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10 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Deputy v. Stategreen2 sentences1988Deputy v. State, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581, 591 (1985) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1589 , 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987). 1986Id. at 591 ; Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1101 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
Flamer v. Stategreen2 sentences2026That question is “whether the error adversely affect[ed] the substantial rights of the party.”53 “To affect the substantial rights of a party, the error must ‘be so clearly prejudicial as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.’”54 An error is clearly prejudicial when there is a “reasonable probability 48 Id. 49 Id. (quoting Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 113 (Del. 1983)). 50 Id. at *5 & n.27 (“Waiver is often used to describe forfeiture, but the two are distinct concepts. . . . [W]aiver is the knowing and intelligent waiver of a right. 2026That question is “whether the error adversely affect[ed] the substantial rights of the party.”53 “To affect the substantial rights of a party, the error must ‘be so clearly prejudicial as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.’”54 An error is clearly prejudicial when there is a “reasonable probability 48 Id. 49 Id. (quoting Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 113 (Del. 1983)). 50 Id. at *5 & n.27 (“Waiver is often used to describe forfeiture, but the two are distinct concepts. . . . [W]aiver is the knowing and intelligent waiver of a right. | 1 | 1 |
Jeffery v. Seven Seventeen Corp.green1 sentence2025The party asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proving that defense.33 Moreover: Because the Court generally is limited to the facts appearing on the face of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, affirmative defenses 28 Id. (quoting Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894 , 896–97 (Del. 2002)). 29 Jeffery v. Seven Seventeen Corp., 461 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Del. 1983) (“Unconscionability is an affirmative defense[.]”); Standard Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Waggoner v. Lastergreen1 sentence2025Co., 209 A.2d 902 , 903–04 (Del. 1965)). 241 Williams Cos., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 159 A.3d 264, 275 (Del. 2017) (quoting Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1136 (Del. 1990)). 44 The party asserting the defense of estoppel bears the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 242 GP contends Walker is “estopped from criticizing [GP]’s valuation methodology based upon his repeated affirmations of the methodology.”243 GP cites the fact that as CFO, “Walker was routinely asked to present to investors many details concerning the valuations performed by [GP].”24 | 1 | 1 |
Stuart v. Stuartgreen1 sentence2025Co., 209 A.2d 902 , 903–04 (Del. 1965)). 241 Williams Cos., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 159 A.3d 264, 275 (Del. 2017) (quoting Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1136 (Del. 1990)). 44 The party asserting the defense of estoppel bears the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 242 GP contends Walker is “estopped from criticizing [GP]’s valuation methodology based upon his repeated affirmations of the methodology.”243 GP cites the fact that as CFO, “Walker was routinely asked to present to investors many details concerning the valuations performed by [GP].”24 | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Geiergreen1 sentence2024The Court, therefore, grants Defendants’ motion.41 A. Overview of the Statute of Limitations for Personal Injury Actions Claims for personal injuries must be brought within two years of the date of injury.42 Delaware has adopted the “occurrence rule” for the statute of limitations, 38 LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 191 (Del. 2009) (citing Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del. 1996)). 39 Pazuniak Law Off., LLC v. Pi-Net Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 3916281 , at *2 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp.green1 sentence2024The Court, therefore, grants Defendants’ motion.41 A. Overview of the Statute of Limitations for Personal Injury Actions Claims for personal injuries must be brought within two years of the date of injury.42 Delaware has adopted the “occurrence rule” for the statute of limitations, 38 LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 191 (Del. 2009) (citing Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1375 (Del. 1996)). 39 Pazuniak Law Off., LLC v. Pi-Net Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 3916281 , at *2 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Christiana Care Health Services v. Davisgreen1 sentence2021The Act provides compensation for employees “for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.”29 In actions filed pursuant to the Act, the negligence of the employee is not a defense. 30 However, if the injury resulted from, inter alia, the employee’s “deliberate and reckless indifference to danger,” the employee will forfeit the right to compensation.31 The employer bears the burden of proving the defense of forfeiture.32 Here, the Board 25 Christiana Care Health Services v. Davis, 127 A.3d 391, 394 (Del. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotin | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Chrysler Corporationgreen2 sentences2021The Act provides compensation for employees “for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.”29 In actions filed pursuant to the Act, the negligence of the employee is not a defense. 30 However, if the injury resulted from, inter alia, the employee’s “deliberate and reckless indifference to danger,” the employee will forfeit the right to compensation.31 The employer bears the burden of proving the defense of forfeiture.32 Here, the Board 25 Christiana Care Health Services v. Davis, 127 A.3d 391, 394 (Del. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotin 2021The Act provides compensation for employees “for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.”29 In actions filed pursuant to the Act, the negligence of the employee is not a defense. 30 However, if the injury resulted from, inter alia, the employee’s “deliberate and reckless indifference to danger,” the employee will forfeit the right to compensation.31 The employer bears the burden of proving the defense of forfeiture.32 Here, the Board 25 Christiana Care Health Services v. Davis, 127 A.3d 391, 394 (Del. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotin | 1 | 1 |
Histed v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green1 sentence2021Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del. 1993). 29 19 Del.C. § 2304. 30 Id. § 2314. 31 Id. § 2353(b). 32 Id. 6 found that Pierre forfeited his workers’ compensation benefits under the deliberate and reckless indifference exception.33 Pierre contends that the Board committed legal error by determining that Pierre had forfeited his right to compensation by acting with deliberate and reckless indifference to danger when he ran in the workplace after being repeatedly warned not to do so. | 1 | 1 |
Wainwright v. Stategreen1 sentence1986Id. at 591 ; Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1101 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marchand II v. Barnhill
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2 sentences2020Gilead’s primary argument toward this end is that each Plaintiff was a passive conduit in a purely lawyer-driven endeavor and thus lacks a proper purpose under Wilkinson v. A. Schulman, Inc. 152 Gilead bears the burden of proving this defense. 153 In Wilkinson, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony revealed a discrepancy between the plaintiff’s actual purpose and the stated purpose in the demand. 154 The plaintiff wanted to investigate the company’s negative financial results, but the demand sought to investigate a board decision to accelerate equity awards. 155 Wilkinson’s counsel had ignored 2020Ch. 1996). 151 See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 . 32 toward this end is that each Plaintiff was a passive conduit in a purely lawyer-driven endeavor and thus lacks a proper purpose under Wilkinson v. A. Schulman, Inc. 152 Gilead bears the burden of proving this defense. 153 In Wilkinson, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony revealed a discrepancy between the plaintiff’s actual purpose and the stated purpose in the demand. 154 The plaintiff wanted to investigate the company’s negative financial results, but the demand sought to investigate a board decision to accelerate equity awards. 155 Wilkinso | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Wilson v. American Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2025Co., 209 A.2d 902 , 903–04 (Del. 1965)). 241 Williams Cos., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 159 A.3d 264, 275 (Del. 2017) (quoting Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1136 (Del. 1990)). 44 The party asserting the defense of estoppel bears the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 242 GP contends Walker is “estopped from criticizing [GP]’s valuation methodology based upon his repeated affirmations of the methodology.”243 GP cites the fact that as CFO, “Walker was routinely asked to present to investors many details concerning the valuations performed by [GP].”24 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp.
green
1 sentence2025The party asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proving that defense.33 Moreover: Because the Court generally is limited to the facts appearing on the face of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss, affirmative defenses 28 Id. (quoting Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894 , 896–97 (Del. 2002)). 29 Jeffery v. Seven Seventeen Corp., 461 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Del. 1983) (“Unconscionability is an affirmative defense[.]”); Standard Gen. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bullen v. Derego
green
1 sentence1988Deputy v. State, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581, 591 (1985) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1589 , 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Randall Book Corp. v. Maryland
green
1 sentence1988Deputy v. State, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581, 591 (1985) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1589 , 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences1977Citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), defendant asserts that by placing the burden on him to prove the defense of voluntary intoxication, the Delaware statutes and the jury instructions based thereon unconstitutionally violate his right to due process of law. 1977Citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), defendant asserts that by placing the burden on him to prove the defense of voluntary intoxication, the Delaware statutes and the jury instructions based thereon unconstitutionally violate his right to due process of law. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.