quoted rule in Kansas

1996In analyzing Halper , the Court quoted the clause of Halper that states a civil sanction is punishment if the sanction ‘ “may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” ’ 128 L.

1995In analyzing Halper , the court quoted the clause of Halper that states a civil sanction is punishment if the sanction “ ‘may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.’ ” 128 L.

2004As stated by the court in Miller , “[i]f a possible cloud on the seller’s title appears, the prospective purchaser must either clear the cloud or proceed at his own risk.” (Emphasis added.) Miller, 13 Kan.

1986In that case, the court quoted the test on this subject set out in State v. Royal, 217 Kan. 197, 202 , 535 P.2d 413 (1975): “ ‘[T]wo questions must be considered in testing whether there has been an impermissible encroachment on due process rights: (1) Has the delay prejudiced the accused in his ability to defend himself, and (2) was the delay a tactical device to gain advantage over him?

1986In that case, the court quoted the test on this subject set out in State v. Royal, 217 Kan. 197, 202 , 535 P.2d 413 (1975): “ ‘[T]wo questions must be considered in testing whether there has been an impermissible encroachment on due process rights: (1) Has the delay prejudiced the accused in his ability to defend himself, and (2) was the delay a tactical device to gain advantage over him?

1986Affirmative answers to both questions need be supplied before it may be said that criminal charges should be dismissed.’ ” 224 Kan. at 683 .

1981In Yeager v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 205 Kan. 504, 509 , 470 P.2d 797 (1970), the court quoted the rule from 52 Am.

1981In Yeager v. National Cooperative Refinery Ass’n, 205 Kan. 504, 509 , 470 P.2d 797 (1970), the court quoted the rule from 52 Am.

1978(See Skelly Oil Co. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 211 Kan. 804 , 508 P.2d 954 [1973], Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 70 , 334 P.2d 315 [1959].) *319 The remainder of the instruction was taken principally from PIK Civil 11.04 and the use of 11.04 would have been proper under the evidence in this case.

1978(See Skelly Oil Co. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 211 Kan. 804 , 508 P.2d 954 [1973], Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 70 , 334 P.2d 315 [1959].) *319 The remainder of the instruction was taken principally from PIK Civil 11.04 and the use of 11.04 would have been proper under the evidence in this case.

1978(See Skelly Oil Co. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 211 Kan. 804 , 508 P.2d 954 [1973], Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 70 , 334 P.2d 315 [1959].) *319 The remainder of the instruction was taken principally from PIK Civil 11.04 and the use of 11.04 would have been proper under the evidence in this case.

1978(See Skelly Oil Co. v. Urban Renewal Agency, 211 Kan. 804 , 508 P.2d 954 [1973], Hoy v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 184 Kan. 70 , 334 P.2d 315 [1959].) *319 The remainder of the instruction was taken principally from PIK Civil 11.04 and the use of 11.04 would have been proper under the evidence in this case.

1961Pointing out, that before the above quoted instruction was submitted to the jury by the trial court, it was objected to for the reason that on the basis of our decision in Kreh v. Trinkle, 185 Kan. 329, 343 P. 2d 213 , the issue of unavoidable accident did not appear to be involved, the gist of all contentions advanced by appellant is that under the facts, conditions and circumstances of record such instruction was not applicable to the evidence and its submission confused and misled the jury, prejudiced her substantial rights', *81 and therefore constituted error requiring the granting of her

1961Pointing out, that before the above quoted instruction was submitted to the jury by the trial court, it was objected to for the reason that on the basis of our decision in Kreh v. Trinkle, 185 Kan. 329, 343 P. 2d 213 , the issue of unavoidable accident did not appear to be involved, the gist of all contentions advanced by appellant is that under the facts, conditions and circumstances of record such instruction was not applicable to the evidence and its submission confused and misled the jury, prejudiced her substantial rights', *81 and therefore constituted error requiring the granting of her

1959In the case of Hinthorn v. Benfer, 90 Kan. 731 , 136 Pac. 247 , the syllabus of the opinion written by Mr. Justice Porter reads: “A narrow porch or landing of an outside stairway used and intended for the use of different tenants of a building, and connected with a common hallway, is part of the stairway itself and necessarily in the possession and control of the landlord; and he is bound to exercise reasonable care to render it safe for the use which he invites others to make of it.

1959In the case of Hinthorn v. Benfer, 90 Kan. 731 , 136 Pac. 247 , the syllabus of the opinion written by Mr. Justice Porter reads: “A narrow porch or landing of an outside stairway used and intended for the use of different tenants of a building, and connected with a common hallway, is part of the stairway itself and necessarily in the possession and control of the landlord; and he is bound to exercise reasonable care to render it safe for the use which he invites others to make of it.

1941In Harmon v. Jones, 146 Kan. 205 , 69 P. 2d 690 , this court quoted the rule from 4 C.

1941In Harmon v. Jones, 146 Kan. 205 , 69 P. 2d 690 , this court quoted the rule from 4 C.

1930Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has resulted from his conduct even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury, as under such circumstances the injury is regarded as an inevitable accident.” In Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136 , 213 Pac. 663 , the court quoted the rule laid down in 29 Cyc. 434: “Persons suddenly placed in a position of peril and impending danger do things which ordinarily would be

1930Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has resulted from his conduct even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury, as under such circumstances the injury is regarded as an inevitable accident.” In Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136 , 213 Pac. 663 , the court quoted the rule laid down in 29 Cyc. 434: “Persons suddenly placed in a position of peril and impending danger do things which ordinarily would be

1930Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has resulted from his conduct even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury, as under such circumstances the injury is regarded as an inevitable accident.” In Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136 , 213 Pac. 663 , the court quoted the rule laid down in 29 Cyc. 434: “Persons suddenly placed in a position of peril and impending danger do things which ordinarily would be

1930Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has resulted from his conduct even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury, as under such circumstances the injury is regarded as an inevitable accident.” In Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136 , 213 Pac. 663 , the court quoted the rule laid down in 29 Cyc. 434: “Persons suddenly placed in a position of peril and impending danger do things which ordinarily would be

1930Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has resulted from his conduct even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury, as under such circumstances the injury is regarded as an inevitable accident.” In Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136 , 213 Pac. 663 , the court quoted the rule laid down in 29 Cyc. 434: “Persons suddenly placed in a position of peril and impending danger do things which ordinarily would be

1930Accordingly, if he exercises such care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise when confronted by a like emergency, he is not liable for an injury which has resulted from his conduct even though another course of conduct would have been more judicious or safer or might even have avoided the injury, as under such circumstances the injury is regarded as an inevitable accident.” In Barnhardt v. Glycerin Co., 113 Kan. 136 , 213 Pac. 663 , the court quoted the rule laid down in 29 Cyc. 434: “Persons suddenly placed in a position of peril and impending danger do things which ordinarily would be

1930Ry., (Mich.) 131 N. W. 145 ; Kantrowitz v. Metropolitan St.

1925(Ely v. Jones, 101 Kan. 572 , 168 Pac. 1102 .) Hence, if the quoted clause in the court’s finding does not mean the ordinary consequences of the revocation of the antenuptial agreement, and is intended to mean that such agreement is in some way enlarged or modified, it is to that extent unenforceable.

1925(Ely v. Jones, 101 Kan. 572 , 168 Pac. 1102 .) Hence, if the quoted clause in the court’s finding does not mean the ordinary consequences of the revocation of the antenuptial agreement, and is intended to mean that such agreement is in some way enlarged or modified, it is to that extent unenforceable.

1923It is sufficient if it just barely preponderates.” The defendant urges that upon the issue of fraud the burden was upon the plaintiff to make out his case by clear and satisfactory proof, and that in view of the quoted clause minimizing the degree of proof required reversible error was committed in this connection, under the authority of Bank v. Reid, 86 Kan. 245 , 120 Pac. 339 .

1923It is sufficient if it just barely preponderates.” The defendant urges that upon the issue of fraud the burden was upon the plaintiff to make out his case by clear and satisfactory proof, and that in view of the quoted clause minimizing the degree of proof required reversible error was committed in this connection, under the authority of Bank v. Reid, 86 Kan. 245 , 120 Pac. 339 .

1921(Auditor of State v. A. T. & S. F. Railroad Co., 6 Kan. 500 .) A typical situation is presented for the application of the declaratory judgment act.

1916In Estate of Jones, 166 Cal. 108 , 135 Pac. 288 , the statute providing for reception of an illegitimate into the father’s family “and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child” (p. 116), the quoted requirement was held to be met by evidence showing that the father often visited the child, contributed continuously to its support, had a paternal affection for it and acted towards it as a father would act towards a legitimate child.

1916In Estate of Jones, 166 Cal. 108 , 135 Pac. 288 , the statute providing for reception of an illegitimate into the father’s family “and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child” (p. 116), the quoted requirement was held to be met by evidence showing that the father often visited the child, contributed continuously to its support, had a paternal affection for it and acted towards it as a father would act towards a legitimate child.

1916In an earlier case (In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408 , 21 Pac. 976 , 22 Pac. 742, 1028 , 6 L.

1916In an earlier case (In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408 , 21 Pac. 976 , 22 Pac. 742, 1028 , 6 L.

1916Eq. 615, 35 Atl. 760 .) But in Little v. Giles, 25 Neb. 313 , 41 N. W. 186 , it was held that a devise with the power of unqaulified disposition, upon condition that if she should marry again whatever of estate remained should go to the surviving children, share and share alike, “ ‘Of all the estate herein bequeathed, or whatever may remain’ at the marriage of the first taker,” (Syl. ¶4) enabled the devisee before marriage to convey the fee; also that the quoted clause was restricted to such part of the estate as remained undisposed of at the time of the marriage.

1915The court quoted the rule as it was stated in the second paragraph of the syllabus of the early case of Morrow, et al., v. Comm’rs of Saline Co., 21 Kan. 484 : “Where to a question the jury respond ‘We don’t know,’ or in any like manner, such an answer is tantamount to a simple denial, for if from the testimony the jury do not know whether an alleged fact exists, it follows that the testimony does not show that it exists, and therefore for the purposes of the case it does not exist.” It was then held that a special finding of failure of proof concerning a fact essential to recovery precludes r

1911(London & Lancashire Fire Insurance Co. v. Turnbull & Co., &c., 86 Ky. 230 ; Westchester Fire Ins.