quoted rule in South Carolina

1979A fair trial is more likely if each juror keeps his own counsel until the appropriate time for deliberation. 253 S. E. (2d) at 105 .

1975This rule has been held or declared to be applicable even though the subsequent action involves a different cause of action, notwithstanding the general rule that a judgment rendered in an action involving a cause of action different from that involved in a subsequent action is not conclusive as to matters not litigated in the former action.” The quoted rule was recognized as a well settled rule of law, although held inapplicable, in the case of Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S. C. 177, 51 S. E. (2d) 622 , wherein the *467 Court said “It is a well settled rule of law that where a defendant neglects to

1967So that where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that his iregligence is an efficient cause, without which the injury would not have resulted, to as great an extent, and that such other cause is not attributable to the person injured.’ ” (Emphasis added.) The quoted rule was stated and applied by this court in the very recent case of Gray v. Barnes, 244 S. C. 454, 137 S. E. (2d) 594 .

1967In other words, where more parties participate in the conspiracy than are logically necessary for the commission of the substantive offense contemplated by the conspiracy, the Wharton rule does not apply.” *257 The quoted rule has apparently never been considered or applied in this jurisdiction, although its existence was recognized in State v. Ferguson, 221 S. C. 300, 70 S. E. (2d) 355 , where the court said, “It is true that in some cases where concerted action is necessary, as for example certain sexual offenses, it is not permitted to charge one in the same indictment with a conspiracy and

1964From one we quote, People v. Hickman, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 4, 87 P. (2d) 80, 83 , as follows: “When the defendant is convicted of one and acquitted upon another count, the test is whether or not the essential elements in the count wherein the defendant was acquitted are identical and necessary to proof of conviction on the guilt count’.” The court then went on to say that tested by the quoted rule the case under consideration did not fall within it for reasons which were pointed out.

1963Authorities in support of the quoted rule include Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa 419 , 116 N. W. 608 , and Lowery v. Lowery, 108 Ga. 766 , 33 S. E. 421 .

1963Authorities in support of the quoted rule include Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa 419 , 116 N. W. 608 , and Lowery v. Lowery, 108 Ga. 766 , 33 S. E. 421 .

1963Otherwise the exception will not generally be considered." See also Wallace v. Timmons , 232 S.C. 311 , 101 S.E. (2d) 844 ; Brady v. Brady , 222 S.C. 242 , 72 S.E. (2d) 193 .

1963Otherwise the exception will not generally be considered." See also Wallace v. Timmons , 232 S.C. 311 , 101 S.E. (2d) 844 ; Brady v. Brady , 222 S.C. 242 , 72 S.E. (2d) 193 .

1963Authorities in support of the quoted rule include Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa 419 , 116 N. W. 608 , and Lowery v. Lowery, 108 Ga. 766 , 33 S. E. 421 .

1963Authorities in support of the quoted rule include Slattery v. Slattery, 139 Iowa 419 , 116 N. W. 608 , and Lowery v. Lowery, 108 Ga. 766 , 33 S. E. 421 .

1963Pertinent here, we think, is the decision in Andrews v. Geyer, 200 Va. 107 , 104 S. E. (2d) 747 , Virginia being the state where the agreement here under consideration was made.

1963Pertinent here, we think, is the decision in Andrews v. Geyer, 200 Va. 107 , 104 S. E. (2d) 747 , Virginia being the state where the agreement here under consideration was made.

1963Otherwise the exception will not generally be considered." See also Wallace v. Timmons , 232 S.C. 311 , 101 S.E. (2d) 844 ; Brady v. Brady , 222 S.C. 242 , 72 S.E. (2d) 193 .

1963Otherwise the exception will not generally be considered." See also Wallace v. Timmons , 232 S.C. 311 , 101 S.E. (2d) 844 ; Brady v. Brady , 222 S.C. 242 , 72 S.E. (2d) 193 .

1963That the trial judge erred in connection with charging Section 46-362 of the Code ( prima facie speed limits) by reading the prima facie speed limits applicable to business district, residential district, and other conditions, and remarking to the jury that there is no evidence in the record that the area in question is a business district and no evidence that there is a residential district when it is undisputed in the record that the area in question had a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour." While it is a close question as to whether the quoted exception embodies a meritorious assignme

1963That the trial judge erred in connection with charging Section 46-362 of the Code ( prima facie speed limits) by reading the prima facie speed limits applicable to business district, residential district, and other conditions, and remarking to the jury that there is no evidence in the record that the area in question is a business district and no evidence that there is a residential district when it is undisputed in the record that the area in question had a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour." While it is a close question as to whether the quoted exception embodies a meritorious assignme

1960The quoted rule was cited and applied in La Count v. General Asbestos & Rubber Co., 175 S. C. 110, 178 S. E. 500 .

1935In Stewart v. Western Telegraph Co., 93 S. C., 119, 76 S. E., 111 , *32 113, the Court quoted the rule from the Lindsley case, as follows: “(1) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. (2) A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicet

1935In Stewart v. Western Telegraph Co., 93 S. C., 119, 76 S. E., 111 , *32 113, the Court quoted the rule from the Lindsley case, as follows: “(1) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. (2) A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicet

1935In Stewart v. Western Telegraph Co., 93 S. C., 119, 76 S. E., 111 , *32 113, the Court quoted the rule from the Lindsley case, as follows: “(1) The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. (2) A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicet