Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marlowe v. IDS Property Casualty Insurancegreen2 sentences2013In the present matter, the court of appeals collapsed the quoted rule from Employers with the rule articulated in Borst , holding that "under Borst and Employers, the panel was entitled to interpret the phrase and determine the scope of discovery it allowed." Marlowe, 340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 27 (emphasis added). 2013Id. at 686 . ¶53 In the present matter, the court of appeals collapsed the quoted rule from Employers with the rule articulated in Borst, holding that "under Borst and Employers, the panel was entitled to interpret the phrase and determine the scope of discovery it allowed." Marlowe, 340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶27 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Phoenix Insurance v. Wisconsin Southern Gas Co.green2 sentences1971Co. v. Wisconsin Southern Gas Co. (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 471, 484, 485 , 173 N. W. 2d 610 , this court quoted the standard by which decisions on motions for a directed verdict will be reviewed: “ Tn determining whether or not the trial court was in error in failing to direct the verdict, this court must take that view of the evidence which is most favorable to the party (the plaintiff in this case) against whom the verdict was sought to be directed. 1971Co. v. Wisconsin Southern Gas Co. (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 471, 484, 485 , 173 N. W. 2d 610 , this court quoted the standard by which decisions on motions for a directed verdict will be reviewed: “ Tn determining whether or not the trial court was in error in failing to direct the verdict, this court must take that view of the evidence which is most favorable to the party (the plaintiff in this case) against whom the verdict was sought to be directed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London
green
2 sentences2013Id. at 686 . ¶53 In the present matter, the court of appeals collapsed the quoted rule from Employers with the rule articulated in Borst, holding that "under Borst and Employers, the panel was entitled to interpret the phrase and determine the scope of discovery it allowed." Marlowe, 340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶27 (emphasis added). 2013Id. at 686 . ¶53 In the present matter, the court of appeals collapsed the quoted rule from Employers with the rule articulated in Borst, holding that "under Borst and Employers, the panel was entitled to interpret the phrase and determine the scope of discovery it allowed." Marlowe, 340 Wis. 2d 594, ¶27 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Dyess
green
2 sentences2006She contends the court's instruction "constitute[d] a judicial endorsement of a finding of guilt based on the mere fact [that] defendant's vehicle crossed the center-line." According to Schutte, the court's instruction in this case had the same effect as the instruction that triggered reversible error in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525 , 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). 2006She contends the court's instruction "constitute[d] a judicial endorsement of a finding of guilt based on the mere fact [that] defendant's vehicle crossed the center-line." According to Schutte, the court's instruction in this case had the same effect as the instruction that triggered reversible error in State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525 , 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Fischer Ex Rel. Fischer v. Ganju
green
1 sentence2003We conclude that the challenged curative instruction did not "probably" mislead the jury, see id., and accordingly, the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in giving the quoted instruction. *899 IV. ¶ 19. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Cunningham v. State
green
2 sentences1984The Cunningham court, relying on prior decisions, expressly declined to follow ABA Standard 18-4.5 (b). 76 Wis. 2d at 284 , 251 N.W.2d at 68 . 1984The Cunningham court, relying on prior decisions, expressly declined to follow ABA Standard 18-4.5 (b). 76 Wis. 2d at 284 , 251 N.W.2d at 68 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Schumacher v. Klabunde
green
1 sentence1971Schumacher v. Klabunde (1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 83, 87, 119 N. W. (2d) 457 ; Mueller v. O’Leary (1935), 216 Wis. 585, 587 , 257 N. W. 161 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Mueller v. O'Leary
neutral
2 sentences1971Schumacher v. Klabunde (1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 83, 87, 119 N. W. (2d) 457 ; Mueller v. O’Leary (1935), 216 Wis. 585, 587 , 257 N. W. 161 . 1971Schumacher v. Klabunde (1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 83, 87, 119 N. W. (2d) 457 ; Mueller v. O’Leary (1935), 216 Wis. 585, 587 , 257 N. W. 161 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Kovarik v. Vesely
green
1 sentence1960The court quoted with approval from an opinion of one of the California courts of appeal which embodied a quotation from 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), p. 2246, sec. 799, as follows: *591 “If, . . . they [the parties] intend that the debt shall be absolute, and fix upon the future event as a convenient time for payment merely, . . . then the debt will not be contingent ; and, if the future event does not happen as contemplated, the law will require payment to be made within a reasonable time.” This court has had before it financing clauses in real-estate contracts of sale in the recent cas | 1 | 1960–1960 |
George v. Oswald
green
2 sentences1960The court quoted with approval from an opinion of one of the California courts of appeal which embodied a quotation from 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), p. 2246, sec. 799, as follows: *591 “If, . . . they [the parties] intend that the debt shall be absolute, and fix upon the future event as a convenient time for payment merely, . . . then the debt will not be contingent ; and, if the future event does not happen as contemplated, the law will require payment to be made within a reasonable time.” This court has had before it financing clauses in real-estate contracts of sale in the recent cas 1960The court quoted with approval from an opinion of one of the California courts of appeal which embodied a quotation from 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), p. 2246, sec. 799, as follows: *591 “If, . . . they [the parties] intend that the debt shall be absolute, and fix upon the future event as a convenient time for payment merely, . . . then the debt will not be contingent ; and, if the future event does not happen as contemplated, the law will require payment to be made within a reasonable time.” This court has had before it financing clauses in real-estate contracts of sale in the recent cas | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Wagner v. Engel-Millar Co.
neutral
2 sentences1914Where there is no question of invalidity on the ground of the broker aiding and abetting a gambling transaction, the validity of the principal contract under sec. 2319a is a question of paramount importance, and to such condition the language of Wagner v. Engel-Millar Co. 144 Wis. 486 , 129 N. W. 392 , is addressed; but as was said in Carson v. Milwaukee P. Co., supra: “Even legitimate transactions furnish many opportunities for collateral wager contracts and gambling, and two persons, broker and principal, knowing the usual way of settling on the board of trade, and knowing that delivery can 1914Where there is no question of invalidity on the ground of the broker aiding and abetting a gambling transaction, the validity of the principal contract under sec. 2319a is a question of paramount importance, and to such condition the language of Wagner v. Engel-Millar Co. 144 Wis. 486 , 129 N. W. 392 , is addressed; but as was said in Carson v. Milwaukee P. Co., supra: “Even legitimate transactions furnish many opportunities for collateral wager contracts and gambling, and two persons, broker and principal, knowing the usual way of settling on the board of trade, and knowing that delivery can | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.