quoted instruction in California

1966As stated in Collison v. Thomas, 55 Cal.2d 490, 498 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 555 , 360 P.2d 51 ] : '“A party cannot permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape the consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded.” [Citations.] While the pretrial order now frames the issues remaining in dispute [citation] and in this respect supersedes the pleading [citation], the quoted rule should be equally applicable however the issues are framed.’ [Citation.] “The soundness of this principle is manifest in this case.

1966As stated in Collison v. Thomas, 55 Cal.2d 490, 498 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 555 , 360 P.2d 51 ] : '“A party cannot permit an issue to be litigated and on appeal escape the consequences by claiming that such issue was not pleaded.” [Citations.] While the pretrial order now frames the issues remaining in dispute [citation] and in this respect supersedes the pleading [citation], the quoted rule should be equally applicable however the issues are framed.’ [Citation.] “The soundness of this principle is manifest in this case.

1958In Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], cited by the defendant here, the error in giving the instruction was mitigated by further instruction to the jury that they were to determine whether or not due care had been exercised.

1958In Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [ 128 P.2d 16 ], cited by the defendant here, the error in giving the instruction was mitigated by further instruction to the jury that they were to determine whether or not due care had been exercised.

1971Where partial payments have been made on a legacy, the amount due to the legatee is to be ascertained by making annual rests, adding the interest each year to the principal, and deducting the payments made during the year, the residue being a new principal, provided, of course, this mode of computation does not result in allowing compound interest.’ ” (Phraner v. Stone, 137 N.J.Eq. 284 [ 44 A.2d 504, 509 ].) Neither the quoted rule from Corpus Juris, the decision of the Supreme Court upon which it is based (Story v. Livingston, 9 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 359, 371 [ 10 L.Ed. 200, 206 ], nor the three

1971Where partial payments have been made on a legacy, the amount due to the legatee is to be ascertained by making annual rests, adding the interest each year to the principal, and deducting the payments made during the year, the residue being a new principal, provided, of course, this mode of computation does not result in allowing compound interest.’ ” (Phraner v. Stone, 137 N.J.Eq. 284 [ 44 A.2d 504, 509 ].) Neither the quoted rule from Corpus Juris, the decision of the Supreme Court upon which it is based (Story v. Livingston, 9 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 359, 371 [ 10 L.Ed. 200, 206 ], nor the three

1971Estate of Luckel, 151 Cal.App.2d 481, 490-491 [ 312 P.2d 24 ], cited by Hospital, does not support the proposition that interest accrued on an annuity in a fixed amount monthly would itself bear interest.

1971Estate of Luckel, 151 Cal.App.2d 481, 490-491 [ 312 P.2d 24 ], cited by Hospital, does not support the proposition that interest accrued on an annuity in a fixed amount monthly would itself bear interest.

1953While ordinarily "a guest" is "not charged with the responsibility for observing the condition of the traffic upon the highway" (Murphy v. National Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal.App. 482, 489 [ 300 P. 91 ]; see, also, Martinelli v. Poley, 210 Cal. 450, 458 [ 292 P. 451 ]), plaintiffs' evidence here shows that Mrs. Smith did undertake to make such observation and that she actively participated with Mrs. Daniels in their joint decision that the boulevard "was clear." Under these circumstances the quoted instruction properly stated considerations affecting the jury's determination of whether Mrs. Smith

1953While ordinarily "a guest" is "not charged with the responsibility for observing the condition of the traffic upon the highway" (Murphy v. National Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal.App. 482, 489 [ 300 P. 91 ]; see, also, Martinelli v. Poley, 210 Cal. 450, 458 [ 292 P. 451 ]), plaintiffs' evidence here shows that Mrs. Smith did undertake to make such observation and that she actively participated with Mrs. Daniels in their joint decision that the boulevard "was clear." Under these circumstances the quoted instruction properly stated considerations affecting the jury's determination of whether Mrs. Smith

1959(Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 625 [ 327 P.2d 897 ] ; Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [ 282 P.2d 7 ].) The doctrine is applicable where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the person who is responsible.

1959(Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 625 [ 327 P.2d 897 ] ; Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [ 282 P.2d 7 ].) The doctrine is applicable where the accident is of such a nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the person who is responsible.

1958Bernesen v. Fish, 135 Cal.App. 588, 602 [ 28 P.2d 67 ], after reviewing the authorities, says: ‘When the instant case is measured by these rules it is evident that the control of the trustee over the property of the trust estate is far too limited and the control over it and the actions of the trustees by the beneficiaries is too complete to permit any doubt of the fact that the trust here in issue cannot be classified as a Massachusetts or Business Trust.

1958Bernesen v. Fish, 135 Cal.App. 588, 602 [ 28 P.2d 67 ], after reviewing the authorities, says: ‘When the instant case is measured by these rules it is evident that the control of the trustee over the property of the trust estate is far too limited and the control over it and the actions of the trustees by the beneficiaries is too complete to permit any doubt of the fact that the trust here in issue cannot be classified as a Massachusetts or Business Trust.

1958In the leading ease of Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 418 [ 292 P. 624 , 71 A.L.R. 871 ], the court says, concerning Massachusetts or business trusts: ‘By the weight of authority, where the trustees have complete control of the business, the creators of the trust are treated as are the cestuis que trust of an ordinary equitable trust, and are exempt from direct personal liability to the creditors of the business; but if the trustees are subject to the control of the creators of the trust, the latter or their successors are liable as partners.’ The quoted rule was adopted as the law of this

1958In the leading ease of Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408, 418 [ 292 P. 624 , 71 A.L.R. 871 ], the court says, concerning Massachusetts or business trusts: ‘By the weight of authority, where the trustees have complete control of the business, the creators of the trust are treated as are the cestuis que trust of an ordinary equitable trust, and are exempt from direct personal liability to the creditors of the business; but if the trustees are subject to the control of the creators of the trust, the latter or their successors are liable as partners.’ The quoted rule was adopted as the law of this

1953In Airola *455 v. Gorham, 56 Cal.App.2d 42, 46 [ 133 P.2d 78 ], this court quoted the rule of Huysman v. Kirsch even as an example of a broader principle applicable also outside the field of malpractice.

1953In Airola *455 v. Gorham, 56 Cal.App.2d 42, 46 [ 133 P.2d 78 ], this court quoted the rule of Huysman v. Kirsch even as an example of a broader principle applicable also outside the field of malpractice.

1983Neither of these victims sufficiently observed their assailant to be able to identify appellant as that person and Mark Baines, who had earlier selected appellant’s police photo as one which “looked like the man [assailant] he saw,” could not repeat his identification at trial. *683 As a result, appellant urges, the above quoted principle announced in People v. Johnson cannot be satisfied because “ ‘An extrajudicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant

1968(People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 626 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 354 P.2d 865 ].) In that context the freshness of the witness’ recollection is obviously crucial, for the in-court identification could well be the product of the extrajudicial identification.

1956The considerations pointing to negligence would have to overcome not only those pointing to a contrary conclusion, but also the presumption that defendant was not negligent.’ ” (A hearing was denied by the Supreme Court.) Appellants also cite Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ], where the same instruction was given, and the court in reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff stated at pages 444 and 445: “Whether the error in giving the instruction is prejudicial depends on the facts of the particular case (Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548

1956The considerations pointing to negligence would have to overcome not only those pointing to a contrary conclusion, but also the presumption that defendant was not negligent.’ ” (A hearing was denied by the Supreme Court.) Appellants also cite Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ], where the same instruction was given, and the court in reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff stated at pages 444 and 445: “Whether the error in giving the instruction is prejudicial depends on the facts of the particular case (Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548

1956The considerations pointing to negligence would have to overcome not only those pointing to a contrary conclusion, but also the presumption that defendant was not negligent.’ ” (A hearing was denied by the Supreme Court.) Appellants also cite Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ], where the same instruction was given, and the court in reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff stated at pages 444 and 445: “Whether the error in giving the instruction is prejudicial depends on the facts of the particular case (Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548

1956The considerations pointing to negligence would have to overcome not only those pointing to a contrary conclusion, but also the presumption that defendant was not negligent.’ ” (A hearing was denied by the Supreme Court.) Appellants also cite Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 272 P.2d 855 ], where the same instruction was given, and the court in reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff stated at pages 444 and 445: “Whether the error in giving the instruction is prejudicial depends on the facts of the particular case (Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548

2020(People v. Lee, supra, B088132, at pp. *6–*7; see Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 705 [“even though malice aforethought may not be implied under section 189 to make a killing murder unless the defendant or his accomplice commits the killing in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony [citations], when a murder is otherwise established, section 189 may be invoked to determine its degree”].) 14 Applying the above quoted rule from Gilbert, we rejected Lee’s challenge to a jury instruction “that a murder ‘which occurs during the commission or attempt to commit the crime of robbery, when

2017(Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 411 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 411 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 ].) It is not, however, among the jurisdictional constraints arising from the constitutional requirement of a “case[]” or “contro vers [y].” (U.S. Const., art.

2017(Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 411 [ 113 L.Ed.2d 411 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 ].) It is not, however, among the jurisdictional constraints arising from the constitutional requirement of a “case[]” or “contro vers [y].” (U.S. Const., art.

2015(See In re Christopher F., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 471, fn. 6, quoting People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 ] [which applied the quoted standard to the appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his robbery conviction].) A standard of review that inquires whether the record showed substantial evidence from which “a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” has no application in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of competency, for either a juvenil

2015Quoting verbatim from the decision in In re Christopher F., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at page 471, footnote 6, the Court of Appeal characterized the applicable standard as a review of “ ‘ “the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt,” ’ ” stating further that “ ‘ “the record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict. . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” 4 It is evident from both the language of the above quote

2015(See In re Christopher F., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 471, fn. 6, quoting People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 ] [which applied the quoted standard to the appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his robbery conviction].) A standard of review that inquires whether the record showed substantial evidence from which “a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” has no application in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of competency, for either a juvenil

2015(See In re Christopher F., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 471, fn. 6, quoting People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 ] [which applied the quoted standard to the appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his robbery conviction].) A standard of review that inquires whether the record showed substantial evidence from which “a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” has no application in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of competency, for either a juvenil

2014Accordingly, she has [forfeited] her right to contest it as error here”]; In re Joe A. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 11, 24 [“The quoted rule makes clear that a bifurcated hearing is required.