quoted rule in Pennsylvania

1986More recently, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), stated the following: We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon and to reaffirm the above quoted standard from Adams as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment.

1986More recently, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), stated the following: We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon and to reaffirm the above quoted standard from Adams as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment.

1958In Livingstone v. Boston Insurance Company, 255 Pa. 1 (1916), the court defined the clause “sole and unconditional ownership” by saying: “The provisions of an insurance policy are construed favorably to the assured, and where he has an insurable interest and is the substantial owner of the property so that the entire loss falls on him, it satisfies the above quoted clause as to ownership, although he may not have a perfect legal title to the insured property.” In Commonwealth ex rel.

1940This court defined the clause, “sole and unconditional ownership”, in Livingstone v. Boston Insuranee Co., 255 Pa. 1 , when, in speaking through Mr. Justice Walling, we said (p. 4) : “The provisions of an insuranee policy are construed favorably to the assured; and where he has an insurable interest and is the substantial owner of the property so that the entire loss falls on him, it satisfies the above quoted clause as to ownership, although he may not have a perfect legal title to the insured property.” (Italics added.) As we have stated above, the Act of 1938, supra, places the expense of i

2009Colville v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 592 Pa. 433 , 926 A.2d 424 (2007).

2009Colville v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 592 Pa. 433 , 926 A.2d 424 (2007).

1986Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), recently stated the following: *19 We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon and to reaffirm the above quoted standard from Adams [v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) ] as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment.

1986Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 , 105 S.Ct. 844 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), recently stated the following: *19 We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon and to reaffirm the above quoted standard from Adams [v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) ] as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment.

1982However, even when giving the need here, a “broad construction” as to “actualnecessity.” Janis v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, _ Pa. Commw. __, 402 A. 2d 1093 , (1979) we must recognize the necessity for another liquor license in this resort even though the township is already one over quota.

1982In Com. v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575 , 364 A. 2d 665 , (1976), the court says, after quoting the statute and emphasizing the exceptions, that: “It is conceded that the quoted exception contained in the statute made the wife competent to testify to Robinson’s alleged acts of violence directed against her” (585-586); the same notion is repeated later in the opinion (585).

1982In Com. v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575 , 364 A. 2d 665 , (1976), the court says, after quoting the statute and emphasizing the exceptions, that: “It is conceded that the quoted exception contained in the statute made the wife competent to testify to Robinson’s alleged acts of violence directed against her” (585-586); the same notion is repeated later in the opinion (585).

1982But the Court further said in footnote 6 that: “We note also that her testimony about these actions was corroborated at trial by other eyewitnesses and was otherwise uncontroverted.” Compare: Com. v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. 305, 307 , 413 A. 2d 418 , (1979); Com. v. Barksdale, 219 Pa. Super. 444, 448 , 281 A. 2d 703 , (1971); Haas v. Fitzpatrick, 117 Pa. Super. 21, 25 , 177 A. 326 , (1935). .

1982But the Court further said in footnote 6 that: “We note also that her testimony about these actions was corroborated at trial by other eyewitnesses and was otherwise uncontroverted.” Compare: Com. v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. 305, 307 , 413 A. 2d 418 , (1979); Com. v. Barksdale, 219 Pa. Super. 444, 448 , 281 A. 2d 703 , (1971); Haas v. Fitzpatrick, 117 Pa. Super. 21, 25 , 177 A. 326 , (1935). .

1982But the Court further said in footnote 6 that: “We note also that her testimony about these actions was corroborated at trial by other eyewitnesses and was otherwise uncontroverted.” Compare: Com. v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. 305, 307 , 413 A. 2d 418 , (1979); Com. v. Barksdale, 219 Pa. Super. 444, 448 , 281 A. 2d 703 , (1971); Haas v. Fitzpatrick, 117 Pa. Super. 21, 25 , 177 A. 326 , (1935). .

1982But the Court further said in footnote 6 that: “We note also that her testimony about these actions was corroborated at trial by other eyewitnesses and was otherwise uncontroverted.” Compare: Com. v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. 305, 307 , 413 A. 2d 418 , (1979); Com. v. Barksdale, 219 Pa. Super. 444, 448 , 281 A. 2d 703 , (1971); Haas v. Fitzpatrick, 117 Pa. Super. 21, 25 , 177 A. 326 , (1935). .

1982But the Court further said in footnote 6 that: “We note also that her testimony about these actions was corroborated at trial by other eyewitnesses and was otherwise uncontroverted.” Compare: Com. v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. 305, 307 , 413 A. 2d 418 , (1979); Com. v. Barksdale, 219 Pa. Super. 444, 448 , 281 A. 2d 703 , (1971); Haas v. Fitzpatrick, 117 Pa. Super. 21, 25 , 177 A. 326 , (1935). .

1982But the Court further said in footnote 6 that: “We note also that her testimony about these actions was corroborated at trial by other eyewitnesses and was otherwise uncontroverted.” Compare: Com. v. Galloway, 271 Pa. Super. 305, 307 , 413 A. 2d 418 , (1979); Com. v. Barksdale, 219 Pa. Super. 444, 448 , 281 A. 2d 703 , (1971); Haas v. Fitzpatrick, 117 Pa. Super. 21, 25 , 177 A. 326 , (1935). .

1975The law does not favor the enforcement of such contracts and will ignore such clauses when the exculpated party is a common carrier, public utility, or one acting under a public duty: Wedner v. Fidelity Security Systems, Inc., 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 67 (1973); Restatement, Contracts, §575.

1975Id. at 270 , 290 A.2d at 259 .

1975Id. at 270 , 290 A.2d at 259 .

1968Builders Eastwick Corp., 430 Pa. 46 (1968); Shilanski v. Farrell, 57 Pa. Superior Ct. 137 (1914); but this is an exception to the above quoted rule and such a provision will not be implied from a contract ambiguous as to time.

1968Builders Eastwick Corp., 430 Pa. 46 (1968); Shilanski v. Farrell, 57 Pa. Superior Ct. 137 (1914); but this is an exception to the above quoted rule and such a provision will not be implied from a contract ambiguous as to time.

1958In many jurisdictions courts in determining proper sentences consider official records and the reports of probation officers, psychiatrists and others." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349 , 35 A. 2d 312 , reaffirmed the above quoted principle of law enunciated in the Petrillo case, and added the following (page 354): "Any other rule than the one thus enunciated would be an impracticable one for courts to apply in exercising their discretionary power, within statutory limits, to impose appropriate sentences on convicted defendants, in the vast majority of criminal cases.

1958In many jurisdictions courts in determining proper sentences consider official records and the reports of probation officers, psychiatrists and others." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 348 Pa. 349 , 35 A. 2d 312 , reaffirmed the above quoted principle of law enunciated in the Petrillo case, and added the following (page 354): "Any other rule than the one thus enunciated would be an impracticable one for courts to apply in exercising their discretionary power, within statutory limits, to impose appropriate sentences on convicted defendants, in the vast majority of criminal cases.

1956It is well established that an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer who has prepared it: MacDonald v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 304 Pa. 213 , 155 A. 491 ; West v. MacMillan (and Automobile Underwriters Insurance Co., Garnishees), 301 Pa. 344 , 152 A. 104 .

1956It is well established that an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer who has prepared it: MacDonald v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 304 Pa. 213 , 155 A. 491 ; West v. MacMillan (and Automobile Underwriters Insurance Co., Garnishees), 301 Pa. 344 , 152 A. 104 .

1956It is well established that an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer who has prepared it: MacDonald v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 304 Pa. 213 , 155 A. 491 ; West v. MacMillan (and Automobile Underwriters Insurance Co., Garnishees), 301 Pa. 344 , 152 A. 104 .

1956It is well established that an insurance policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer who has prepared it: MacDonald v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 304 Pa. 213 , 155 A. 491 ; West v. MacMillan (and Automobile Underwriters Insurance Co., Garnishees), 301 Pa. 344 , 152 A. 104 .

1949On the other hand we have the direct statement in the case of Murdock et al. v. Murdock et al., 300 Pa. 280 (1930) to the effect that “though partners, in the absence of special agreement, receive no compensation, yet ‘a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs’ ”.

1942Marcus, 95 Conn. 454, 459 .

1940It is well settled that one under a duty to insure the property of another is presumptively required to insure it for its full value, and a failure to do so entails liability for all the resulting damages in the event pf its loss: Broussard v. South Texas Rice Company, 103 *218 Tex. 535; Ela v. French, 11 N. H. 356; Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 Ill. 404 ; Pauksztis v. Raeder Blank Book, Lithographing & Printing Company, 212 Pa. 403 .

1940It is well settled that one under a duty to insure the property of another is presumptively required to insure it for its full value, and a failure to do so entails liability for all the resulting damages in the event pf its loss: Broussard v. South Texas Rice Company, 103 *218 Tex. 535; Ela v. French, 11 N. H. 356; Shoenfeld v. Fleisher, 73 Ill. 404 ; Pauksztis v. Raeder Blank Book, Lithographing & Printing Company, 212 Pa. 403 .

1938Co., 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 325 , the above quoted clause was held to be a “sound-health clause,” and in Connell v. Life Ins.