quoted rule in Georgia

1990When the Court reexamined its holding in Bennett v. City of Baxley, 149 Ga. 275 ( 99 SE 864 ) (1919), in Phillips, 210 Ga. at 75 , it stated: We wish at this time to put at rest any doubts resulting from that case.

1990When the Court reexamined its holding in Bennett v. City of Baxley, 149 Ga. 275 ( 99 SE 864 ) (1919), in Phillips, 210 Ga. at 75 , it stated: We wish at this time to put at rest any doubts resulting from that case.

1987Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535, 539 , supra. Under circumstances similar to those of the case sub judice, the Supreme Court in National Factor accepted the above quoted rule and held, "that the circumstances must be such as to raise a presumption of knowledge that the party is acting dishonestly, or adequate notice to the bank may come from circumstances which reasonably support the sole inference that a breach of trust is intended." National Factor &c.

1987Corp. v. State Bank of Cochran, 224 Ga. 535, 539 , supra. Under circumstances similar to those of the case sub judice, the Supreme Court in National Factor accepted the above quoted rule and held, “that the circumstances must be such as to raise a presumption of knowledge that the party is acting dishonestly, or adequate notice to the bank may come from circumstances which reasonably support the sole inference that a breach of trust is intended.” National Factor &c.

1981The facts of this case fall within the quoted rule of Pethel v. Waters, supra. Under these facts the trial court did not err in failing to charge that an agreement to forbear must be for a definite period of time and the verdict of the jury should not have been set aside.

1977The default, if it occurred in May, 1972, could only be opened in November, 1976, under the provisions of Code § 81A-155 (b) specifying that at any time before final judgment, on payment of costs, etc. the court in its discretion may allow a default to be opened "for providential cause preventing the filing of a plea or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to be opened.” In Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201 ( 219 SE2d 115 ) we certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the above

1977The default, if it occurred in May, 1972, could only be opened in November, 1976, under the provisions of Code § 81A-155 (b) specifying that at any time before final judgment, on payment of costs, etc. the court in its discretion may allow a default to be opened "for providential cause preventing the filing of a plea or for excusable neglect or where the judge, from all the facts, shall determine that a proper case has been made for the default to be opened.” In Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc., 235 Ga. 201 ( 219 SE2d 115 ) we certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the above

1977Relying in large part on Axelroad v. Preston, 232 Ga. 836 ( 209 SE2d 178 ), a case where the court had made a discretionary ruling to allow a default to be opened which he felt to be due to the illness of counsel, the Supreme Court ruled that three grounds for opening a default exist.

1977Relying in large part on Axelroad v. Preston, 232 Ga. 836 ( 209 SE2d 178 ), a case where the court had made a discretionary ruling to allow a default to be opened which he felt to be due to the illness of counsel, the Supreme Court ruled that three grounds for opening a default exist.

1965It follows, therefore, that upon application of the above quoted principle *652 to the facts of the present case (which for the purposes of this decision are almost identical with the facts in Merritt v. State, 110 Ga. App. 150 , supra), it must-be held that the defense of entrapment was not proven.

1964Co., 91 Ga. App. 746 ( 87 SE2d 166 ); Sharpe v. Frost, 94 Ga. App. 444 ( 95 SE2d 309 ); Wilson v. Garrett, 92 Ga. App. 820 ( 90 SE2d 74 ); Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 552 ( 103 SE2d 745 ). (b) Special grounds 10, 11, 13 and 14, numbered 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the amended motion for new trial complain of ex *347 cerpts from the charge, and special ground 15, numbered 17 of the amended motion for new trial complains of the failure to charge a quoted principle of law even without request.

1964Co., 91 Ga. App. 746 ( 87 SE2d 166 ); Sharpe v. Frost, 94 Ga. App. 444 ( 95 SE2d 309 ); Wilson v. Garrett, 92 Ga. App. 820 ( 90 SE2d 74 ); Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 552 ( 103 SE2d 745 ). (b) Special grounds 10, 11, 13 and 14, numbered 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the amended motion for new trial complain of ex *347 cerpts from the charge, and special ground 15, numbered 17 of the amended motion for new trial complains of the failure to charge a quoted principle of law even without request.

1964Co., 91 Ga. App. 746 ( 87 SE2d 166 ); Sharpe v. Frost, 94 Ga. App. 444 ( 95 SE2d 309 ); Wilson v. Garrett, 92 Ga. App. 820 ( 90 SE2d 74 ); Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 552 ( 103 SE2d 745 ). (b) Special grounds 10, 11, 13 and 14, numbered 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the amended motion for new trial complain of ex *347 cerpts from the charge, and special ground 15, numbered 17 of the amended motion for new trial complains of the failure to charge a quoted principle of law even without request.

1964Co., 91 Ga. App. 746 ( 87 SE2d 166 ); Sharpe v. Frost, 94 Ga. App. 444 ( 95 SE2d 309 ); Wilson v. Garrett, 92 Ga. App. 820 ( 90 SE2d 74 ); Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 552 ( 103 SE2d 745 ). (b) Special grounds 10, 11, 13 and 14, numbered 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the amended motion for new trial complain of ex *347 cerpts from the charge, and special ground 15, numbered 17 of the amended motion for new trial complains of the failure to charge a quoted principle of law even without request.

1964Co., 91 Ga. App. 746 ( 87 SE2d 166 ); Sharpe v. Frost, 94 Ga. App. 444 ( 95 SE2d 309 ); Wilson v. Garrett, 92 Ga. App. 820 ( 90 SE2d 74 ); Roseberry v. Freeman, 97 Ga. App. 545, 552 ( 103 SE2d 745 ). (b) Special grounds 10, 11, 13 and 14, numbered 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the amended motion for new trial complain of ex *347 cerpts from the charge, and special ground 15, numbered 17 of the amended motion for new trial complains of the failure to charge a quoted principle of law even without request.

1963The Supreme Court, however, in Stuart v. Berry, 218 Ga. 361 ( 127 SE2d 912 ) found that no question regarding the constitutionality of a statute remained in the case, that it had no jurisdiction, and that: “The above quoted rule from the act of 1952 [Code Ann. § 81-1001], as construed by this court and the Court of Appeals, renders moot the overruling of the demurrers to the original petition, to the three amendments, and to the petition as amended.

1963The Supreme Court, however, in Stuart v. Berry, 218 Ga. 361 ( 127 SE2d 912 ) found that no question regarding the constitutionality of a statute remained in the case, that it had no jurisdiction, and that: “The above quoted rule from the act of 1952 [Code Ann. § 81-1001], as construed by this court and the Court of Appeals, renders moot the overruling of the demurrers to the original petition, to the three amendments, and to the petition as amended.

1962The rule that must be applied here is stated in Board of Tax Assessors v. Catledge, 173 Ga. 656 (1) ( 160 SE 909 ): “The cardinal rule in the construction of legislative enactments is to ascertain the true intention of the General Assembly in the passage of the law.

1962The rule that must be applied here is stated in Board of Tax Assessors v. Catledge, 173 Ga. 656 (1) ( 160 SE 909 ): “The cardinal rule in the construction of legislative enactments is to ascertain the true intention of the General Assembly in the passage of the law.

1958The plaintiff contends that on general demurrer the petition should not be dismissed when there is any allegation of negligence, and relies on that line of -cases exemplified by Hudgins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 122 Ga. 695 ( 50 S. E. 974 ), and Southern Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 95 Ga. App. 263, 265 ( 97 S. E. 2d 629 ), where it was held: “In the absence of allegations that make it affirmatively appear that the plaintiffs’ losses were caused by their own negligence, simple allegations of negligence are sufficient as against general demurrer.” This contention is wit

1958The plaintiff contends that on general demurrer the petition should not be dismissed when there is any allegation of negligence, and relies on that line of -cases exemplified by Hudgins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 122 Ga. 695 ( 50 S. E. 974 ), and Southern Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 95 Ga. App. 263, 265 ( 97 S. E. 2d 629 ), where it was held: “In the absence of allegations that make it affirmatively appear that the plaintiffs’ losses were caused by their own negligence, simple allegations of negligence are sufficient as against general demurrer.” This contention is wit

1957Co., 132 Ga. 515 ( 64 S. E. 456 ); Rowe Motor Express Co. v. Twiggs County, 152 Ga. 548 ( 110 S. E. 303 ); Carr v. Carr, 157 Ga. 208 ( 121 S. E. 227 ).” The plaintiff contends that the above quoted rule does not apply to the present case and cites Hiller v. Howell, 74 Ga. 174 ; Dilman Bros. v. Patterson Produce &c.

1957Co., 132 Ga. 515 ( 64 S. E. 456 ); Rowe Motor Express Co. v. Twiggs County, 152 Ga. 548 ( 110 S. E. 303 ); Carr v. Carr, 157 Ga. 208 ( 121 S. E. 227 ).” The plaintiff contends that the above quoted rule does not apply to the present case and cites Hiller v. Howell, 74 Ga. 174 ; Dilman Bros. v. Patterson Produce &c.

1957Co., 132 Ga. 515 ( 64 S. E. 456 ); Rowe Motor Express Co. v. Twiggs County, 152 Ga. 548 ( 110 S. E. 303 ); Carr v. Carr, 157 Ga. 208 ( 121 S. E. 227 ).” The plaintiff contends that the above quoted rule does not apply to the present case and cites Hiller v. Howell, 74 Ga. 174 ; Dilman Bros. v. Patterson Produce &c.

1957Co., 132 Ga. 515 ( 64 S. E. 456 ); Rowe Motor Express Co. v. Twiggs County, 152 Ga. 548 ( 110 S. E. 303 ); Carr v. Carr, 157 Ga. 208 ( 121 S. E. 227 ).” The plaintiff contends that the above quoted rule does not apply to the present case and cites Hiller v. Howell, 74 Ga. 174 ; Dilman Bros. v. Patterson Produce &c.

1957Co., 132 Ga. 515 ( 64 S. E. 456 ); Rowe Motor Express Co. v. Twiggs County, 152 Ga. 548 ( 110 S. E. 303 ); Carr v. Carr, 157 Ga. 208 ( 121 S. E. 227 ).” The plaintiff contends that the above quoted rule does not apply to the present case and cites Hiller v. Howell, 74 Ga. 174 ; Dilman Bros. v. Patterson Produce &c.

1957Co., 2 Ga. App. 213 ( 58 S. E. 365 ); and Lowe Co. v. Teasley & Co., 4 Ga. App. 155 ( 60 S. E. 1077 ).

1957The last case cited was expressly disapproved by this court in Brooks v. Jackins, 38 Ga. App. 57 ( 142 S. E. 574 ), where after the above quoted rule was applied it was said (headnote 3a): “The ruling by this court in Lowe Co. v. Teasley & Co., 4 Ga. App. 155 (3) ( 60 S. E. 1077 ), to the effect that where a trial judge, in granting a new trial, places his judgment solely upon a specified ground alleging error of law, the merits of that particular ground will be inquired into regardless of whether the new trial is a first new trial or not, appears to be in conflict with *6 the decisions of the

1957The last case cited was expressly disapproved by this court in Brooks v. Jackins, 38 Ga. App. 57 ( 142 S. E. 574 ), where after the above quoted rule was applied it was said (headnote 3a): “The ruling by this court in Lowe Co. v. Teasley & Co., 4 Ga. App. 155 (3) ( 60 S. E. 1077 ), to the effect that where a trial judge, in granting a new trial, places his judgment solely upon a specified ground alleging error of law, the merits of that particular ground will be inquired into regardless of whether the new trial is a first new trial or not, appears to be in conflict with *6 the decisions of the

1957The last case cited was expressly disapproved by this court in Brooks v. Jackins, 38 Ga. App. 57 ( 142 S. E. 574 ), where after the above quoted rule was applied it was said (headnote 3a): “The ruling by this court in Lowe Co. v. Teasley & Co., 4 Ga. App. 155 (3) ( 60 S. E. 1077 ), to the effect that where a trial judge, in granting a new trial, places his judgment solely upon a specified ground alleging error of law, the merits of that particular ground will be inquired into regardless of whether the new trial is a first new trial or not, appears to be in conflict with *6 the decisions of the

1957The last case cited was expressly disapproved by this court in Brooks v. Jackins, 38 Ga. App. 57 ( 142 S. E. 574 ), where after the above quoted rule was applied it was said (headnote 3a): “The ruling by this court in Lowe Co. v. Teasley & Co., 4 Ga. App. 155 (3) ( 60 S. E. 1077 ), to the effect that where a trial judge, in granting a new trial, places his judgment solely upon a specified ground alleging error of law, the merits of that particular ground will be inquired into regardless of whether the new trial is a first new trial or not, appears to be in conflict with *6 the decisions of the