ruling error in Massachusetts

2018See Commonwealth v. Mitchell , 444 Mass. 786 , 791 (2005). "[T]he party moving to subpoena documents to be produced before trial must establish good cause, satisfied by a showing '(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not

2017Rather, it is intended to "expedite trial proceedings and to avoid delays caused when counsel must inspect or examine documents or objects produced in response to a summons." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 796-797 (2005). 9 The second and third requirements of Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004), are neither disputed nor relevant to this appeal. 7 We review a judge's ruling on rule 17 (a) (2) motions for abuse of discretion.

2025Jones, 478 Mass. at 68, quoting Lampron, 441 Mass. at 269-270 .

2017Rather, it is intended to "expedite trial proceedings and to avoid delays caused when counsel must inspect or examine documents or objects produced in response to a summons." Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 796-797 (2005). 9 The second and third requirements of Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 269 (2004), are neither disputed nor relevant to this appeal. 7 We review a judge's ruling on rule 17 (a) (2) motions for abuse of discretion.

2026See Roch v. Mollica, 481 Mass. 164 , 165 n.2 (2019). 4 The husband first argues that the judge violated his right to due process by not conducting an evidentiary hearing, not continuing the hearing after permitting his attorney to withdraw, preventing him from presenting exculpatory evidence, and not resolving what he describes as "ambiguities" in his favor.

2025Despite the fact that the good cause standard of rule 55 (c) is "less stringent" than the excusable neglect standard of rule 60 (b) (1), see Institution for Sav. in Newburyport & Its Vicinity v. Langis, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 822 (2018), and the judge's ruling applied rule 55 (c), the defendant again frames his appellate argument under the paradigm of rule 60 (b) (1).

2017Germain's] protected petitioning activity." We review the judge's ruling for an error of law or 11 The preponderance of the evidence standard has been defined as the quantum of evidence that makes a certain proposition "appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there." Sargent v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 307 Mass. 246, 250 (1940). 12 an abuse of discretion.

2017See Marabello v. Boston Bark Corp., 463 Mass. 394, 397 (2012). 3.

2017She's not intelligent enough, she's not sophisticated enough to perpetuate a cold, calculating fabrication." Although the argument was properly based on the evidence admitted at trial, see Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 433 (1984) (although "there was no misconduct in the prosecutor's summation because he relied on a ruling by the judge, we conclude that the judge's ruling was error"), it served to focus the jury on Larson's testimony for the wrong reasons.

2016See, e.g., Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7 (discussing the appropriate standard of review with respect to the analysis of the second prong of the two-part test). 7 We conclude that whether we review the judge’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo or with discretion, the ruling was in error with respect to the statements to the Boston Globe, but was not in error with respect to the e-mail sent to hospital employees. 2.

2016See, e.g., Benoit, 454 Mass. at 154 n.7 (discussing the appropriate standard of review with respect to the analysis of the second prong of the two-part test).7 We conclude that whether we review the judge's denial of the motion to dismiss de novo or with discretion, the ruling was in error with respect to the statements to the Boston Globe, but was not in error with respect to the e-mail sent to hospital employees. 2.

2016A judge’s ruling on a rule 60(b)(6) motion “will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Rezendes v. Rezendes, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 441 (1999). 7 , 8 1.

2016See Rule 6 of *433 the Rules of the Superior Court (1989). 9 The defendant, citing Powers, supra, contends that the judge’s ruling was error because it was based on the mistaken premise that a white defendant is not entitled to make a Soares-Batson challenge. 10 Looking at the colloquy as a whole, see note 8, supra; note 11, infra, there are two possible interpretations of the judge’s ruling.

2015Specifically, pursuant to G.L.c. 231, §60G(a), a defendant may, as here, move for a post-verdict hearing to offer evidence in regard to the. amount of damages awarded a plaintiff for medical costs and expenses incurred prejudgment which the defendant claims were “replaced, compensated or indemnified” by a collateral source, such as health or disability insurance. 2 If any such awarded damages duplicate those collateral benefits, the statute requires the judge to “reduce the award by the amount of the benefits, less the amount the plaintiff paid to secure such benefits, through premiums and the

2014See King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650 , 658 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1473 (2013) (defendant who raises affirmative defense in answer “may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on that defense at a later juncture through his conduct”).

2014See King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650 , 658 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1473 (2013) (defendant who raises affirmative defense in answer “may forfeit the right to seek a ruling on that defense at a later juncture through his conduct”).

2010See Commonwealth v. Moorer, 431 Mass. 544, 546-548 (2000).

2010The trial judge is afforded substantial discretion in deciding whether, and for what purposes, evidence is relevant, see Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 477 (1991), and a trial judge's rulings on these questions are reversible only for an abuse of discretion.

2010The trial judge is afforded substantial discretion in deciding whether, and for what purposes, evidence is relevant, see Anthony’s Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 477 (1991), and a trial judge’s rulings on these questions are reversible only for an abuse of discretion.

2009In Worcester County v. Mayor & Aldermen of Worcester, 116 Mass. 193, 194 (1874), this court held that, notwithstanding the absence of any specific statutory exemption from taxation for county-owned land, such land is exempt from taxation if it is owned by an “instrumentalit[y] ” of the Commonwealth and devoted to public purposes. “[C]ourts infer that it is not the intention of the Legislature to tax [county property used for public purposes] in the absence of any express declaration that it should be taxed.” Essex County v. Salem, 153 Mass. 141, 142 (1891).

2009In Worcester County v. Mayor & Aldermen of Worcester, 116 Mass. 193, 194 (1874), this court held that, notwithstanding the absence of any specific statutory exemption from taxation for county-owned land, such land is exempt from taxation if it is owned by an “instrumentalit[y] ” of the Commonwealth and devoted to public purposes. “[C]ourts infer that it is not the intention of the Legislature to tax [county property used for public purposes] in the absence of any express declaration that it should be taxed.” Essex County v. Salem, 153 Mass. 141, 142 (1891).

2008Nor does the record indicate that they sought to have a sealed transcript provided for this court, cf. Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 431 Mass. 609, 617 (2000). 35 The defendants have not demonstrated that they were deprived of anything meaningful to their defense.

2008The defendants have the burden of establishing why the judge’s ruling was in error, and they have not done so. 34 Commonwealth v. Torres, 437 Mass. 460, 469 (2002).

2008There also must be a determination that there is “a substantial basis ... for claiming prejudice from the nondisclosure.” Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 412 (1992).

2008See Jinwala v. Bizzaro, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (1987), noting that “[t]he landlord [was] not barred by rules of issue preclusion ... by virtue of his failure to seek recovery for damages in the original summary process complaint or by the denial of his motion to amend the complaint for that purpose” (citation omitted).

1999See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992).

1998It’s based on that he relies upon that.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 842 (1996) (opinion based on eight years’ experience with nonspecific ortho-tolodine testing); Commonwealth v. Avellar, 416 Mass. 409, 417-418 (1993) (pediatrician’s opinion that child victim’s father exhibited inappropriate grief response at hospital); Commonwealth v. Ghee, 414 Mass. 313, 320 (1993) (opinions based on physical comparisons of fingerprint photographs and die lines on plastic bags); Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 569 (1986) (opinion that bite marks matched defendant’s dental imp