quoted rule in New Jersey

1997In Ford Motor Co. v. Edison Tp., the Supreme Court articulated the Tax Court’s responsibility to find value as follows: When an original assessment is unreliable, the Tax Court may not invoke its presumptive correctness and must establish value, even if it means coming to a determination contrary to both experts. [ Id. at 313, 604 A.2d 580 (citation omitted).] I am convinced that the assessments on Block 400, Lot 1 are “unreliable.” In reaching this conclusion I am influenced by the following factors: (a) plaintiffs valuation evidence; (b) defendant’s adoption of a wholly unrealistic valuation

1993That narrow concentration causes the Court to observe that "[t]he trial court's error lay in telling the jury outright that [defendant] had a `duty to warn.'" Ante at 358, 625 A. 2d at 1075 .

1991Super. 523, 530 , 522 A. 2d 464 (App.Div. 1987), "[a]lthough the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is not among the express circumstances set forth in the Code which give rise to a presumption of knowledge, see N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7b, the common law rule, which permits such an inference, may still be invoked in prosecutions under the Code." [3] Our opinion should not be read to indicate that the quoted instruction is required in cases where a passenger of a car is charged with theft of property found in the trunk.

1970Rather, we hold that the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code, section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only "standstill" robberies ( e.g., People v. Knowles (1950) supra, 35 Cal. 2d 175 , 217 P. 2d 1 ) but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. [ 80 Cal. Rptr., at 910 , 459 P. 2d, at 238 ] It is immediately evident that the quoted rule is inapplicable to the factual circumstances of t

1970Rather, we hold that the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code, section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only "standstill" robberies ( e.g., People v. Knowles (1950) supra, 35 Cal. 2d 175 , 217 P. 2d 1 ) but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. [ 80 Cal. Rptr., at 910 , 459 P. 2d, at 238 ] It is immediately evident that the quoted rule is inapplicable to the factual circumstances of t

1970Rather, we hold that the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code, section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only "standstill" robberies ( e.g., People v. Knowles (1950) supra, 35 Cal. 2d 175 , 217 P. 2d 1 ) but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. [ 80 Cal. Rptr., at 910 , 459 P. 2d, at 238 ] It is immediately evident that the quoted rule is inapplicable to the factual circumstances of t

1970Rather, we hold that the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal Code, section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only "standstill" robberies ( e.g., People v. Knowles (1950) supra, 35 Cal. 2d 175 , 217 P. 2d 1 ) but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. [ 80 Cal. Rptr., at 910 , 459 P. 2d, at 238 ] It is immediately evident that the quoted rule is inapplicable to the factual circumstances of t

1970The New York court itself has recently observed in People v. Miles, 23 N.Y. 2d 527 , 297 N.Y.S. 2d 913 , 245 N.E. 2d 688 (1969), cert. denied 395 U.S. 948 , 89 S.Ct. 2028 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 467 (1969): In short, the Levy-Lombardi rule was designed to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess of prosecutorial zeal.

1970The New York court itself has recently observed in People v. Miles, 23 N.Y. 2d 527 , 297 N.Y.S. 2d 913 , 245 N.E. 2d 688 (1969), cert. denied 395 U.S. 948 , 89 S.Ct. 2028 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 467 (1969): In short, the Levy-Lombardi rule was designed to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess of prosecutorial zeal.

1970The New York court itself has recently observed in People v. Miles, 23 N.Y. 2d 527 , 297 N.Y.S. 2d 913 , 245 N.E. 2d 688 (1969), cert. denied 395 U.S. 948 , 89 S.Ct. 2028 , 23 L.Ed. 2d 467 (1969): In short, the Levy-Lombardi rule was designed to prevent gross distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by excess of prosecutorial zeal.

1968In Sherwood Jewelers-Newark, *363 Inc. v. Philadelphia National Insurance Co., 102 F. Supp. 103 ( D.C.N.J., 1952), which involved a policy written before N.J.S.A. 17:36-5.20 was enacted, the court rejected the contention that the period of limitations began to run on the date the company declined liability and held that the action was barred since it was "not commenced within twelve months after the date of the occurrence which [gave] rise to the loss", as provided in the policy.

1962R.R. 4:69; In re General Assignment for Benefit of Creditors of Xaviers, Inc., 66 N.J.

1960Nor do we find plain error affecting substantial rights, under R.R. 1:5-3( c ) and R.R. 2:5; cf. Harpell v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 20 N.J. 309, 318 (1956), affirming 35 N.J.

1957The majority treat In re Fisler, 133 N.J.

1951The courts of this State have held that service upon one of two partners in an action seeking to hold them jointly is personally binding only upon the partner served, and that a statute making a judgment binding personally upon the unserved partner is violative of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution as construed in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N.J.L. 379 , 79 A. 347 ( E. & A. 1910).

1951The courts of this State have held that service upon one of two partners in an action seeking to hold them jointly is personally binding only upon the partner served, and that a statute making a judgment binding personally upon the unserved partner is violative of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution as construed in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N.J.L. 379 , 79 A. 347 ( E. & A. 1910).

1951The courts of this State have held that service upon one of two partners in an action seeking to hold them jointly is personally binding only upon the partner served, and that a statute making a judgment binding personally upon the unserved partner is violative of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution as construed in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N.J.L. 379 , 79 A. 347 ( E. & A. 1910).

1950The reason is clear and persuasive; `the one has no more right to the exclusive use or possession of the chattels so held than the other.' Chambers v. Hunt, supra ( 22 N.J.L. 552, at p. 556 ).

1949Since the purpose of Civil Service is "to provide a modern personnel system for positions in the classified service," ( R.S. 11:4-1), to this end the Civil Service Commission can exercise not only such authority as is legally conferred by express provisions of law but also "such as is by fair implication and intendment incident to and included in the authority expressly conferred for the purpose of carrying out and accomplishing the objects for which the commission was created." ( City of Newark v. Civil Service Commission, 115 N.J.L. 26 .) Both the plaintiff and the defendant were applicants