burden of proving error in Georgia

2022See id.; see also Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 54 (3) ( 823 SE2d 736 ) (2019) (a criminal defendant-appellant bears the burden of showing that hearing assistance during trial was inadequate); King v. State, 300 Ga. 180, 182 (2) ( 794 SE2d 110 ) (2016) (“The appellant bears the burden of proving error by the appellate record . . . .”); Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 80 (5) ( 635 SE2d 118 ) (2006) (finding no reversible error arising out of the use of an interpreter where the appellant failed to show how he “was denied the right to participate in a meaningful way in the proceedings”).

2022See id.; see also Birdow v. State, 305 Ga. 48, 54 (3) ( 823 SE2d 736 ) (2019) (a criminal defendant-appellant bears the burden of showing that hearing assistance during trial was inadequate); King v. State, 300 Ga. 180, 182 (2) ( 794 SE2d 110 ) (2016) (“The appellant bears the burden of proving error by the appellate record . . . .”); Puga-Cerantes v. State, 281 Ga. 78, 80 (5) ( 635 SE2d 118 ) (2006) (finding no reversible error arising out of the use of an interpreter where the appellant failed to show how he “was denied the right to participate in a meaningful way in the proceedings”).

2016It is not the function of this court to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wade v. State, 305 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) ( 700 SE2d 827 ) (2010).

2016It is not the function of this court to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wade v. State, 305 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) ( 700 SE2d 827 ) (2010).

2026See Hornbuckle v. State, 300 Ga. 750, 753 (2017) (“‘The appellant bears the burden of proving error by the ap- pellate record.’”); Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 290 (1974) (“The bur- den of showing error is upon the appellant.”).

2026See Hornbuckle v. State, 300 Ga. 750, 753 (2017) (“‘The appellant bears the burden of proving error by the ap- pellate record.’”); Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 290 (1974) (“The bur- den of showing error is upon the appellant.”).

2026See Har- rington, 562 US at 105 . (a) Anderson argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffec- tive assistance when he failed to object to the provocation by words alone jury instruction because that instruction prohibited a finding of voluntary manslaughter if the jury found the malice element of malice murder and therefore violated this Court’s de- cision in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992).

2026See Har- rington, 562 US at 105 . (a) Rease asserts 17 instances of ineffective assistance but 17 has listed the majority of these claims “in a cursory manner.” Ri- ley v. State, 321 Ga. 112 , 120–21 (2025) (rejecting appellant’s “list of generalized assertions of his trial counsel’s alleged failings” be- cause it did not “show in what respect his counsel’s performance was deficient” (cleaned up)).

2012It is axiomatic that “[t]he party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity bears the burden of proving such waiver.” (Citations omitted.) Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Doe, 278 Ga. App. 878, 881 (1) ( 630 SE2d 85 ) (2006).

2012It is axiomatic that “[t]he party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity bears the burden of proving such waiver.” (Citations omitted.) Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga. v. Doe, 278 Ga. App. 878, 881 (1) ( 630 SE2d 85 ) (2006).

2023As the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity in this case, Tibbetts “bears the burden of proving such waiver.” Ga. Dept. of Community Health v. Data Inquiry, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 683, 685 (1) ( 722 SE2d 403 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023As the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity in this case, Tibbetts “bears the burden of proving such waiver.” Ga. Dept. of Community Health v. Data Inquiry, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 683, 685 (1) ( 722 SE2d 403 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2026See also Jacobs v. State, 306 Ga. 571, 575 (2019) (“[I]t is not this Court’s responsibility to cull the record to find support for a defendant’s claims.”).

2026See also Jacobs v. State, 306 Ga. 571, 575 (2019) (“[I]t is not this Court’s responsibility to cull the record to find support for a defendant’s claims.”).

2026See Hornbuckle v. State, 300 Ga. 750, 753 (2017) (“‘The appellant bears the burden of proving error by the ap- pellate record.’”); Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 290 (1974) (“The bur- den of showing error is upon the appellant.”).

2026See Hornbuckle v. State, 300 Ga. 750, 753 (2017) (“‘The appellant bears the burden of proving error by the ap- pellate record.’”); Young v. State, 232 Ga. 285, 290 (1974) (“The bur- den of showing error is upon the appellant.”).

2023Sys. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 329 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994) (explaining that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proving waiver); Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449 (“The trial court’s factual findings will, of course, be sustained if there is evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (punctuation omitted)); Williams, 341 Ga. App. at 290 (same). 6 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see Conway v. Jones, 353 Ga. App. 110 , 111 (1) ( 836 SE2d 538 ) (2019) (“Any suit against the State barred by sovere

2023Sys. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 329 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994) (explaining that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proving waiver); Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449 (“The trial court’s factual findings will, of course, be sustained if there is evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (punctuation omitted)); Williams, 341 Ga. App. at 290 (same). 6 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see Conway v. Jones, 353 Ga. App. 110 , 111 (1) ( 836 SE2d 538 ) (2019) (“Any suit against the State barred by sovere

2023Sys. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 329 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994) (explaining that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proving waiver); Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449 (“The trial court’s factual findings will, of course, be sustained if there is evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (punctuation omitted)); Williams, 341 Ga. App. at 290 (same). 6 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see Conway v. Jones, 353 Ga. App. 110 , 111 (1) ( 836 SE2d 538 ) (2019) (“Any suit against the State barred by sovere

2020Sys. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 328 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994) (explaining that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proving waiver); Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449 (“The trial court’s factual findings will, of course, be sustained if there is evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (punctuation omitted)); Williams, 341 Ga. App. at 290 (same). 6 Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 126 (2) ( 549 SE2d 341 ) (2001); accord Drumm v. George, 345 Ga. App. 760 , 762 ( 814 SE2d 575 ) (2018); Watts v. C

2023Sys. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 329 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994) (explaining that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proving waiver); Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449 (“The trial court’s factual findings will, of course, be sustained if there is evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (punctuation omitted)); Williams, 341 Ga. App. at 290 (same). 6 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see Conway v. Jones, 353 Ga. App. 110 , 111 (1) ( 836 SE2d 538 ) (2019) (“Any suit against the State barred by sovere

2020Sys. of Ga. v. Daniels, 264 Ga. 328, 328 ( 446 SE2d 735 ) (1994) (explaining that the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity has the burden of proving waiver); Jenkins, 347 Ga. App. at 449 (“The trial court’s factual findings will, of course, be sustained if there is evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking the waiver of immunity.” (punctuation omitted)); Williams, 341 Ga. App. at 290 (same). 6 Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122, 126 (2) ( 549 SE2d 341 ) (2001); accord Drumm v. George, 345 Ga. App. 760 , 762 ( 814 SE2d 575 ) (2018); Watts v. C

2011Compare OCGA § 16-3-2 with OCGA § 16-3-4 (a). 18 See, e.g., Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 218 (2) (b) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (stating, in the context of analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he trial court [properly] instructed the jury that appellant had entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and that he bore the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence”); Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 727 (18) ( 352 SE2d 762 ) (1987) (holding that the trial court did not err by charging the jury on insanity and placing the burden of proof as to tha

2011Compare OCGA § 16-3-2 with OCGA § 16-3-4 (a). 18 See, e.g., Durrence v. State, 287 Ga. 213, 218 (2) (b) ( 695 SE2d 227 ) (2010) (stating, in the context of analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he trial court [properly] instructed the jury that appellant had entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and that he bore the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence”); Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 727 (18) ( 352 SE2d 762 ) (1987) (holding that the trial court did not err by charging the jury on insanity and placing the burden of proof as to tha

2010OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) now requires a criminal defendant to “inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.” 14 Lowery, supra at 75 (4) (b) (ii). 15 Id. at 71 (4) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). 16 Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 838 (1) ( 514 SE2d 426 ) (1999). 17 See id. at 837 (whether a verdict resulted from coercion depended upon the totality of the circumstances). 18 297 Ga. App. 153 ( 676 SE2d 821 ) (2009). 19 Id. at 160 (2). 20 See generally Nowill v. State, 271 Ga. App. 254, 259 (5) ( 609 SE2d 188 ) (appellant bear

2010OCGA § 17-8-58 (a) now requires a criminal defendant to “inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate.” 14 Lowery, supra at 75 (4) (b) (ii). 15 Id. at 71 (4) (a) (citation and punctuation omitted). 16 Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 838 (1) ( 514 SE2d 426 ) (1999). 17 See id. at 837 (whether a verdict resulted from coercion depended upon the totality of the circumstances). 18 297 Ga. App. 153 ( 676 SE2d 821 ) (2009). 19 Id. at 160 (2). 20 See generally Nowill v. State, 271 Ga. App. 254, 259 (5) ( 609 SE2d 188 ) (appellant bear

2002Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 691 (2) ( 458 SE2d 876 ) (1995).

2002Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 691 (2) ( 458 SE2d 876 ) (1995).

2024See Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 58 (1) (b) ( 805 SE2d 60 ) (2017) (“it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for apportioning fault to a non-party”); McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (b) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“The lack of evidence on which apportionment could be based also defeats [defendant]’s claim that she is entitled to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) and (d)[.]”); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 717 (4) ( 788 SE2d 810 ) (2016) (once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that a nonpart

2024See Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 58 (1) (b) ( 805 SE2d 60 ) (2017) (“it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for apportioning fault to a non-party”); McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (b) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“The lack of evidence on which apportionment could be based also defeats [defendant]’s claim that she is entitled to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) and (d)[.]”); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 717 (4) ( 788 SE2d 810 ) (2016) (once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that a nonpart

1984Our Supreme Court has ruled that ‘charges which place any burden of persuasion upon the defendant in criminal cases shall not be given and such charges will be deemed erroneous and subject to reversal, absent harmless error and invited error.’ State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ) (1976).” Lett v. State, supra at 477. 2 See Perkins v. State, 151 Ga. *190 App. 199 (1) ( 259 SE2d 193 ) (1979).

1981Our Supreme Court has ruled that “charges which place any burden of persuasion upon the defendant in criminal cases shall not be given and such charges will be deemed erroneous and subject to reversal, absent harmless error and invited error.” State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269 , 270 ( 227 SE2d 241 ) (1976).

2026See Har- rington, 562 US at 105 . (a) Anderson argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffec- tive assistance when he failed to object to the provocation by words alone jury instruction because that instruction prohibited a finding of voluntary manslaughter if the jury found the malice element of malice murder and therefore violated this Court’s de- cision in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992).

2026See Har- rington, 562 US at 105 . (a) Rease asserts 17 instances of ineffective assistance but 17 has listed the majority of these claims “in a cursory manner.” Ri- ley v. State, 321 Ga. 112 , 120–21 (2025) (rejecting appellant’s “list of generalized assertions of his trial counsel’s alleged failings” be- cause it did not “show in what respect his counsel’s performance was deficient” (cleaned up)).

2025“If either Strickland prong is not met, this Court need not examine the other prong.” Palmer v. State, 303 Ga. 810, 816 (2018). 8 In all, the burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a heavy one.

2024See Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 58 (1) (b) ( 805 SE2d 60 ) (2017) (“it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for apportioning fault to a non-party”); McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (b) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“The lack of evidence on which apportionment could be based also defeats [defendant]’s claim that she is entitled to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) and (d)[.]”); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 717 (4) ( 788 SE2d 810 ) (2016) (once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that a nonpart

2024See Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 58 (1) (b) ( 805 SE2d 60 ) (2017) (“it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for apportioning fault to a non-party”); McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (b) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“The lack of evidence on which apportionment could be based also defeats [defendant]’s claim that she is entitled to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) and (d)[.]”); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 717 (4) ( 788 SE2d 810 ) (2016) (once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that a nonpart

2024See Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 58 (1) (b) ( 805 SE2d 60 ) (2017) (“it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for apportioning fault to a non-party”); McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (b) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“The lack of evidence on which apportionment could be based also defeats [defendant]’s claim that she is entitled to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) and (d)[.]”); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 717 (4) ( 788 SE2d 810 ) (2016) (once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that a nonpart

2024See Johnson Street Properties v. Clure, 302 Ga. 51, 58 (1) (b) ( 805 SE2d 60 ) (2017) (“it is the defendant’s burden to establish a rational basis for apportioning fault to a non-party”); McReynolds v. Krebs, 290 Ga. 850, 853 (1) (b) ( 725 SE2d 584 ) (2012) (“The lack of evidence on which apportionment could be based also defeats [defendant]’s claim that she is entitled to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) and (d)[.]”); Brown v. Tucker, 337 Ga. App. 704, 717 (4) ( 788 SE2d 810 ) (2016) (once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the defendant seeking to establish that a nonpart

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Thus, in order to overcome the District’s assertion of sovereign immunity using the ex contractu exception, “[Tibbetts] has the burden of showing that the contract sought to be enforced is in writing and contains all of the terms necessary to constitute a valid contract.” And here, although Tibbetts may be entitled to continuing employment, he failed to show a written contract including all necessary terms that was executed by the parties.1 The statute states that a teacher’s “employment” shall be renewed, not the teacher’s “employment contract.” And in any event, the “renewal” of a contract i

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign

2023Safety v. Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 806 SE2d 195 ) (2017) (same). 7 Ashby, 354 Ga. App. at 864; see See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747 (2) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Absent any evidence that the legislature intended a different interpretation or to indicate that the electorate did not intend to extend sovereign immunity to counties, we hold the 1991 amendments extension of sovereign immunity to ‘the state and its departments and agencies’ must also apply to counties.”); Layer v. Barrow Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 871 (1) ( 778 SE2d 156 ) (2015) (“As a general rule, counties enjoy sovereign