quoted rule in Tennessee

2003The emphasized portion of the above quoted rule delineates the three circumstances in which evidence from a juror may be admitted to impeach a verdict, namely when there has been “(1) extraneous prejudicial information, (2) outside influence, or (3) antecedent agreements to be bound by a quotient or majority result.” Caldararo, 794 S.W.2d at 742 .

2002The emphasized portion of the above quoted rule delineates the three circumstances in which evidence from a juror may be admitted to impeach a verdict, namely when there has been “(1) extraneous prejudicial information, (2) outside influence, or (3) antecedent agreements to be bound by a quotient or majority result.” Caldararo, 794 S.W.2d at 742 .

2016In the sentence immediately preceding the above quoted instruction, the instructions clearly stated that, after the jury had convicted the Defendants of one of the applicable predicate offenses in Count 2, the jury then ―had to determine whether or not the [Defendants are] guilty of Employing a Firearm During the Commission of a Dangerous [Felony].‖ Our courts acknowledge that jurors do not read instructions in the same way a lawyer might but instead apply ―commonsense understanding of the instructions[.]‖ Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 31 .

2014Davis, 191 S.W.3d at 120 .

2001The court also quoted the standard from Citizens Real Estate & Loan Co., Inc. v. Mountain States Development Corp., 633 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), “[w]hen the injury is permanent, any depreciation in the value of the property will be an element of damages, according to the extent and duration of plaintiff’s estate.

2001An estimate of damages on this basis presupposes that the premises are subject to the same lasting detriment, and that it is not to be avoided or removed by any expenditure, for, otherwise, the injury would be measured upon different elements.” Id.

1997Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228 , 443 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Ferguson v. Moore, 209 Tenn. 29 , 348 S.W.2d 496 (1961); Bowers v. Lester, 49 Tenn. 456 (1871).

1997Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228 , 443 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Ferguson v. Moore, 209 Tenn. 29 , 348 S.W.2d 496 (1961); Bowers v. Lester, 49 Tenn. 456 (1871).

1997Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228 , 443 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Ferguson v. Moore, 209 Tenn. 29 , 348 S.W.2d 496 (1961); Bowers v. Lester, 49 Tenn. 456 (1871).

1997Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228 , 443 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Ferguson v. Moore, 209 Tenn. 29 , 348 S.W.2d 496 (1961); Bowers v. Lester, 49 Tenn. 456 (1871).

1997Dick v. Dick, 223 Tenn. 228 , 443 S.W.2d 472 (1969); Ferguson v. Moore, 209 Tenn. 29 , 348 S.W.2d 496 (1961); Bowers v. Lester, 49 Tenn. 456 (1871).

1985The quoted principle has been affirmed in numerous Tennessee cases, including Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn. 247 , 225 S.W.2d 49 (1949) and Lawrence County v. White, 200 Tenn. 1 , 288 S.W.2d 735 (1956).

1985The quoted principle has been affirmed in numerous Tennessee cases, including Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn. 247 , 225 S.W.2d 49 (1949) and Lawrence County v. White, 200 Tenn. 1 , 288 S.W.2d 735 (1956).

1985The quoted principle has been affirmed in numerous Tennessee cases, including Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn. 247 , 225 S.W.2d 49 (1949) and Lawrence County v. White, 200 Tenn. 1 , 288 S.W.2d 735 (1956).

1985The quoted principle has been affirmed in numerous Tennessee cases, including Reed v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn. 247 , 225 S.W.2d 49 (1949) and Lawrence County v. White, 200 Tenn. 1 , 288 S.W.2d 735 (1956).

1984The Court of Appeals stated that the charge was “consistent with what was stated in In Re Padgett’s Will, 54 Tenn.App. 1 , 387 S.W.2d 355 (1964), in which two holographs were also at issue.” The quoted instruction actually is based upon a statement made in an earlier appellate opinion dealing with wills of Mr. Charles Padgett, In re Padgett’s Will, 51 Tenn.App. 134, 144 , 364 S.W.2d 947, 951-952 (1962).

1984The Court of Appeals stated that the charge was “consistent with what was stated in In Re Padgett’s Will, 54 Tenn.App. 1 , 387 S.W.2d 355 (1964), in which two holographs were also at issue.” The quoted instruction actually is based upon a statement made in an earlier appellate opinion dealing with wills of Mr. Charles Padgett, In re Padgett’s Will, 51 Tenn.App. 134, 144 , 364 S.W.2d 947, 951-952 (1962).

1981In that case, this Court found no fatal variance where the indictment reflected ownership of a stolen automobile in “Fay Sims, doing business as Fay’s Motor Company” while the proof showed that the car had been stolen from “Fay’s Motor Company” and that the car was titled to “Fay’s Motor Company.” In holding that the defendant could successfully prevail on a plea of autrefois convict if another prosecution was attempted for the theft of the car as alleged in the indictment, the Court quoted the rule as to variance, as stated in Pope v. State, 149 Tenn. 176, 178-79 , 258 S.W. 775 (1923): ...

1981The court quoted the rule regarding judicial immunity from Lambdin, supra, and then held: There is no evidence in this record that any of the police officers to whom defendant made the alleged defamatory statement constituted a tribunal as described by the Supreme Court.

1979The trial judge charged the jury as follows: “The presumption from the recent possession of stolen property is that the person in possession is the thief, and, if unexplained either by direct evidence or by attending circumstances, it is taken as conclusive, for the general rule is that a presumption of guilt arises from the possession of the fruits of the crime recently after its commission.” The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the petitioner, Bales, that the quoted instruction was clearly erroneous and contrary to the decision of the Court in Bush v. State, Tenn., 541 S.W.2d 391, 397 (

1979The trial judge charged the jury as follows: “The presumption from the recent possession of stolen property is that the person in possession is the thief, and, if unexplained either by direct evidence or by attending circumstances, it is taken as conclusive, for the general rule is that a presumption of guilt arises from the possession of the fruits of the crime recently after its commission.” The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the petitioner, Bales, that the quoted instruction was clearly erroneous and contrary to the decision of the Court in Bush v. State, Tenn., 541 S.W.2d 391, 397 (

1978With the word “irreparable” deleted, the quoted test also serves “as a standard for the admissibility of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification itself.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 , 93 S.Ct. 375, 381 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972).

1978With the word “irreparable” deleted, the quoted test also serves “as a standard for the admissibility of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification itself.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 , 93 S.Ct. 375, 381 , 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972).

1976As was stated in McDonald v. State, 89 Tenn. 161 , 14 S.W. 487 (1890), the Courts, in charging juries, should not depart from the long-settled, oft-repeated, and well understood language in which the Court of last resort has declared the law.

1976As was stated in McDonald v. State, 89 Tenn. 161 , 14 S.W. 487 (1890), the Courts, in charging juries, should not depart from the long-settled, oft-repeated, and well understood language in which the Court of last resort has declared the law.

1964It may mean that he has sworn to a falsehood, without being conscious at the time that it was a falsehood, and the words are actionable only when they convey the charge of perjury in a clear, unequivocal manner, admitting of no uncertainty.” The rule stated in the above quoted test was applied by this Court in McAnally v. Williams, 35 Tenn. 26 .

1958The Court quoted the rule from Joyce: "`Unless an injunction order is void upon its face for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the judge who granted it, it must be obeyed, however erroneous the granting of it may have been, until it is dissolved on motion or appeal or *233 some other method of direct review in the action in which it was granted.' 1 Joyce on Injunctions, § 247" (italics ours). [ 129 Tenn. 560 , 167 S.W. 690 .] The Court referred to Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419 , 54 S.W. 732 , 50 L.R.A. 105 , where the injunction was void, because it was granted ex parte, required the holding

1958The Court quoted the rule from Joyce: “ ‘Unless an injunction order is void upon its face for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the judge who granted it, it must be obeyed, however erroneous the granting of it may have been, until it is dissolved on motion or appeal or some other method of direct review in the action in which it was granted.’ 1 Joyce on Injunctions, sec. 247” (italics onrs). [ 129 Tenn. 560 , 167 S. W. 690 .] The Court referred to Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419 , 54 S. W. 732 , 50 L.

1958The Court quoted the rule from Joyce: "`Unless an injunction order is void upon its face for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the judge who granted it, it must be obeyed, however erroneous the granting of it may have been, until it is dissolved on motion or appeal or *233 some other method of direct review in the action in which it was granted.' 1 Joyce on Injunctions, § 247" (italics ours). [ 129 Tenn. 560 , 167 S.W. 690 .] The Court referred to Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419 , 54 S.W. 732 , 50 L.R.A. 105 , where the injunction was void, because it was granted ex parte, required the holding

1958The Court quoted the rule from Joyce: "`Unless an injunction order is void upon its face for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the judge who granted it, it must be obeyed, however erroneous the granting of it may have been, until it is dissolved on motion or appeal or *233 some other method of direct review in the action in which it was granted.' 1 Joyce on Injunctions, § 247" (italics ours). [ 129 Tenn. 560 , 167 S.W. 690 .] The Court referred to Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky. 419 , 54 S.W. 732 , 50 L.R.A. 105 , where the injunction was void, because it was granted ex parte, required the holding

1948Jur. 1031 , Master and Servant, Sec. 593, and others relating to the doctrine of respondeat superior, we conceive the present case to he within the category discussed in Frank v. Wright, 140 Tenn. 535 , 205 S. W. 434 , 435, wherein the Court quoted the rule as stated in Labatt, 6 Master and Servant, Sec. 2281a, as follows: “A servant may be presumed prima facie to have been acting in the course of his employment, wherever it appears, not only that his master was owner of the given instrumentality, but also that, at the time when the alleged tort was committed, it was being used under condition

1944In Borden Mills, Inc., v. Manis, 173 Tenn., 440 , 121 S. W. (2d), 523, 524 , the Court held that the statute authorizing either the employer or employee to submit a dispute about compensation “to the judge or chairman of the county court in which the accident occurred” manifests an intent to fix the local jurisdiction in the county in which the accident occurred, notwithstanding the venue statute providing that in all transitory actions the cause of action follows the person of the defendant “unless otherwise expressly provided, ’ ’ since such proceeding is within the quoted exception.

1944In Borden Mills, Inc., v. Manis, 173 Tenn., 440 , 121 S. W. (2d), 523, 524 , the Court held that the statute authorizing either the employer or employee to submit a dispute about compensation “to the judge or chairman of the county court in which the accident occurred” manifests an intent to fix the local jurisdiction in the county in which the accident occurred, notwithstanding the venue statute providing that in all transitory actions the cause of action follows the person of the defendant “unless otherwise expressly provided, ’ ’ since such proceeding is within the quoted exception.

1938An assignment of errors in the appellate court is in the nature of a pleading, framed under rules prescribed by the court (Wood v. Frazier, 86 Tenn., 500 , 8 S. W., 148 ; Cheatham v. Pearce, 89 Tenn., 668, 681 , 15 S. W., 1080 ); and it is easy for counsel of the known ability and learning of the counsel in this case to conform *376 to these Rules, one of which, in the present instance, seems to have been overlooked, doubtless by inadvertence.

1938An assignment of errors in the appellate court is in the nature of a pleading, framed under rules prescribed by the court (Wood v. Frazier, 86 Tenn., 500 , 8 S. W., 148 ; Cheatham v. Pearce, 89 Tenn., 668, 681 , 15 S. W., 1080 ); and it is easy for counsel of the known ability and learning of the counsel in this case to conform *376 to these Rules, one of which, in the present instance, seems to have been overlooked, doubtless by inadvertence.

1938An assignment of errors in the appellate court is in the nature of a pleading, framed under rules prescribed by the court (Wood v. Frazier, 86 Tenn., 500 , 8 S. W., 148 ; Cheatham v. Pearce, 89 Tenn., 668, 681 , 15 S. W., 1080 ); and it is easy for counsel of the known ability and learning of the counsel in this case to conform *376 to these Rules, one of which, in the present instance, seems to have been overlooked, doubtless by inadvertence.

1929We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the consideration of conveyances in this State, and look to the inten *313 tion of the instnunent alone for onr guide, that intention to be arrived at from the language of tbe instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” Williams v. Williams, 16 Lea 164 , 171-172.” To same effect, see Speight v. Askins, 118 Tenn. 749 , 102 S. W. 74 ; Teague v. Sowder, supra, page 155; Myers v. Comer, 144 Tenn. 475, 480 , 234 S. W. 325 ; Dalton v. Eller, 153 Tenn. 418, 423 , 284 S. W. 68 .

1929We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the consideration of conveyances in this State, and look to the inten *313 tion of the instnunent alone for onr guide, that intention to be arrived at from the language of tbe instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” Williams v. Williams, 16 Lea 164 , 171-172.” To same effect, see Speight v. Askins, 118 Tenn. 749 , 102 S. W. 74 ; Teague v. Sowder, supra, page 155; Myers v. Comer, 144 Tenn. 475, 480 , 234 S. W. 325 ; Dalton v. Eller, 153 Tenn. 418, 423 , 284 S. W. 68 .

1929We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the consideration of conveyances in this State, and look to the inten *313 tion of the instnunent alone for onr guide, that intention to be arrived at from the language of tbe instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” Williams v. Williams, 16 Lea 164 , 171-172.” To same effect, see Speight v. Askins, 118 Tenn. 749 , 102 S. W. 74 ; Teague v. Sowder, supra, page 155; Myers v. Comer, 144 Tenn. 475, 480 , 234 S. W. 325 ; Dalton v. Eller, 153 Tenn. 418, 423 , 284 S. W. 68 .

1929We have most wisely abandoned technical rules in the consideration of conveyances in this State, and look to the inten *313 tion of the instnunent alone for onr guide, that intention to be arrived at from the language of tbe instrument, read in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” Williams v. Williams, 16 Lea 164 , 171-172.” To same effect, see Speight v. Askins, 118 Tenn. 749 , 102 S. W. 74 ; Teague v. Sowder, supra, page 155; Myers v. Comer, 144 Tenn. 475, 480 , 234 S. W. 325 ; Dalton v. Eller, 153 Tenn. 418, 423 , 284 S. W. 68 .

1927Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256 , 16 S.W. 723 , 25 Am.