46 New York opinions name it 13 courts 1882–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of New York v. Stategreen2 sentences2021The burden of proving waiver rests with the party asserting it ( see City of New York v State of New York , 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]). 2021The burden of proving waiver rests with the party asserting it ( see City of New York v State of New York , 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2004(State v Armstrong, supra, 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights” and “do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” (Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 [1938] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) This presumption against waiver of constitutional rights does not exist with respect to the issue of whether or not a suspect has been placed in police custody. 2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 | 2 | 2 |
Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.green2 sentences1989(See, Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § III.3.1 [PLI 1980]; Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 379-380 ; Bingham v Gaynor, 203 NY 27 .) Following a series of United States Supreme Court cases it is now clear that when an action is by a private figure and the purported libel is published on matters of public concern by a media defendant that plaintiff has the burden of showing both falsity and fault before recovering damages (Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776 ; accord, Mahoney v Adirondack Publ. 1989At common law, once the plaintiff established that the defendant was "at fault” in publishing the defamatory falsehood (Gertz v Robert Welch, 418 US 323 ), defendant had the burden of proving in defense that the statement was true (Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 379-380 [1977]). | 1 | 2 |
In re the Judicial Settlement of the Final Account of Proceedings of Lestergreen2 sentences1970The burden of proving a claim of an executor for expenses of administration rests upon him and he must show that it was of the value charged (Matter of Lester, 172 App. Div. 509 ). 1962He must show the justice of the claim, that it was necessary, and that it was of the value charged.” (Matter of Lester, 172 App. Div. 509, 520 [1916].) Before chapter 443 of the Laws of 1914: ‘ ‘ Theoretically the estates of deceased persons are administered upon the principle * * * that the executor or administrator shall personally advance the necessary expenses of administration in reliance upon the final decree of the surrogate for reimbursement, yet it is well known that no administrator or executor does in fact thus execute his trust. | 1 | 2 |
Claim of Fiebrantz v. McCormickgreen1 sentence2025Ultimately, the claimant has the burden of proving the claim by clear and convincing evidence ( see Matter of Parisi , 2024 NYLJ LEXIS 2526, citing Matter of Fiebranz v. McMormick , 43 AD2d 794, 795 [1973], aff'd 35 NY2d 888 [1974]). | 1 | 1 |
In re the Estate of Ballesterosgreen1 sentence2025The title to real property, when specifically devised in a Will to a named individual, vests in that beneficiary at the moment of a decedent's death, subject to decedent's debts and obligations ( Matter of Ballesteros , 20 AD3d 414, 415 [2005]). | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky v. Kinggreen1 sentence2012One exception to the warrant requirement applies “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable” (Kentucky v King, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1849, 1856 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 394 [1978]). “[A] warrantless intrusion may be justified by the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling” (Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 100 [1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Minnesota v. Olsongreen1 sentence2012One exception to the warrant requirement applies “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable” (Kentucky v King, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1849, 1856 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 394 [1978]). “[A] warrantless intrusion may be justified by the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling” (Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 100 [1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Mincey v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2012One exception to the warrant requirement applies “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable” (Kentucky v King, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1849, 1856 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 394 [1978]). “[A] warrantless intrusion may be justified by the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling” (Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 100 [1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knappgreen1 sentence2012The burden of proving the exception to the search warrant requirement is strictly on the People; that burden is even greater when the police had an opportunity to obtain a warrant (People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 694 [1981]; People v Mojica-Sanchez, 90 AD3d 488 , 489 [1st Dept 2011], Iv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012]). | 1 | 1 |
Manitta v. State Liquor Authoritygreen1 sentence2010“The burden of proving a claim of an executor for expenses of administration rests upon [the executor] and [the executor] must show that it was of the value charged” (Matter of Shulsky, 34 AD2d 545, 548 [1970]; cf. Vinlis Constr. | 1 | 1 |
Trevino v. Davisgreen1 sentence2005City of New York v State of New York, 40 NY2d 659, 669 [1976]; Rosenthal v City of New York, 283 AD2d 156, 160 [2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 654 [2001]), did not show that COBA agreed that the term “service” has the meaning that respondents now ascribe to it. | 1 | 1 |
Allstate Insurance v. Killakeygreen1 sentence1999Co. v Killakey, supra, at 329). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen1 sentence1990The People have the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence "which requires a residuum of competent legal evidence in the record” (People v Machia, 96 AD2d 1113, 1114 ; see also, People v Davis, 155 AD2d 610 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Austin v. . Munrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, supra, 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. 2004In Armstrong , the court found that because the prosecution carries the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona, supra , 384 US at 475 ), it should also assume the duty of establishing the absence of a custodial setting. ( State v Armstrong, supra , 223 Wis 2d at 347 , 588 NW2d at 613 .) The analogy drawn in Armstrong , however, overlooks the long-standing principle that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." ( Johnson v Zerbst , 304 US 45 | 2 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Ballott
green
2 sentences1985(People v Rahming, 26 NY2d 411 ; People v Ballott, 20 NY2d 600 .) Should the defendant establish a violation of due process, the burden shifts to the People to show, by "clear and convincing” evidence, that the in-court identification has an independent source. 1982(See People v Rahming, 26 NY2d 411 ; People v Ballott, 20 NY2d 600 .) The fact that Pommells was unable to identify the photos he previously identified does not demonstrate a violation of due process. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
People v. Rahming
green
2 sentences1985(People v Rahming, 26 NY2d 411 ; People v Ballott, 20 NY2d 600 .) Should the defendant establish a violation of due process, the burden shifts to the People to show, by "clear and convincing” evidence, that the in-court identification has an independent source. 1982(See People v Rahming, 26 NY2d 411 ; People v Ballott, 20 NY2d 600 .) The fact that Pommells was unable to identify the photos he previously identified does not demonstrate a violation of due process. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
Noah v. . Bowery Savings Bank
green
2 sentences1972Bank, 225 N. Y. 284, 288-289 ; Gearns v. Bowery Sav. 1939(Noah v. Bowery Savings Bank, 225 N. Y. 284.) Nor can its third defense of ratification, based upon plaintiff’s pleading a second cause of action in its amended complaint against the defendant Queens Bank, be sustained. | 2 | 1939–1972 |
Claim of Fiebrantz v. Estate of McCormick
neutral
1 sentence2025Ultimately, the claimant has the burden of proving the claim by clear and convincing evidence ( see Matter of Parisi , 2024 NYLJ LEXIS 2526, citing Matter of Fiebranz v. McMormick , 43 AD2d 794, 795 [1973], aff'd 35 NY2d 888 [1974]). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Mojica-Sanchez
green
1 sentence2012The burden of proving the exception to the search warrant requirement is strictly on the People; that burden is even greater when the police had an opportunity to obtain a warrant (People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 694 [1981]; People v Mojica-Sanchez, 90 AD3d 488 , 489 [1st Dept 2011], Iv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. MUNT
green
1 sentence2012The burden of proving the exception to the search warrant requirement is strictly on the People; that burden is even greater when the police had an opportunity to obtain a warrant (People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 694 [1981]; People v Mojica-Sanchez, 90 AD3d 488 , 489 [1st Dept 2011], Iv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012]). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Vinlis Construction Co. v. Roreck
neutral
1 sentence2010Co. v Roreck, 30 AD2d 668 [1968], mod on other grounds 27 NY2d 687 [1970]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Vinlis Construction Co. v. Roreck
green
1 sentence2010Co. v Roreck, 30 AD2d 668 [1968], mod on other grounds 27 NY2d 687 [1970]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence1999However, if the prior conviction is established, defendant bears the burden of proving his claim that the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained (CPL 400.21 [7] [b]; People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. DeGina
green
1 sentence1995Thus, the court was required to consider not only whether a "reasonable view of the evidence” (CPL 300.50 [1]) supported the defense, but whether defendant had undertaken the burden of proving that defense (see, People v DeGina, 72 NY2d 768, 777-778 , supra). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
In re the Arbitration between Smith
green
1 sentence1991The burden of proving a claim when only a part of a vehicle is involved, however, is necessarily substantial; to establish that the claim originated in collision, as Matter of Smith (supra) requires, the claimant must prove that the detached part, in an unbroken chain of events, caused the accident. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Machia
green
1 sentence1990The People have the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence "which requires a residuum of competent legal evidence in the record” (People v Machia, 96 AD2d 1113, 1114 ; see also, People v Davis, 155 AD2d 610 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Baginski v. New York Telephone Co.
green
1 sentence1990Co., 130 AD2d 362, 365 ), to permit the amendment containing this partial defense was not an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People ex rel. Henriquez v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Bingham v. . Gaynor
green
1 sentence1989(See, Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § III.3.1 [PLI 1980]; Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 42 NY2d 369, 379-380 ; Bingham v Gaynor, 203 NY 27 .) Following a series of United States Supreme Court cases it is now clear that when an action is by a private figure and the purported libel is published on matters of public concern by a media defendant that plaintiff has the burden of showing both falsity and fault before recovering damages (Philadelphia Newspapers v Hepps, 475 US 767, 776 ; accord, Mahoney v Adirondack Publ. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Ashley v. New York Policemen's & Firemen Retirement System green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| King v. Tanner green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Martin green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Felsen v. Sol Cafe Manufacturing Corp. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hollender v. Trump Village Cooperative, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State Division of Human Rights v. McHarris Gift Center green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Aetna Insurance v. Kennedy Ex Rel. Bogash green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Welfare green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Zara Contracting Co. v. State neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Acosta v. Previte neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Acosta v. Previte green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Sweeney v. New York green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Laietta green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. . Persce green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Arcidicono neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hawk v. Olson green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Olive v. United States neutral | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| People v. Richetti green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Darlow v. State neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Ruffalo's Trucking Service, Incorporated v. National Ben-Franklin Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.