quoted analysis in Maryland

13 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
McCullough v. Stategreen md · 2008 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011 2 sentences 2011This Court quoted that analysis with approval in Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 406 , 942 A.2d 736, 744 (2008), while concluding “as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the trial court’s finding that [Petitioner] had not met her burden to prove the validity of the transfer, was not clearly erroneous.” Id. at 414 , 942 A.2d at 749 . 2011This Court quoted that analysis with approval in Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 406 , 942 A.2d 736, 744 (2008), while concluding “as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the trial court’s finding that [Petitioner] had not met her burden to prove the validity of the transfer, was not clearly erroneous.” Id. at 414 , 942 A.2d at 749 .	2	2
In Re Foleygreen md · 2003 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011We agree with and adopt the above quoted analysis, which is entirely consistent with Hams, supra, in which this Court stated: In Maryland, discovery orders “being interlocutory in nature, are not ordinarily appealable prior to a final judgment terminating the case in the trial court.” In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634 , 820 A.2d 587, 592 (2003) (reversing the Court of Special Appeals’s holding that a discovery order for a medical examination of the subject of a guardianship proceeding met the four requirements of the collateral order doctrine because the order did not satisfy the third and fourth 2011We agree with and adopt the above quoted analysis, which is entirely consistent with Hams, supra, in which this Court stated: In Maryland, discovery orders “being interlocutory in nature, are not ordinarily appealable prior to a final judgment terminating the case in the trial court.” In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 634 , 820 A.2d 587, 592 (2003) (reversing the Court of Special Appeals’s holding that a discovery order for a medical examination of the subject of a guardianship proceeding met the four requirements of the collateral order doctrine because the order did not satisfy the third and fourth	1	1
Imbraguglio v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.green md · 2000 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000In Imbraguglio , we used the above quoted test to determine "whether a shift in the contents of a bin, while a [warehouse] worker [standing on a wooden pallet hoisted in the air by a forklift] is retrieving dropped cartons, is an expected or unexpected occurrence.” 358 Md. 194, 215-17 , 747 A.2d 662, 674 (2000). 2000In Imbraguglio , we used the above quoted test to determine "whether a shift in the contents of a bin, while a [warehouse] worker [standing on a wooden pallet hoisted in the air by a forklift] is retrieving dropped cartons, is an expected or unexpected occurrence.” 358 Md. 194, 215-17 , 747 A.2d 662, 674 (2000).	1	1
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Samisgreen md · 1937 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994The court quoted the test for materiality set forth in Life Insurance Co. v. Samis, 172 Md. 517, 528 , 192 A. 335, 339 (1937), namely whether the facts concealed from the insurer “ ‘were of such probative force as in all reasonable probability, if brought to the knowledge of the company, would have precluded the issuance of the policy.’ ” The circuit court also pointed out that the insurer “carries the burden of showing that the policy would not have been written if the fact of Van Horn’s epileptic condition had been disclosed.” 1 The circuit court then found that Atlantic Mutual failed, in tw 1994The court quoted the test for materiality set forth in Life Insurance Co. v. Samis, 172 Md. 517, 528 , 192 A. 335, 339 (1937), namely whether the facts concealed from the insurer “ ‘were of such probative force as in all reasonable probability, if brought to the knowledge of the company, would have precluded the issuance of the policy.’ ” The circuit court also pointed out that the insurer “carries the burden of showing that the policy would not have been written if the fact of Van Horn’s epileptic condition had been disclosed.” 1 The circuit court then found that Atlantic Mutual failed, in tw	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
Bricker v. Warch green mdctspecapp · 2003 2 sentences 2011As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Bricker v. Warch, 152 Md.App. 119 , 831 A.2d 453 (2003): Although it is not uncommon for a fact-finding judge to be clearly erroneous when he [or she] is affirmatively PERSUADED of something, it is, as in this case, almost impossi 659 ble for a judge to be clearly erroneous when he [or she] is simply NOT PERSUADED of something. 2011As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Bricker v. Warch, 152 Md.App. 119 , 831 A.2d 453 (2003): Although it is not uncommon for a fact-finding judge to be clearly erroneous when he [or she] is affirmatively PERSUADED of something, it is, as in this case, almost impossi 659 ble for a judge to be clearly erroneous when he [or she] is simply NOT PERSUADED of something.	2	2009–2011
Figgins v. Cochrane green md · 2008 2 sentences 2011This Court quoted that analysis with approval in Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 406 , 942 A.2d 736, 744 (2008), while concluding “as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the trial court’s finding that [Petitioner] had not met her burden to prove the validity of the transfer, was not clearly erroneous.” Id. at 414 , 942 A.2d at 749 . 2009This Court quoted that analysis with approval in Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 406 , 942 A.2d 736, 744 (2008), while concluding “as did the Court of Special Appeals, that the trial court’s finding that [Petitioner] had not met her burden to prove the validity of the transfer, was not clearly erroneous.” Id. at 414 , 942 A.2d at 749 .	2	2009–2011
In Re Steinberg green dc · 2004 1 sentence 2005Accordingly, Steinberg is hereby suspended from the practice of law for thirty days, and reinstatement shall be conditioned on proof of fitness to practice law.” Id. at 122 . 7 .	1	2005–2005
Mahoney v. Byers green md · 1946 2 sentences 1999The fact that the analysis shows the presence of a drug shall be conclusive evidence either that there was knowledge of the fact on the part of the trainer or that he was guilty of carelessness in permitting it to be administered. [Emphasis added.] 40 The Court of Appeals held that the irrebuttable presumption established in the above quoted rule was unconstitutional. 187 Md. at 87 , 48 A.2d 600 . 1999The fact that the analysis shows the presence of a drug shall be conclusive evidence either that there was knowledge of the fact on the part of the trainer or that he was guilty of carelessness in permitting it to be administered. [Emphasis added.] 40 The Court of Appeals held that the irrebuttable presumption established in the above quoted rule was unconstitutional. 187 Md. at 87 , 48 A.2d 600 .	1	1999–1999
Incorporated Village of Great Neck v. Green green nysupct · 1957 2 sentences 1976Guilford reads the quoted clause to mean that unless Beasley’s vehicles are “used with some frequency” 698 they should “be deemed stored or otherwise in violation of Sub-Division III.” To underpin its position, Guilford cites Incorporated Village v. Green, 166 N.Y.S.2d 219 , 8 Misc. 2d 356 (1957). 1976Guilford reads the quoted clause to mean that unless Beasley’s vehicles are “used with some frequency” 698 they should “be deemed stored or otherwise in violation of Sub-Division III.” To underpin its position, Guilford cites Incorporated Village v. Green, 166 N.Y.S.2d 219 , 8 Misc. 2d 356 (1957).	1	1976–1976
Grimm v. Co. Comm'rs of Wash. Co. green md · 1969 1 sentence 1975Furthermore, as we pointed out in *721 Grimm, supra at 635 , some courts, most notably the Court of Appeals of New York, go so far as to indicate “that to grant declaratory relief when another action in which all of the same issues may be adequately determined is pending at the time the action for a declaratory judgment is filed is an abuse of the trial court's discretion.” We here, however, are not required to go that far; therefore, we think that a concise statement, with slight modifications as noted, of the law of this State in this regard can be found in Professor Borchard’s Declaratory J	1	1975–1975
O'Dell v. Barrett green md · 1932 1 sentence 1949The meaning of these words is immaterial, since we hold that by the true construction of the statute itself the Board has no power to pay for chiropractic treatments. 731 Plaintiffs allege that “the professional standing and skill of Doctors of Chiropractic * * was expressly recognized and acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in their opinion in O’Dell v. Barrett, 163 Md. [342] 347 [ 163 A. 191, 192 ].” In that case, a personal injury case, the court, in holding that a chiropractor was qualified to testify as an expert as to the effect of an injury to the spine, said: “In view of the fact t	1	1949–1949
Geary v. Geary green ny · 1936 1 sentence 1948The court quoted the rule laid down in Matthews v. Matthews, supra, “It must, therefore, appear before judgment is entered purporting to deal with a non-resident’s property, that by attachment, by injunction, by sequestration, in some manner, the court has laid hands upon his property within the State.” [ 272 N. Y. 390 , 6 N. Ed. 2d 72] The Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 106, comment *40 (e), lays down the rule as follows: “If no property is attached or otherwise proceeded against before the rendition of the judgment, there is no jurisdiction to render a judgment.	1	1948–1948
Davis v. State green md · 1854 1 sentence 1939In Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 , an almost identical clause of the Constitution of 1851, article 3, section 17, was involved, and it was then said: “A practice had crept into our system of legislation, of engrafting, upon subjects of great public benefit and importance, for local or selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters, and rather than endanger the main subject, or for the purpose of securing new strength for it, members were often induced to sanction and actually vote for such provisions, which if they were offered as independent subjects, would never have received their	1	1939–1939
Hubbard v. Mayor of Baltimore neutral md · 1930 2 sentences 1932Brady v. Road Directors of Allegany County, 148 Md. 493 , 129 A. 682 ; Hubbard v. Baltimore, 158 Md. 46 , 148 A. 128 ; Koehler v. State Roads Commission, 125 Md. 444 , 94 A. 16 . 1932Brady v. Road Directors of Allegany County, 148 Md. 493 , 129 A. 682 ; Hubbard v. Baltimore, 158 Md. 46 , 148 A. 128 ; Koehler v. State Roads Commission, 125 Md. 444 , 94 A. 16 .	1	1932–1932
Koehler v. State Roads Commission neutral md · 1915 2 sentences 1932Brady v. Road Directors of Allegany County, 148 Md. 493 , 129 A. 682 ; Hubbard v. Baltimore, 158 Md. 46 , 148 A. 128 ; Koehler v. State Roads Commission, 125 Md. 444 , 94 A. 16 . 1932Brady v. Road Directors of Allegany County, 148 Md. 493 , 129 A. 682 ; Hubbard v. Baltimore, 158 Md. 46 , 148 A. 128 ; Koehler v. State Roads Commission, 125 Md. 444 , 94 A. 16 .	1	1932–1932
Brady v. Road Directors for Allegany County neutral md · 1925 2 sentences 1932Brady v. Road Directors of Allegany County, 148 Md. 493 , 129 A. 682 ; Hubbard v. Baltimore, 158 Md. 46 , 148 A. 128 ; Koehler v. State Roads Commission, 125 Md. 444 , 94 A. 16 . 1932Brady v. Road Directors of Allegany County, 148 Md. 493 , 129 A. 682 ; Hubbard v. Baltimore, 158 Md. 46 , 148 A. 128 ; Koehler v. State Roads Commission, 125 Md. 444 , 94 A. 16 .	1	1932–1932

Where else courts name it

CA 149 (1893–2020) TX 73 (1914–2024) OK 58 (1923–2016) MO 50 (1910–2006) FL 42 (1908–2018) LA 37 (1918–2004) NC 36 (1940–2023) AL 35 (1907–2024) MI 34 (1949–2024) PA 30 (1904–2019) IL 30 (1903–2015) MS 29 (1931–2022) GA 28 (1918–2018) OR 26 (1917–2020) WA 25 (1911–2018) NY 21 (1902–2012) TN 20 (1927–2016) IA 18 (1921–2016) KS 17 (1911–2004) AR 16 (1921–1998) NJ 15 (1949–1997) MA 15 (1928–2009) AZ 13 (1966–2004) KY 13 (1925–2024) MD 13 (1932–2011) IN 13 (1933–2017) CO 12 (1958–1996) OH 11 (1932–2011) SC 10 (1935–1979) NM 10 (1942–2012) ID 9 (1957–2023) DC 9 (1913–2018) WI 8 (1914–2013) MN 7 (1922–1983) MT 7 (1929–2002) NE 7 (1890–1974) DE 6 (1934–1978) RI 6 (1962–2014) ME 6 (1891–1980) SD 6 (1941–1969) ND 6 (1908–1998) HI 5 (1937–1989) UT 5 (1937–1994) WY 5 (1937–2003) CT 4 (1942–2009) NV 4 (1950–1965) WV 3 (1969–2026) AK 2 (1997–1998) VA 2 (1986–2014) VT 2 (1945–1978)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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