quoted rule in Oklahoma

1977Scrivner-Stevens Company v. Boliaris, Okl., 385 P.2d 911 .” Under the above quoted rule, we must conclude that the trial court found that it was not customary for salesman in the clothing business to be authorized to engage in “sale or return” contracts.

1964The controlling' rule in such cases recently was expressed in Syllabus 2 of Scrivner-Stevens Co., Inc. v. Boliaris, Okl, 385 P.2d 911 : “In a civil action triable tc a jury, where jury is waived and the cause is tried to the court, the findings of the trial court have the force and effect of a jury verdict, and where the finding is a general one it is the finding of every specific thing necessary to be found in-sustaining the general verdict, and in-such case, there being no errors at-law, the judgment will not be disturbed', on appeal if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to s

1982The Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, Okl.App. 528 P.2d 1135 (1974), considered an identical exclusionary clause as presented here and affirmed a trial court’s order denying recovery on the theory that an injury that occurred in the course of insured’s employment was excluded from coverage.

1979Appeal of Turner, Okl., 544 P.2d 1261 (1976)., And the exception allows only for driving related to employment if extreme and unusual hardship is shown.

1978In Clampitt v. Johnson, Okl., 359 P.2d 588 , this Court held: “As a matter of comity, if a court of a sister state enters a valid and binding order or judgment concerning the custody of a child, and the child is brought into this state in derogation of such order or judgment, the courts of this state should not assume or exercise jurisdiction to re-litigate the question of custody, unless the welfare of the child is in jeopardy or some other unusual circumstance exists.” The quoted rule from Clampitt has been discussed and followed in Duncan v. Seay, Okl., 553 P.2d 492 , and Grubbs v. Hunter,

1978In Clampitt v. Johnson, Okl., 359 P.2d 588 , this Court held: “As a matter of comity, if a court of a sister state enters a valid and binding order or judgment concerning the custody of a child, and the child is brought into this state in derogation of such order or judgment, the courts of this state should not assume or exercise jurisdiction to re-litigate the question of custody, unless the welfare of the child is in jeopardy or some other unusual circumstance exists.” The quoted rule from Clampitt has been discussed and followed in Duncan v. Seay, Okl., 553 P.2d 492 , and Grubbs v. Hunter,

1978In Clampitt v. Johnson, Okl., 359 P.2d 588 , this Court held: “As a matter of comity, if a court of a sister state enters a valid and binding order or judgment concerning the custody of a child, and the child is brought into this state in derogation of such order or judgment, the courts of this state should not assume or exercise jurisdiction to re-litigate the question of custody, unless the welfare of the child is in jeopardy or some other unusual circumstance exists.” The quoted rule from Clampitt has been discussed and followed in Duncan v. Seay, Okl., 553 P.2d 492 , and Grubbs v. Hunter,

1976Defendant maintains that prior to his oral confession he signed a particular statement, the contents of which are reflected in the record, which in part stated: “[W]e have no way of giving you a lawyer but one will be appointed for you if you wish one if and when you go to court . . . .” (Tr. 67) The defendant urges this language is patently insufficient and is an incomplete statement of the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, supra. We first observe the constitutional sufficiency of a rights waiver containing the above quoted warning was before this Court recently in Rowbotham v. State,

1974In Sessions v. State, Okl.Cr., 494 P. 2d 351 , this Court said: “We lastly observe that the instruction should have been more detailed giving the jury guidelines to consider all the surrounding facts and circumstances such as [commonness] 1 or unusualness of name, character of the former crime or crimes and the place of its commission.” The above quoted instruction is directly in line with what we observed in Sessions v. State, supra, and further it is in accord with what we held in Williams v. State, supra. Therefore, once it was shown that the identity of name of the defendant was the same a

1974The court then held, in effect, that Community’s lien, although filed first, did not constitute notice to Central because it was filed under a different name, and accorded precedence to Central’s lien under the rule stated as follows in Bankers Investment Co. v. Humphrey, Okl., 369 P.2d 608 : “ * * * Where one of two innocent parties must suffer through the act or negligence of a third party, the loss should fall upon the one who by his conduct created the circumstances which enabled the third party to perpetrate the wrong or cause the loss.” In a reply brief, Community argues that the quoted

1973Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, Okl., 397 P.2d 637 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Evans, Okl., 376 P.2d 336 ; Farmers Cooperative Association v. Madden, Okl., 356 P.2d 741 .” It is apparent the language in Ideal, supra, must be considered as an encroachment into an area of settled law as expressed in the Downum case, supra. This requires the Ideal Cement case to be read carefully and applied narrowly, in view of the quoted rule.

1973Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, Okl., 397 P.2d 637 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Evans, Okl., 376 P.2d 336 ; Farmers Cooperative Association v. Madden, Okl., 356 P.2d 741 .” It is apparent the language in Ideal, supra, must be considered as an encroachment into an area of settled law as expressed in the Downum case, supra. This requires the Ideal Cement case to be read carefully and applied narrowly, in view of the quoted rule.

1973In construing this portion of the constitutional provision, the Oklahoma Court relied on the holding of the Supreme Court of South Dakota in the case of Norbeck Nicholson Company v. State, 32 S.D. 189 , 142 N.W. 847 , wherein the South Dakota Supreme Court construed a provision of the South Dakota Constitution which is identical to the above quoted clause of our Constitution.

1973In construing this portion of the constitutional provision, the Oklahoma Court relied on the holding of the Supreme Court of South Dakota in the case of Norbeck Nicholson Company v. State, 32 S.D. 189 , 142 N.W. 847 , wherein the South Dakota Supreme Court construed a provision of the South Dakota Constitution which is identical to the above quoted clause of our Constitution.

1973Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, Okl., 397 P.2d 637 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Evans, Okl., 376 P.2d 336 ; Farmers Cooperative Association v. Madden, Okl., 356 P.2d 741 .” It is apparent the language in Ideal, supra, must be considered as an encroachment into an area of settled law as expressed in the Downum case, supra. This requires the Ideal Cement case to be read carefully and applied narrowly, in view of the quoted rule.

1973Jeffries Truck Line v. Grisham, Okl., 397 P.2d 637 ; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Evans, Okl., 376 P.2d 336 ; Farmers Cooperative Association v. Madden, Okl., 356 P.2d 741 .” It is apparent the language in Ideal, supra, must be considered as an encroachment into an area of settled law as expressed in the Downum case, supra. This requires the Ideal Cement case to be read carefully and applied narrowly, in view of the quoted rule.

1973The South Dakota court stated: "A member of the State Legislature, by virtue of his office, stands in a fiduciary and trust relation towards the State; in other words, he is the confidential agent of the State for the purpose of appropriating the State's money in payment of the lawful contractual obligations of the State, and it seems to be almost universally held that it is against some public policy to permit such an agent, or any agent occupying a like position, to himself be directly or indirectly interested in any contract with the State or other municipality, during the time of the exist

1973The South Dakota court stated: "A member of the State Legislature, by virtue of his office, stands in a fiduciary and trust relation towards the State; in other words, he is the confidential agent of the State for the purpose of appropriating the State's money in payment of the lawful contractual obligations of the State, and it seems to be almost universally held that it is against some public policy to permit such an agent, or any agent occupying a like position, to himself be directly or indirectly interested in any contract with the State or other municipality, during the time of the exist

1971Lines v. Jackson, Okl., 442 P.2d 287 , as follows: “It is an error in respect to a pure, simple, and unmix,ed question of law, under our harmless error statute, Tit. 12, O.S.1961, § 78, to grant a new trial on account of a claimed error that, as far as the record shows, is harmless.” Under his Proposition Two, defendant, in effect seeks to bring this case within the above quoted rule, by arguing, in substance, that, as far as the record shows, the jury, in rendering its verdict in his favor, could have determined, or have been of the opinion, that the evidence showed he was confronted with a s

1970It is therefore our opinion that the present case is a proper one for application of the rule laid down in Rhoades Oil Co. v. Plumb, Okl., 429 P.2d 965 , as follows: “In workmen’s compensation cases, physicians’ reports reflecting independent examinations of the claimant are not incompetent as medical evidence merely because they may be based, in part, upon a medical history related to their authors by the claimant, and reflecting consideration of medical records of his case; made previously at other medical facilities.” Upon application of the above quoted rule to the medical evidence in the

1970In view of the above quoted rule from Taylor v. Taylor, supra, this constitutes a valid consideration for the compromise agreement.

1968The basis of the quoted principle was adopted from the Kansas decision of Bowers v. Bowers, 70 Kan. 164 , 78 P. 430 , from which jurisdiction our statute was adopted.

1968The basis of the quoted principle was adopted from the Kansas decision of Bowers v. Bowers, 70 Kan. 164 , 78 P. 430 , from which jurisdiction our statute was adopted.

1967The decision states: “ * * * It is well settled by this court and other courts of the highest standing that the vendee in an executory contract for the purchase of lands, who, after paying part of the consideration under such contract, makes default and refuses to carry out the further terms agreed upon, cannot maintain an action to recover any of the consideration advanced. * * * ” See Diehl v. Welsh, Okl., 393 P.2d 834 , for a more full and definite statement of the above quoted rule of law.

1967Defendants cite Nicholson v. Roberts, 144 Okl. 116 , 289 P. 331 , to support their contention that plaintiffs’ action was for rescission.

1967Defendants cite Nicholson v. Roberts, 144 Okl. 116 , 289 P. 331 , to support their contention that plaintiffs’ action was for rescission.

1966Burke v. Bennett Drilling Co., Okl., 371 P.2d 477 .

1966As said in Gentry v. Smith, Okl., 373 P.2d 71 , 74: Cl ⅝ * * “When such a situation exists in an action of legal cognizance that is triable by a jury, but where jury trial has been waived, the trial court’s judgment, as to issues of fact, is affirmed if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support it. * * *480 And, in determining whether such a judgment has the quantum of support prescribed by the above quoted rule, we must take into consideration “every reasonable inference deducible” from the competent evidence reasonably tending to support it.

1965The public nature’ of docks, piers, and wharves, belonging to a municipality, is not taken away by leasing them separately to different parties exclusively for commerce, pursuant to a general plan that aims to accommodate all comers. * * * ” Fullest application of the quoted rule may be observed in Marchant v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513 , 126 A. 884 , and Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, (Tex.Civ.App.), 271 S.W.2d 137 ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 ; Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177 , 89 N.W.2d 635 ; Wayland v. .Snapp et al., 232 Ar

1965The public nature’ of docks, piers, and wharves, belonging to a municipality, is not taken away by leasing them separately to different parties exclusively for commerce, pursuant to a general plan that aims to accommodate all comers. * * * ” Fullest application of the quoted rule may be observed in Marchant v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513 , 126 A. 884 , and Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, (Tex.Civ.App.), 271 S.W.2d 137 ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 ; Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177 , 89 N.W.2d 635 ; Wayland v. .Snapp et al., 232 Ar

1965The public nature’ of docks, piers, and wharves, belonging to a municipality, is not taken away by leasing them separately to different parties exclusively for commerce, pursuant to a general plan that aims to accommodate all comers. * * * ” Fullest application of the quoted rule may be observed in Marchant v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513 , 126 A. 884 , and Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation District, (Tex.Civ.App.), 271 S.W.2d 137 ; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Eyck (CCA 2d) 76 F.2d 515 ; Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177 , 89 N.W.2d 635 ; Wayland v. .Snapp et al., 232 Ar

1965Co. v. Richardson, 42 Okl. 457 , 141 P. 1107 .” The quoted rule was referred to in Syllabus 1 of Haskins v. Felder, Okl., 270 P.2d 960 , as follows: “The common law governing the diversion of surface waters as adopted and applied in this state has been modified by the rule of reason.” These rules have evolved from the consistent holdings of this Court, in such cases as Davis v. Fry, 14 Okl. 340 , 78 P. 180 , 69 L.R.A. 460 ; Chicago R.

1965Co. v. Richardson, 42 Okl. 457 , 141 P. 1107 .” The quoted rule was referred to in Syllabus 1 of Haskins v. Felder, Okl., 270 P.2d 960 , as follows: “The common law governing the diversion of surface waters as adopted and applied in this state has been modified by the rule of reason.” These rules have evolved from the consistent holdings of this Court, in such cases as Davis v. Fry, 14 Okl. 340 , 78 P. 180 , 69 L.R.A. 460 ; Chicago R.

1965Co. v. Richardson, 42 Okl. 457 , 141 P. 1107 .” The quoted rule was referred to in Syllabus 1 of Haskins v. Felder, Okl., 270 P.2d 960 , as follows: “The common law governing the diversion of surface waters as adopted and applied in this state has been modified by the rule of reason.” These rules have evolved from the consistent holdings of this Court, in such cases as Davis v. Fry, 14 Okl. 340 , 78 P. 180 , 69 L.R.A. 460 ; Chicago R.

1965Co. v. Richardson, 42 Okl. 457 , 141 P. 1107 .” The quoted rule was referred to in Syllabus 1 of Haskins v. Felder, Okl., 270 P.2d 960 , as follows: “The common law governing the diversion of surface waters as adopted and applied in this state has been modified by the rule of reason.” These rules have evolved from the consistent holdings of this Court, in such cases as Davis v. Fry, 14 Okl. 340 , 78 P. 180 , 69 L.R.A. 460 ; Chicago R.