quoted rule in Illinois

2004In Bettenhausen v. Guenther , 388 Ill. 487 (1944), the court, after restating the Weisguth dicta , reversed a trial court order allowing petitioners leave to withdraw their oral motions to dismiss their petition after the court had already granted the motions.

2004In Bettenhausen v. Guenther, 388 Ill. 487 (1944), the court, after restating the Weisguth dicta, reversed a trial court order allowing petitioners leave to withdraw their oral motions to dismiss their petition after the court had already granted the motions.

2000The quoted principle in Davis that "the extension of the doctrine of judicial notice to include facts *** readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy is an important aid in the efficient disposition of litigation" ( Davis , 65 Ill. 2d at 165 , 357 N.E.2d at 796 ) applies with equal force regardless of the standard of proof required.

2000The quoted principle in Davis that "the extension of the doctrine of judicial notice to include facts *** readily verifiable from sources of indisputable accuracy is an important aid in the efficient disposition of litigation" ( Davis , 65 Ill. 2d at 165 , 357 N.E.2d at 796 ) applies with equal force regardless of the standard of proof required.

2015Neither the Davis nor Scott court conditioned their sanction of the use of judicial notice upon the level of proof required.” White, 311 Ill.

2011Moreover, the quoted principle appears to have its roots in Sinclair Refining Co. v. City of Chicago, 246 Ill.

1996Certainly the failure to keep a dog secured was not in itself sufficient to establish liability at common law for damages caused by such animal.” Beckert, 50 Ill.

1994In disregarding the waiver that it concedes occurred in this case, the majority stresses that "[t]he waiver rule is one of administrative convenience rather than jurisdiction." (Opinion at 152 of 199 Ill.Dec. at 948 of 633 *956 N.E.2d.) What the majority neglects to point out, however, is that the quoted principle is the underpinning for our review of plain error; it does not justify a search for any error or, as the majority regrettably does here, a remand to determine whether error occurred.

1990It is proper, however, for the owner to establish the existence of valuable mineral deposits on the real estate being valued and in doing this to show the character of the deposits) and to what extent it enhances the land’s market value.” Oberlaender, 42 Ill. 2d at 415-16 , 247 N.E.2d at 892 .

1990It is proper, however, for the owner to establish the existence of valuable mineral deposits on the real estate being valued and in doing this to show the character of the deposits) and to what extent it enhances the land’s market value.” Oberlaender, 42 Ill. 2d at 415-16 , 247 N.E.2d at 892 .

1988The quoted rule from Mallder speaks in terms of “specific acts or omissions.” (Emphasis added.) (Mallder, 145 Ill.

1988App. 3d at 811 , 495 N.E.2d at 1358 .) Moreover, any limitation upon police immunity which covers only passive conduct fails to give them the discretion they need in performing their difficult and often dangerous tasks.

1982Next, defendants contend that the trial court erred in excluding their testimony about improvements they made to the subject property “after the Contract [was] signed and during a period of time they believed the deal was dead.” According to defendants, if the trial court had known that defendants had spent approximately $2000 on improvements, it might have concluded that it would be inequitable to grant plaintiffs specific performance or that defendants should be awarded a $2000 “allowance.” Defendants rely on Fitzpatrick v. Allied Contracting Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 448, 456 , 182 N.E.2d 183,

1982Next, defendants contend that the trial court erred in excluding their testimony about improvements they made to the subject property “after the Contract [was] signed and during a period of time they believed the deal was dead.” According to defendants, if the trial court had known that defendants had spent approximately $2000 on improvements, it might have concluded that it would be inequitable to grant plaintiffs specific performance or that defendants should be awarded a $2000 “allowance.” Defendants rely on Fitzpatrick v. Allied Contracting Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 448, 456 , 182 N.E.2d 183,

1982Next, defendants contend that the trial court erred in excluding their testimony about improvements they made to the subject property “after the Contract [was] signed and during a period of time they believed the deal was dead.” According to defendants, if the trial court had known that defendants had spent approximately $2000 on improvements, it might have concluded that it would be inequitable to grant plaintiffs specific performance or that defendants should be awarded a $2000 “allowance.” Defendants rely on Fitzpatrick v. Allied Contracting Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 448, 456 , 182 N.E.2d 183,

1982Next, defendants contend that the trial court erred in excluding their testimony about improvements they made to the subject property “after the Contract [was] signed and during a period of time they believed the deal was dead.” According to defendants, if the trial court had known that defendants had spent approximately $2000 on improvements, it might have concluded that it would be inequitable to grant plaintiffs specific performance or that defendants should be awarded a $2000 “allowance.” Defendants rely on Fitzpatrick v. Allied Contracting Co. (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 448, 456 , 182 N.E.2d 183,

1980The court quoted the test stated in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 , 67 L.

1980The court quoted the test stated in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 , 67 L.

1980Ed. 1042, 1045 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 627 , that parental rights “* * * may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.” ( 68 Ill. 2d 419, 438 , 369 N.E.2d 858, 866 .) The court then applied this test, holding that the legislative restriction on the revocability of consent to adoption was reasonably related to the State’s authority to legislate with regard to the adoption of children and for their general welfare.

1980Ed. 1042, 1045 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 627 , that parental rights “* * * may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.” ( 68 Ill. 2d 419, 438 , 369 N.E.2d 858, 866 .) The court then applied this test, holding that the legislative restriction on the revocability of consent to adoption was reasonably related to the State’s authority to legislate with regard to the adoption of children and for their general welfare.

1979App. 3d 588 , 376 N.E.2d 1065 , this court held that the giving of the quoted instruction did not constitute reversible error.

1979App.3d 588 , 376 N.E.2d 1065 , this court held that the giving of the quoted instruction did not constitute reversible error.

1976He relies upon Falls v. Visser, 250 Ill.

1975This issue was decided adversely to defendant’s contentions in People v. Nardi, 48 Ill.2d 111, 116 , 268 N.E.2d 389 .

1975This issue was decided adversely to defendant’s contentions in People v. Nardi, 48 Ill.2d 111, 116 , 268 N.E.2d 389 .

1974Perhaps the closest case to the one before us is Solone v. Reck, 55 Ill.App.2d 282 , 204 N.E.2d 614 .

1974Perhaps the closest case to the one before us is Solone v. Reck, 55 Ill.App.2d 282 , 204 N.E.2d 614 .

1973“The Unitéd States Supreme Court reversed McCarthy’s conviction entered on a plea of guilty because the trial judge did not ‘personally inquire whether the defendant understood the nature of the charge’ as required by Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P.; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 .” In the instant case, the quoted inquiry of the defendant is insufficient.

1973“The Unitéd States Supreme Court reversed McCarthy’s conviction entered on a plea of guilty because the trial judge did not ‘personally inquire whether the defendant understood the nature of the charge’ as required by Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P.; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 .” In the instant case, the quoted inquiry of the defendant is insufficient.

1968City of Chicago v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 331 Ill 322, 163 NE 17 .” In reviewing the arguments of counsel in the light of the above quoted rule, we cannot say that in refusing to grant Moore and Humphreys a new trial, the trial court abused its discretion.

1956However, in United States v. Troy-Parisian, Inc., 115 F.2d 224 , which involved a conditional sales contract with a similar clause, the court held that’ such a clause in the contract bars such a defense to the note.

1956Keller v. Village of Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365 , the quoted principle was interpreted as meaning that it was not unreasonable to regulate the location of garages in strictly residential districts.

1941(Herrin and Southern Railroad Co. v. Nolte, 243 Ill. 594 ; South Park Comrs. v. Ayer, 237 id. 211; Chicago and State Line Railway Co. v. Mines, 221 id. 448.) Where the estimates of expert witnesses as to values are conflicting, the jury may resort to an inspection of the premises in order to determine the weight of each opinion, but the verdict will not be sustained, unless it is within the range of the values expressed by the witnesses.

1933In the Richards case, supra ( 62 Ill. 417 ), the court adhered to the rule applied in the Pitney case, and on page 425 said: “The words, too, ‘equally,’ or ‘share and share alike,’ or ‘to be equally divided,’ import an intention.

1924Plaintiff in error cites the cases of Flynn v. People, 222 Ill. 303 , Filippo v. People, 224 id. 212, and Foglia v. People, 229 id. 286, as authority for his contention that the clause of the instruction objected to is not only inapplicable but prejudicial.

1918The rule announced in that case-was expressly approved and adhered to in International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 489 , and Mueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 283 id. 148.

1909In another connection this court quoted the rule, supposed to be here available, in the case of Tuthill v. Belt Railway Company, 145 Ill.

1908In Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co. 210 Ill. 460 , this court quoted the rule announced in Jerome v. Ross, supra, but said (p. 463) : “The cases where equity will enjoin to prevent a multiplicity of suits between two persons, only, are where the whole controversy arises out of the same matter and has been settled at law, and further litigation, which seems purely vexatious, is persisted in.

1908In Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co. 210 Ill. 460 , this court quoted the rule announced in Jerome v. Ross, supra, but said (p. 463) : “The cases where equity will enjoin to prevent a multiplicity of suits between two persons, only, are where the whole controversy arises out of the same matter and has been settled at law, and further litigation, which seems purely vexatious, is persisted in.

1907A witness’ credit may be impeached by proof that he has made statements out of court contrary to what he has testified to at that trial, (i Lewis’ Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 462.) Starkie, in discussing this question, lays down the following rule: “If the witness admits the words, declaration or act, proof on the other side becomes unnecessary, and an opportunity is afforded to the witness of giving such reasons, explanations or exculpations of his conduct, if any there be, as the circumstances may furnish.” (1 Starkie on Evidence,—10th ed.—*p- 240.) This court quoted this rule with approval

1903The power of sale given is a limited power, and can only be exercised for the purposes named in the instrument; (Fleming v. Mills, 182 Ill. 464 ; Griffin v. Grffin, 141 id. 373;) and could not be exercised unless the necessities of the life tenants required it,—that is, made it necessary, etc. The testimony in the record shows no necessity whatever for the sale of the property in question within the meaning of the power given.