25 Alabama opinions name it 4 courts 1902–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bandow v. Bandowgreen2 sentences2008See Bandow, 794 P.2d at 1350 . 2006See Bandow , 794 P.2d at 1350 . | 2 | 2 |
Ivery v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. “(b) ‘Severe mental disease or defect’ does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. “(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.” 12 See Ivery v. State, 686 So.2d 495, 500-02 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), opinion after remand, 686 So.2d 520 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (analyzing the meaning of and proof necessary to establish “wrongfulness” as that term is applied to criminal insanity). | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Stategreen1 sentence2001The defendant “ ‘has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” Montgomery v. State, 781 So.2d 1007, 1015 (Ala.Crim.App.2000)(quoting § 13A-3-1, Ala.Code 1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ware v. State
green
2 sentences2003Section 13A-3-1 states, in relevant part: "(a) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a *340 result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts. ... ".... "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis added.) In Ware v. State, 584 So.2d 939 (Ala. Crim.App.1991), this Court noted: "In 1988, the Alabama legislature replaced our insanity defense statut 1998Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. "(b) `Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." We have explained the insanity defense as follows: "In Ware v. State , 584 So.2d 939 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991), this Court observed: "`In 1988, the Alabama legislature replaced our insanity defense statute by enacting the "Reasonable Insanity Test Act of 1988," 1988 Ala. Acts 1051, No. 88-654, n | 3 | 1996–2003 |
Ex Parte SouthTrust Bank
green
2 sentences1995Id. 1995Id. | 3 | 1995–1995 |
Ex Parte Allied-Signal, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Co. , 595 So.2d 865 , 867 (Ala. 1992), this Court reaffirmed the standard governing dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens: "In Ex parte Allied-Signal, Inc. , 561 So.2d 1062 (Ala. 1990), while this Court held that the decision whether to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens is within the trial court's discretion, it held that all of the factors under § 6-5-430 must be positively found to justify dismissal and that the defendant has the burden of proving these factors. 1992Such dismissal may be conditioned upon the defendant or defendants filing with the court a consent (i) to submit to jurisdiction in the identified forum, or (ii) to waive any defense based upon a statute of limitations if an action on the same cause of action is commenced in the identified forum within 60 days of the dismissal." In Ex parte Allied-Signal, Inc. , 561 So.2d 1062 (Ala. 1990), while this Court held that the decision whether to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens is within the trial court's discretion, it held that all of the factors under § 6-5-430 must be positiv | 2 | 1992–1993 |
Romano v. Romano
green
1 sentence2016The mother had the burden of proof at trial, see Romano v. Romano, 703 So.2d 374 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), and has the burden of proving error on the record in this appeal, see Dais v. State, 420 So.2d 278 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dais v. State Ex Rel. Davis
green
1 sentence2016The mother had the burden of proof at trial, see Romano v. Romano, 703 So.2d 374 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), and has the burden of proving error on the record in this appeal, see Dais v. State, 420 So.2d 278 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Parsons v. State
green
1 sentence2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Streeter v. State
neutral
2 sentences2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased 2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Aaron v. State
green
2 sentences2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased 2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lee v. State
green
2 sentences2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased 2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Ivery v. State
green
1 sentence2010Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. “(b) ‘Severe mental disease or defect’ does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. “(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.” 12 See Ivery v. State, 686 So.2d 495, 500-02 (Ala.Crim.App.1996), opinion after remand, 686 So.2d 520 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (analyzing the meaning of and proof necessary to establish “wrongfulness” as that term is applied to criminal insanity). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lakey v. State
green
2 sentences2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased 2010The commentary to § 13A-3-1 explains: “The law in Alabama on insanity as a defense in a criminal case has been well recognized: “‘Under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the burden is on the defendant to clearly prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury that he was so affected by disease of the brain when the offense was committed as to render him so insane that he did not know right from wrong with respect to the particular offense charged, or by reason of such mental disease he could not resist doing the wrong; and the crime must have been the product solely of such diseased | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sistrunk v. State
green
2 sentences2010Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. "(b) `Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." In Sistrunk v. State, 455 So.2d 287 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), we discussed the burden on a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. 2010Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. “(b) ‘Severe mental disease or defect’ does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. “(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.” In Sistrunk v. State, 455 So.2d 287 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), we discussed the burden on a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Ex Parte Fort James Operating Co.
green
1 sentence2006Ex parte Fort James Operating Co. , 895 So.2d 294 (Ala. 2004). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Williams v. State
green
1 sentence2005Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. "(b) `Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." The identical issue presented in this case was addressed in-depth by this Court in Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276 (Ala. Crim.App.1996): "[Williams] argues that § 13A-3-1 is unconstitutional because, he says, it violates his rights to due process, equal protection, trial by jury, and pr | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Fox v. State
green
1 sentence1999Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. "(b) `Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis added.) "The United States Supreme Court has held that `when the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, he is entitled to psychiatric assistance *Page 585 at trial.' Ake v. O | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Ake v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences1999Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. "(b) `Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis added.) "The United States Supreme Court has held that `when the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, he is entitled to psychiatric assistance *Page 585 at trial.' Ake v. O 1999Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. "(b) `Severe mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. "(c) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis added.) "The United States Supreme Court has held that `when the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, he is entitled to psychiatric assistance *Page 585 at trial.' Ake v. O | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Haynes v. State
green
1 sentence1995In Haynes v. State , 644 So.2d 1281 , 1282 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994), this court stated: "Legal insanity is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof rests upon the accused to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was suffering from a severe mental disease or defect at the time the crime was committed. § 13A-3-1 , Code of Alabama 1975. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Donald v. Transport Life Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence1993Co. , 595 So.2d 865 , 867 (Ala. 1992), this Court reaffirmed the standard governing dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens: "In Ex parte Allied-Signal, Inc. , 561 So.2d 1062 (Ala. 1990), while this Court held that the decision whether to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens is within the trial court's discretion, it held that all of the factors under § 6-5-430 must be positively found to justify dismissal and that the defendant has the burden of proving these factors. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Reid v. State
green
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Reid v. State
green
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1990Waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 1990Waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst , 304 U.S. 458 , 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hall v. State
green
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ex Parte Minnifield
green
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Minnifield v. State
green
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Murray v. State
neutral
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Murray v. State
green
1 sentence1990Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 334.01(3)(b) (3d ed. 1977), stated that "a consent to an illegal search is a waiver of the constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures"); Hall v. State , 399 So.2d 348 , 353 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981) (wherein the court noted that "[c]lear and convincing evidence of waiver is required, and the burden of proving waiver is on the State as the party claiming it"); Murray v. State , 396 So.2d 125 , 129 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied, 396 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1981); Minnifield v. State , 390 So.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 390 So.2d 115 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Fletcher
green
2 sentences1989Arizona has since, by statutory change, placed the burden of proving the defense of insanity on the defendant, see State v. Fletcher , 149 Ariz. 187 , 717 P.2d 866 (1986), and the Grilz decision may no longer be valid. 1989Arizona has since, by statutory change, placed the burden of proving the defense of insanity on the defendant, see State v. Fletcher , 149 Ariz. 187 , 717 P.2d 866 (1986), and the Grilz decision may no longer be valid. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Trieb green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Dixon v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Herbert v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Grenada Bank v. Willey green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Lesane v. United States green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Magwood v. Alabama green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Magwood v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Ex Parte Magwood green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Davis v. Folmar. neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Penney v. Burns green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Thomas v. Rogers neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| McDonald v. Montgomery Street Railway neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Evans v. Norris, Stodder & Co. neutral | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.