73 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1914–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Doroughgreen2 sentences1954Great Southern Life Insurance Company v. Dorough, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 772, 775, 776 ; Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Wm. 1954Great Southern Life Insurance Company v. Dorough, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 772, 775, 776 ; Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Wm. | 3 | 4 |
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmongreen2 sentences2024In this context, however, the text of Section 10501(b) indicates a narrower understanding of the term “regulation.” Neither of those cases addressed a clause preempting state laws or remedies related to “regulation” of a subject matter, much less “with respect to” such “regulation.” Because the federal law at issue in Garmon provided essentially no guidance on the scope of its preemptive effect, the Court based its decision in that case on its own perception of the federal law’s “national purposes,” 359 U.S. at 244 , not on a statute that preempted state “regulation” of anything, id. at 240 (n 2024In this context, however, the text of Section 10501(b) indicates a narrower understanding of the term “regulation.” Neither of those cases addressed a clause preempting state laws or remedies related to “regulation” of a subject matter, much less “with respect to” such “regulation.” Because the federal law at issue in Garmon provided essentially no guidance on the scope of its preemptive effect, the Court based its decision in that case on its own perception of the federal law’s “national purposes,” 359 U.S. at 244 , not on a statute that preempted state “regulation” of anything, id. at 240 (n | 2 | 2 |
Nicholas v. Stategreen1 sentence2021App. 2008). 4Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). 2 accused] has been found guilty shall . . . . run concurrently.” 5 There are six exceptions to the above rule in section 3.03 of the statute containing the above quoted rule. 6 We agree with the brief filed by the State in which it concedes that none of the exceptions in section 3.03 apply to the convictions at issue. 7 And since Scott’s thefts were tried in a single criminal action, the general rule, which provides for cumulative sentences, is the rule that applies to Scott’s cases even thou | 1 | 1 |
Robbins v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(a). 6Id. § 3.03(b)(1)-(6). 7Id. 8Id. 9See id. § 3.03; Robbins v. State, 914 S.W.2d 582, 583-84 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Harris v. State, 661 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), another case involving autopsy photographs of a child who had died from abuse, where the court quoted the rule which was adopted in Mar *478 tin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972): [I]f a photograph is competent, material and relevant to the issue on trial, it is not rendered inadmissible merely because it is gruesome or might tend to arouse the passions of the jury, unless it is offered solely to inflame the minds of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Harris v. State, 661 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), another case involving autopsy photographs of a child who had died from abuse, where the court quoted the rule which was adopted in Mar *478 tin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972): [I]f a photograph is competent, material and relevant to the issue on trial, it is not rendered inadmissible merely because it is gruesome or might tend to arouse the passions of the jury, unless it is offered solely to inflame the minds of the jury. | 1 | 1 |
County of Hennepin v. Holtgreen2 sentences1979See also County of Hennepin v. Holt, 296 Minn. 164 , 207 N.W.2d 723 (1973). 1979See also County of Hennepin v. Holt, 296 Minn. 164 , 207 N.W.2d 723 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Barton Plumbing Company v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1975See also Barton Plumbing Co. v. Johnson, 285 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Civ.App.1955, writ ref.). | 1 | 1 |
Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.green2 sentences1972Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, 155 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.Civ.App.1941), writ ref.” In Brown v. Lundell, supra, this Court, though holding the lessee liable for negligence reaffirmed the above quoted rule from Guffey v. Stroud. 1972Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Company, 155 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.Civ.App.1941), writ ref." In Brown v. Lundell, supra, this Court, though holding the lessee liable for negligence reaffirmed the above quoted rule from Guffey v. Stroud. | 1 | 1 |
| Ferguson v. Fergusongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Slade Bassett v. Crumgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024And the Court quoted this principle again as part of its preemption analysis in Cipollone. 505 U.S. at 521 . 2024And the Court quoted this principle again as part of its preemption analysis in Cipollone. 505 U.S. at 521 . | 3 | 2023–2024 |
Oliphant v. Markham
neutral
2 sentences1971In Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543 , 15 S.W. 569, 571 , the jury was instructed ‘that, if they found that Jones bought futures for Markham, and advanced money for that purpose * * * this rendered the transaction illegal, and plaintiff could not recover.’ Our Supreme Court said that the quoted instruction was correct. 1971In Oliphant v. Markham, 79 Tex. 543 , 15 S.W. 569, 571 , the jury was instructed ‘that, if they found that Jones bought futures for Markham, and advanced money for that purpose * * * this rendered the transaction illegal, and plaintiff could not recover.’ Our Supreme Court said that the quoted instruction was correct. | 2 | 1959–1971 |
Garza v. Richmond
neutral
2 sentences1971In Garza v. Richmond, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W. 889 , it was held that checks cashed by the plaintiff for the purpose of gambling at a table run by plaintiff could not be collected through the Courts of Texas. 1959In Garza v. Richmond, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W. 889 , it was held that checks cashed by the plaintiff for the purpose of gambling at a table run by plaintiff could not be collected through the Courts of Texas. | 2 | 1959–1971 |
Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Milliken
neutral
2 sentences1954Co., 127 Tex. 23, 27 , 91 S.W.2d 332, 333 ; Pope v. Beauchamp, 110 Tex. 271, 280 , 219 S.W. 447 ; Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Company, 172 U.S. 401 , 19 S.Ct. 233 , 43 L.Ed. 492, 495 ; Mills v. Mills, Tex.Com.App., 228 S.W. 919 ; Burleson v. Tinnin, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W. 350 , application for writ of er ror refused; Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Milliken, Tex.Civ.App., 87 S.W.2d 503, 505 . “ ‘The plaintiff’s testimony, the substance of which has been hereinbefore stated, is not so clear, positive and unequivocal upon the point at issue and of such' nature and given under su 1954App., 87 S.W. 2d 503, 505 . “ ‘The plaintiff’s testimony, the substance of which has been hereinbefore stated, is not so clear, positive and unequivocal upon the point at issue and of such nature and given under such circumstances as to bring it within the exception to the above quoted rule and authorize the trial court to give conclusive effect to it. | 2 | 1954–1954 |
Maddox Bros. & Anderson v. Covington
green
2 sentences1917The quoted clause concerning restrictions and regulations refers, not to Courts of Civil Appeals, whose jurisdiction was being defined elsewhere (sec. 6), b.ut to the Supreme Court; and “restrictions” is there used in the sense of “limitations.” Maddox v. Covington, 87 Texas, 454 , 29 S. W., 465 ; Schleicher v. Runge, 90 Texas, 456 , 39 S. W., 279 . 1917The quoted clause concerning restrictions and regulations refers, not to Courts of Civil Appeals, whose jurisdiction was being defined elsewhere (sec. 6), b.ut to the Supreme Court; and “restrictions” is there used in the sense of “limitations.” Maddox v. Covington, 87 Texas, 454 , 29 S. W., 465 ; Schleicher v. Runge, 90 Texas, 456 , 39 S. W., 279 . | 2 | 1917–1917 |
Schleicher v. Runge
green
2 sentences1917The quoted clause concerning restrictions and regulations refers, not to Courts of Civil Appeals, whose jurisdiction was being defined elsewhere (sec. 6), b.ut to the Supreme Court; and “restrictions” is there used in the sense of “limitations.” Maddox v. Covington, 87 Texas, 454 , 29 S. W., 465 ; Schleicher v. Runge, 90 Texas, 456 , 39 S. W., 279 . 1917The quoted clause concerning restrictions and regulations refers, not to Courts of Civil Appeals, whose jurisdiction was being defined elsewhere (sec. 6), b.ut to the Supreme Court; and “restrictions” is there used in the sense of “limitations.” Maddox v. Covington, 87 Texas, 454 , 29 S. W., 465 ; Schleicher v. Runge, 90 Texas, 456 , 39 S. W., 279 . | 2 | 1917–1917 |
Prado-Steiman Ex Rel. Prado v. Bush
green
1 sentence2012The court quoted this rule in Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266 , 1279-80 (11th Cir.2000), another case defendants cite. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Branscum v. Castleberry
neutral
1 sentence1986Under the court's charge, the jury could have found Texan Transfer to be [Byboth and Branscum's] alter ego upon a finding that "one or more" of the above quoted factors existed. 695 S.W.2d at 645 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Crisp v. Security National Insurance Company
green
1 sentence1984Crisp v. Security National Insurance Co., 369 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.1963), where the Supreme Court said: The quoted clause constitutes only a limitation on the amount of recovery. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Palm v. Mortgage Investment Co. of El Paso
green
1 sentence1982Under the rule a covenant which requires conduct which the parties themselves cannot define with certainty will not be implied. 229 S.W.2d at 874 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Willis v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1981Any experienced trial lawyer knows that a purported trial without adequate preparation amounts to no trial at all.” (Footnote omitted) The Court also quoted the rule it had adopted from Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.): “We think that the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplated the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the law and facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity to present them to a court or jury in their most favorable light.” See also King v | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Nebraska v. Iowa
green
2 sentences1981An early and leading case is Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 , 12 S.Ct. 396 , 36 L.Ed. 186 (1892). 1981An early and leading case is Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 , 12 S.Ct. 396 , 36 L.Ed. 186 (1892). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
King v. Beto
green
1 sentence1981Any experienced trial lawyer knows that a purported trial without adequate preparation amounts to no trial at all.” (Footnote omitted) The Court also quoted the rule it had adopted from Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.): “We think that the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplated the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the law and facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity to present them to a court or jury in their most favorable light.” See also King v | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Thaddeus King, Jr. v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence1981Any experienced trial lawyer knows that a purported trial without adequate preparation amounts to no trial at all.” (Footnote omitted) The Court also quoted the rule it had adopted from Willis v. Hunter, 166 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.): “We think that the right to the effective assistance of counsel contemplated the guiding hand of an able and responsible lawyer, devoted solely to the interest of his client; who has ample opportunity to acquaint himself with the law and facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity to present them to a court or jury in their most favorable light.” See also King v | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hulsey v. Keel
neutral
1 sentence1978In agreement is Hulsey v. Keel, 541 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.), wherein the Court stated, “ . . there must be a written agreement signed by the parties and timely filed with the clerk to postpone the decision. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hazel v. State
green
2 sentences1978Penal Code, Sec. 46.01, is ‘any firearm that is designed, made, or adapted to be fired with one hand.’ (Em phasis Supplied) Again, it is evident that the lesser offense and the offense charged are capable of proof by the same fact that appellant had in his automobile a .38 caliber revolver.” (Emphasis added.) In Hazel v. State, supra, the defendant’s conviction for the lesser included offense was held proper on the basis of the above quoted analysis of whether Art. 37.09, supra, applied. 1978Penal Code, Sec. 46.01, is `any firearm that is designed, made, or adapted to be fired with one hand.' (Emphasis *162 Supplied) Again, it is evident that the lesser offense and the offense charged are capable of proof by the same fact that appellant had in his automobile a .38 caliber revolver." (Emphasis added.) In Hazel v. State, supra, the defendant's conviction for the lesser included offense was held proper on the basis of the above quoted analysis of whether Art. 37.09, supra, applied. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
City of Tyler v. Bruck
green
1 sentence1977The above quoted rule was followed in City of Tyler v. Bruck, 267 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1954, writ ref’d n. r. e.), where the Court pointed out that equity will not relieve a person from his erroneous acts or omissions resulting from his own negligence. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Continental Credit Corporation v. Norman
green
1 sentence1977The same rule was applied in Continental Credit Corporation v. Norman, 303 S.W.2d 449 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1957, writ ref’d n. r. e.), where Justice Pope, writing for the Court, said: “The trial court concluded that both General Motors, the owner; and Continental, the mortgagee, were negligent. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wortham v. Walker
green
2 sentences1976The duty, in a word, must be ministerial, one which does not involve any discretion, and which leaves no alternative.” In Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255 , 128 S.W.2d 1138 (1939), the court quoted the rule concerning the certainty of averments in petition for mandamus as: “. . . ‘Relator, to be entitled to the right must at least have a clear legal right to the performance by respondent of the particular duty sought to be enforced, that is, there must be a clear legal right in relator and a corresponding duty on the part of the person to whom the writ is directed. 1976The duty, in a word, must be ministerial, one which does not involve any discretion, and which leaves no alternative.” In Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255 , 128 S.W.2d 1138 (1939), the court quoted the rule concerning the certainty of averments in petition for mandamus as: “. . . ‘Relator, to be entitled to the right must at least have a clear legal right to the performance by respondent of the particular duty sought to be enforced, that is, there must be a clear legal right in relator and a corresponding duty on the part of the person to whom the writ is directed. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
City of Corsicana v. Willman
green
2 sentences1973The appellants cite for consideration the Supreme Court opinion in the case of City of Corsicana v. Willmann, 147 Tex. 377 , 216 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1949). 1973The appellants cite for consideration the Supreme Court opinion in the case of City of Corsicana v. Willmann, 147 Tex. 377 , 216 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1949). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Mr. Eddie, Inc. v. Ginsberg green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Toliver v. Bergmann green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Ingram v. Dallas County Water Control & Improvement District No. 7
green
1 sentence1972Mr. Eddie, Inc. v. Ginsberg (Eastland Tex.Civ.App.1968) 430 S.W.2d 5 , error refused NRE (see at page 10 a quoted instruction as to definition of “good cause”); Ingram v. Dallas County Water Control and Improvement District (Dallas Tex.Civ.App.1968) 425 S.W.2d 366 , no writ history. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Vick v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Fuentes v. State neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Shannon v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Jefferson v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Nichols v. State neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Hilliard v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Keener v. Cleveland green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Moss & Raley v. Wren green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Miller v. Carlson green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| McNeil v. McLain neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Houston & Texas Central Railroad v. Keeling green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Francis v. Foster green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| P. E. Schow & Bros. v. McCloskey green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Hobbs v. Grant green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Atlantic Oil Producing Co. v. Jackson neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| First Natl. Bk. in Dallas v. Hannay green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.