quoted instruction in Mississippi

2022The majority correctly quotes McManus v. Howard, 569 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Pace v. Owens, 511 So. 2d 489, 490 (Miss. 1987), in which we indeed wrote: “The welfare of the children and their best interest is the primary objective of the law, and the courts must not accord to contractual arrangements such importance as to turn the inquiry away from that goal.” However, the majority fails to note that the McManus Court applied the quoted principle to the issue of custody, holding that the parties may not agree to a custody arrangement that would result in a surrender of the chancery co

2014Id.

2014Id.

2003Id. at 749-50 , quoting URCCC 8.04 B.1.

1997Id. at 506-07 , 112 S.Ct. at 2612-13 .

1997Id. at 506-07 , 112 S.Ct. at 2612-13 .

1993Appellant did not meet the burden which the law places upon him in that respect and of course it is elemental that no instruction should be granted without some evidentiary support. 213 Miss. at 199 , 56 So.2d at 492 .

1993Appellant did not meet the burden which the law places upon him in that respect and of course it is elemental that no instruction should be granted without some evidentiary support. 213 Miss. at 199 , 56 So.2d at 492 .

1993Dodd, 238 Miss. at 382 , 118 So.2d at 323 .

1993Dodd, 238 Miss. at 382 , 118 So.2d at 323 .

1990This is not descriptive merely, but is an implied covenant of the existence of the ways. 235 So.2d at 717 , quoting 202 Miss. at 598 , 30 So.2d at 56 .

1990This is not descriptive merely, but is an implied covenant of the existence of the ways. 235 So.2d at 717 , quoting 202 Miss. at 598 , 30 So.2d at 56 .

1981The lower court and appellee here rely almost exclusively on the case of Stockton v. Lamberth, 278 So.2d 423 (Miss.1973), in justifying the granting of the above quoted instruction.

1975The appellant argues that the above quoted instruction did not inform the jury that the appellant, the owner who was in control of the premises, was conscious that the contraband was in his apartment and that this is one of the requirements of the doctrine of guilt by "constructive possession." This Court said in City of Jackson v. Gordon, 119 Miss. 325 , 80 So. 785 (1919): "We do not think it was intended by the act to hold a person guilty of the offense of unlawfully having in his possession liquor, where he did not know or was not conscious of the possession, even if by any stretch of reaso

1975The appellant argues that the above quoted instruction did not inform the jury that the appellant, the owner who was in control of the premises, was conscious that the contraband was in his apartment and that this is one of the requirements of the doctrine of guilt by "constructive possession." This Court said in City of Jackson v. Gordon, 119 Miss. 325 , 80 So. 785 (1919): "We do not think it was intended by the act to hold a person guilty of the offense of unlawfully having in his possession liquor, where he did not know or was not conscious of the possession, even if by any stretch of reaso

1973In Dobbs v. State, 200 Miss. 595 , 29 So.2d 84 (1947), the same objection was made to an instruction, and the Court stated: The objection that the quoted instruction shifts the burden of proof to the defendant is not well-taken.

1969In Gilchrist the Court also quoted the rule found in Restatement, Contracts Section 235 at page 319 (1932): “ ‘ * * * all writings forming part of the same transaction are interpreted together.’ ” 192 So.2d at 418 .

1966Where a railroad crossing has a peculiar or dangerous environment, reasonable care may require additional warnings and safeguards for those traversing such a crossing. * * * (252 Miss, at 449-450, 172 So.2d at 419 ) The quoted instruction could have led the jury to believe that the fact that the evidence showed that the train was running at a speed of about eighty miles per hour constituted a violation of the law, and thus was negligence, which was the sole cause of the accident.

1965Barry v. State, 187 Miss. 221 , 192 So. 841 (1940).

1965Barry v. State, 187 Miss. 221 , 192 So. 841 (1940).

1962The Court quoted from the rule announced in Gulf, Mobile and Northern Railroad Co. v. Brown, 143 Miss. 890 , 108 So. 503 , as follows: “Appellant’s position is that the obligation of the master to furnish his servant a reasonably safe place to work has no application to the facts of this. case *269 because appellee was employed, with others, to repair and make the very place safe, the unsafety of which caused his injury; that therefore he knew the place was unsafe and assumed the risk of such unsafety.

1962The Court quoted from the rule announced in Gulf, Mobile and Northern Railroad Co. v. Brown, 143 Miss. 890 , 108 So. 503 , as follows: “Appellant’s position is that the obligation of the master to furnish his servant a reasonably safe place to work has no application to the facts of this. case *269 because appellee was employed, with others, to repair and make the very place safe, the unsafety of which caused his injury; that therefore he knew the place was unsafe and assumed the risk of such unsafety.

1958Almost this identical instruction was approved by this Court in the ease of Hadad v. Lockeby, 176 Miss. 660, 668 , 169 So. *459 691, and tbe rule announced therein is in line with many holdings of this Court.

1956Fletcher cites in support of it cases from twelve states, including National Casualty Co. v. Hallam, 163 Miss. 164 , 138 So. 572 (1932).

1956Fletcher cites in support of it cases from twelve states, including National Casualty Co. v. Hallam, 163 Miss. 164 , 138 So. 572 (1932).

1955Code 1942, under which this suit ivas brought, provides that “In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” The quoted rule was approved, in effect, in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732 , 41 So. 263 , and, at least, received tacit approval in Mississippi Cotton Oil Company v. Smith, 95 Miss. 528 , 48 So. 735 ; Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company v. Boone

1955Code 1942, under which this suit ivas brought, provides that “In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” The quoted rule was approved, in effect, in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732 , 41 So. 263 , and, at least, received tacit approval in Mississippi Cotton Oil Company v. Smith, 95 Miss. 528 , 48 So. 735 ; Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company v. Boone

1955Code 1942, under which this suit ivas brought, provides that “In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” The quoted rule was approved, in effect, in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732 , 41 So. 263 , and, at least, received tacit approval in Mississippi Cotton Oil Company v. Smith, 95 Miss. 528 , 48 So. 735 ; Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company v. Boone

1955Code 1942, under which this suit ivas brought, provides that “In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” The quoted rule was approved, in effect, in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732 , 41 So. 263 , and, at least, received tacit approval in Mississippi Cotton Oil Company v. Smith, 95 Miss. 528 , 48 So. 735 ; Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company v. Boone

1955Code 1942, under which this suit ivas brought, provides that “In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” The quoted rule was approved, in effect, in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732 , 41 So. 263 , and, at least, received tacit approval in Mississippi Cotton Oil Company v. Smith, 95 Miss. 528 , 48 So. 735 ; Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company v. Boone

1955Code 1942, under which this suit ivas brought, provides that “In such action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration all the damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every kind to any and all parties interested in the suit.” The quoted rule was approved, in effect, in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Anderson, 89 Miss. 732 , 41 So. 263 , and, at least, received tacit approval in Mississippi Cotton Oil Company v. Smith, 95 Miss. 528 , 48 So. 735 ; Gulf & Ship Island Railroad Company v. Boone

1955Company v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 859 , 85 So. 104 .

1955Company v. Alexander, 122 Miss. 859 , 85 So. 104 .

1955Bridges v. State, 197 Miss. 527 , 19 So. 2d 738 ; Buies of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Bule 11.

1955Bridges v. State, 197 Miss. 527 , 19 So. 2d 738 ; Buies of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Bule 11.

1955Terminal Company v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352 , 116 N. E. 651 , in these words: ‘ ‘ Even where a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under certain circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident * * See also Avery Body Works v. Hall, 224 Miss. 51 , 79 So. 2d 453 .

1955Terminal Company v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352 , 116 N. E. 651 , in these words: ‘ ‘ Even where a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under certain circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident * * See also Avery Body Works v. Hall, 224 Miss. 51 , 79 So. 2d 453 .

1955Terminal Company v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352 , 116 N. E. 651 , in these words: ‘ ‘ Even where a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under certain circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident * * See also Avery Body Works v. Hall, 224 Miss. 51 , 79 So. 2d 453 .

1955Terminal Company v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 352 , 116 N. E. 651 , in these words: ‘ ‘ Even where a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under certain circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident * * See also Avery Body Works v. Hall, 224 Miss. 51 , 79 So. 2d 453 .

1955On the other hand, claimant invokes the rule set out in Cowart v. Pearl River Tung Company, 218 Miss. 472 , 67 So. 2d 356 , quoted from Larson on Workmen’s Compensation Law, as follows: ‘£ Pre-existing disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the ‘arising out of employment’ requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which compensation is sought.” Again in the Cowart case, this Court quoted the rule set out in Peoria R.

1955On the other hand, claimant invokes the rule set out in Cowart v. Pearl River Tung Company, 218 Miss. 472 , 67 So. 2d 356 , quoted from Larson on Workmen’s Compensation Law, as follows: ‘£ Pre-existing disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim under the ‘arising out of employment’ requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which compensation is sought.” Again in the Cowart case, this Court quoted the rule set out in Peoria R.

1954For instance, in Wilkinson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 336-337 , 108 So. 711 , 46 A. L.

1954For instance, in Wilkinson v. State, 143 Miss. 324, 336-337 , 108 So. 711 , 46 A. L.