufficient if the objection merely goes to the competency of the testimony of the witness.” Furthermore, the court’s ruling was not error, even

1923Rep. 50’.” In the case of Hartzell v. Hartzell, 42 Okla. 390 , 141 Pac. 772 , it is said in the syllabus: “An objection on the ground that the testimony is incompetent does not raise the question of the competency of the witness.” In case of Butler et al. v. Wilson, 54 Okla. 229 , 103 Pac. 823 , it is said in the first paragraph of the syllabus: “An objection to the witness on the ground of .competency must go to the competency of the witness, and is insufficient if the objection merely goes to the competency of the testimony of the witness.” Furthermore, the court’s ruling was not error, even

1923Rep. 50’.” In the case of Hartzell v. Hartzell, 42 Okla. 390 , 141 Pac. 772 , it is said in the syllabus: “An objection on the ground that the testimony is incompetent does not raise the question of the competency of the witness.” In case of Butler et al. v. Wilson, 54 Okla. 229 , 103 Pac. 823 , it is said in the first paragraph of the syllabus: “An objection to the witness on the ground of .competency must go to the competency of the witness, and is insufficient if the objection merely goes to the competency of the testimony of the witness.” Furthermore, the court’s ruling was not error, even

1916If this ruling was error, the defendant in error is in no position to complain 'of it, because the instruction is. in comformity with the allega *89 tions in liis petition on this subject; but in the case of Ezzard v. State National Bank, 57 Okla. 371 , 157 Pac. 127 , the court had this exact question under consideration, and it was held there: “A purchasing corporation does not become liable for the prior debts or obligations of the vendor corporation, in the absence of either express contract or statutory provisions therefor.

1916If this ruling was error, the defendant in error is in no position to complain 'of it, because the instruction is. in comformity with the allega *89 tions in liis petition on this subject; but in the case of Ezzard v. State National Bank, 57 Okla. 371 , 157 Pac. 127 , the court had this exact question under consideration, and it was held there: “A purchasing corporation does not become liable for the prior debts or obligations of the vendor corporation, in the absence of either express contract or statutory provisions therefor.