79 Ohio opinions name it 5 courts 1957–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hurt v. Liberty Twp.green2 sentences2021Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio- 7820, 97 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.). {¶4} If a public office asserts an exception to the PRA, the burden of proving the exception rests on the public office. 2020Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820 , 97 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 27-30 (5th Dist.). {¶5} If a public office asserts an exception to the PRA, the burden of proving the exception rests on the public office. | 8 | 9 |
Knapp v. Edwards Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2017Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). "[T]here must be sufficient basis in the record * * * upon which the court can decide that error." Hungler v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio St.3d 338, 342 (1986). {¶ 19} In this case, Wiggins points to nothing in the record to support this claim. 2008See *Page 25 Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197 , 199 (holding that a defendant claiming error on appeal has the burden of proving the error by reference to matters in the appellate record). {¶ 64} For all these reasons, we conclude that appellant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance. | 4 | 6 |
Hungler v. City of Cincinnatigreen2 sentences2017Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). "[T]here must be sufficient basis in the record * * * upon which the court can decide that error." Hungler v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio St.3d 338, 342 (1986). {¶ 19} In this case, Wiggins points to nothing in the record to support this claim. 2017Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). "[T]here must be sufficient basis in the record * * * upon which the court can decide that error." (Emphasis sic.) Hungler v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio St.3d 338, 342 (1986). {¶ 30} First, we note that Stephens' purported recorded statement is not in the record. | 3 | 3 |
Morris v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2024However, in light of Ohio’s strong public policy favoring arbitration, the party asserting waiver bears the burden of proving waiver, Morris v. Morris, 189 Ohio App.3d 608 , 2010- Ohio-4750, 939 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), and the court “will not lightly infer waiver of a right to arbitrate.” Id. at ¶ 18. 2024However, in light of Ohio’s strong public policy favoring arbitration, the party asserting waiver bears the burden of proving waiver, Morris v. Morris, 189 Ohio App.3d 608 , 2010- Ohio-4750, 939 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), and the court “will not lightly infer waiver of a right to arbitrate.” Id. at ¶ 18. | 2 | 3 |
Hook v. Hookgreen2 sentences2019Moreover, “[t]he commingling of separate property with other property of any type does not destroy the identity of the separate property as separate property, except when the separate property is not traceable.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). “[T]he party claiming that an asset is separate property has the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hook v. Hook, 189 Ohio App.3d 440 , 2010- Ohio-4165, 938 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.). {¶ 11} We review a trial court’s factual findings on the classification of marital and separate property pursuant to R.C. 3105.171 under a manifes 2019Moreover, “[t]he commingling of separate property with other property of any type does not destroy the identity of the separate property as separate property, except when the separate property is not traceable.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). “[T]he party claiming that an asset is separate property has the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hook v. Hook, 189 Ohio App.3d 440 , 2010- Ohio-4165, 938 N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.). {¶ 11} We review a trial court’s factual findings on the classification of marital and separate property pursuant to R.C. 3105.171 under a manifes | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bobogreen2 sentences2016Summit No. 16822, 1995 WL 244156 , (Apr. 26, 1995), citing State v. Bobo, 65 Ohio App.3d 685, 689 , 585 N.E.2d 429 (8th Dist.1989). {¶45} When a suspect in custody expresses “his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.” State v. Voss, 12th Dist. 2016Summit No. 16822, 1995 WL 244156 , (Apr. 26, 1995), citing State v. Bobo, 65 Ohio App.3d 685, 689 , 585 N.E.2d 429 (8th Dist.1989). {¶45} When a suspect in custody expresses “his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” the suspect “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.” State v. Voss, 12th Dist. | 1 | 2 |
Medical Imaging v. Medical Res., Unpublished Decision (6-2-2005)green2 sentences2010No. 04 MA 220, 2005-Ohio-2783 , 2005 WL 1324746 (noting that “[i]t is usually the defendant’s actions after plaintiffs filing of the lawsuit that are the subject of appellate disputes on waiver of the right to arbitrate” [emphasis sic], since the plaintiff waives arbitration by filing suit). {¶ 17} Given Ohio’s public policy favoring arbitration, the party asserting that the right to arbitrate has been waived bears the burden of proving waiver. 2005No. 04 MA 220, 2005-Ohio-2783, ¶ 23 (waiver); Still v. Hayman, 153 Ohio App.3d 487 , 2003-Ohio-4113 , 794 N.E.2d 751 , ¶ 8 (laches); Hoeppner v. Jess Howard Electric Co., 150 Ohio App.3d 216 ; 2002-Ohio-6167 , 780 N.E.2d 290 , ¶ 44 (equitable estoppel). {¶ 16} Waiver is not to be lightly inferred, and the burden of proving waiver is on the party asserting it. | 1 | 2 |
Pierron v. Pierron, 07ca3153 (3-13-2008)green1 sentence2025“The duration of the marriage is critical in distinguishing marital, separate, and post-separation assets and liabilities, and in determining appropriate dates for the valuation of those assets and liabilities.” Pierron v. Pierron, 2008-Ohio-1286, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.), citing Pottmeyer v. Pottmeyer, 2004-Ohio-3709, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.). {¶ 17} “Once a court has made an equitable property division, it has no jurisdiction to modify its decision.” Id. at ¶ 7, citing R.C. 3105.171(I) and Knapp v. Knapp, 2005-Ohio- 7105, ¶ 40 (4th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Rossi v. Rossigreen1 sentence2025Rossi, 2014-Ohio-1832, at ¶ 43 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Pinnell v. Cugini & Cappoccia Builders, Inc.green2 sentences2025“Given Ohio’s public policy favoring arbitration, the party asserting that the right to arbitrate has been waived bears the burden of proving waiver.” (Citation omitted.) Id., citing Morris v. Morris, 2010-Ohio-4750 , ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). {¶ 51} “ ‘ “A party asserting waiver must prove that the waiving party knew of the existing right to arbitrate and, based on the totality of the circumstances, acted inconsistently with that known right.” ’ ” Id., citing White v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-1671 , ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), -22- quoting Pinnell v. Cugini & Cappoccia Builders, Inc., 2014-Ohio-669, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). 2025“Given Ohio’s public policy favoring arbitration, the party asserting that the right to arbitrate has been waived bears the burden of proving waiver.” (Citation omitted.) Id., citing Morris v. Morris, 2010-Ohio-4750 , ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). {¶ 51} “ ‘ “A party asserting waiver must prove that the waiving party knew of the existing right to arbitrate and, based on the totality of the circumstances, acted inconsistently with that known right.” ’ ” Id., citing White v. Smith, 2015-Ohio-1671 , ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), -22- quoting Pinnell v. Cugini & Cappoccia Builders, Inc., 2014-Ohio-669, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Pottmeyer v. Pottmeyer, Unpublished Decision (7-8-2004)green1 sentence2025“The duration of the marriage is critical in distinguishing marital, separate, and post-separation assets and liabilities, and in determining appropriate dates for the valuation of those assets and liabilities.” Pierron v. Pierron, 2008-Ohio-1286, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.), citing Pottmeyer v. Pottmeyer, 2004-Ohio-3709, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.). {¶ 17} “Once a court has made an equitable property division, it has no jurisdiction to modify its decision.” Id. at ¶ 7, citing R.C. 3105.171(I) and Knapp v. Knapp, 2005-Ohio- 7105, ¶ 40 (4th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Neel v. A. Perrino Constr., Inc.green2 sentences2024See also Crosscut Capital, LLC v. DeWitt, 2021-Ohio-1827 , 173 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); Neel v. A. Perrino Constr., Inc., 2018-Ohio-1826 , 113 N.E.3d 70, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). 2024See also Crosscut Capital, LLC v. DeWitt, 2021-Ohio-1827 , 173 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); Neel v. A. Perrino Constr., Inc., 2018-Ohio-1826 , 113 N.E.3d 70, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Crosscut Capital, L.L.C. v. Dewittgreen2 sentences2024See also Crosscut Capital, LLC v. DeWitt, 2021-Ohio-1827 , 173 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); Neel v. A. Perrino Constr., Inc., 2018-Ohio-1826 , 113 N.E.3d 70, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). 2024See also Crosscut Capital, LLC v. DeWitt, 2021-Ohio-1827 , 173 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.); Neel v. A. Perrino Constr., Inc., 2018-Ohio-1826 , 113 N.E.3d 70, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Tenneco Resins, Inc., and Tenn-Uss Chemicals Co. v. Davy International, Ag And/or Davy McKee International, Aggreen1 sentence2021Further, “[b]ecause of the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the burden of proving waiver of the right to arbitration is on the party asserting a waiver.” Griffith v. Linton, 130 Ohio App.3d 746, 751 , 721 N.E.2d 146 (10th Dist.1998), citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Intern., AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
City of Wooster v. Entertainment One, Inc.green2 sentences2019Wooster v. Entertainment One, Inc., 158 Ohio App.3d 161 , 2004-Ohio-3846, ¶ 48 (9th Dist.); City of Hudson v. Patel, 9th Dist. 2019Wooster v. Entertainment One, Inc., 158 Ohio App.3d 161 , 2004-Ohio-3846, ¶ 48 (9th Dist.); City of Hudson v. Patel, 9th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
| Barkley v. Barkleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fletcher v. Fletchergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martinred | 1 | 1 |
| Goldberger v. Bexley Propertiesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Manos v. Day Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| D'Ferro v. American Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Valencic v. Akron & Barberton Belt Rd. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Darby v. Chambersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peck v. Peck
green
2 sentences2019Greene No. 2013 CA 15, 2013- Ohio-3758, ¶ 14, citing Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 , 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist.1994). 2019Greene No. 2013 CA 15, 2013- Ohio-3758, ¶ 14, citing Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734 , 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist.1994). | 7 | 2002–2019 |
Griffith v. Linton
green
2 sentences2021Further, “[b]ecause of the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the burden of proving waiver of the right to arbitration is on the party asserting a waiver.” Griffith v. Linton, 130 Ohio App.3d 746, 751 , 721 N.E.2d 146 (10th Dist.1998), citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Intern., AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir.1985). 2021Further, “[b]ecause of the strong public policy in favor of arbitration, the burden of proving waiver of the right to arbitration is on the party asserting a waiver.” Griffith v. Linton, 130 Ohio App.3d 746, 751 , 721 N.E.2d 146 (10th Dist.1998), citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Intern., AG, 770 F.2d 416, 420 (5th Cir.1985). | 4 | 2005–2021 |
Harsco Corp. v. Crane Carrier Co.
green
2 sentences2018"A court will not lightly infer waiver of a right to arbitrate." Id. at ¶ 18, citing Harsco Corp. v. Crane Carrier Co. , 122 Ohio App.3d 406 , 415, 701 N.E.2d 1040 (3d Dist. 1997). " ' "A party asserting waiver must prove that the waiving party knew of the existing right to arbitrate and, based on the totality of the circumstances, acted inconsistently with that known right." ' " White at ¶ 25 , quoting Pinnell v. Cugini & Cappoccia Builders, Inc. , 10th Dist. 2018"A court will not lightly infer waiver of a right to arbitrate." Id. at ¶ 18, citing Harsco Corp. v. Crane Carrier Co. , 122 Ohio App.3d 406 , 415, 701 N.E.2d 1040 (3d Dist. 1997). " ' "A party asserting waiver must prove that the waiving party knew of the existing right to arbitrate and, based on the totality of the circumstances, acted inconsistently with that known right." ' " White at ¶ 25 , quoting Pinnell v. Cugini & Cappoccia Builders, Inc. , 10th Dist. | 4 | 2005–2018 |
Okos v. Okos
green
2 sentences2019Okos v. Okos, 137 Ohio App.3d 563, 569 , 739 N.E.2d 368 (6th Dist.2000). 2019Okos v. Okos, 137 Ohio App.3d 563, 569 , 739 N.E.2d 368 (6th Dist.2000). | 3 | 2002–2019 |
State v. Edwards
green
2 sentences2016Summit No. 15777, 1993 WL 36093 , (Feb. 17, 1993), quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 , 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated in part Richland County, Case No. 16 CA 13 10 on other grounds 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978). {¶44} “The State bears the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barr, 9th Dist. 2016Summit No. 15777, 1993 WL 36093 , (Feb. 17, 1993), quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 , 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated in part Richland County, Case No. 16 CA 13 10 on other grounds 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978). {¶44} “The State bears the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barr, 9th Dist. | 3 | 2011–2016 |
Jordan v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2016Summit No. 15777, 1993 WL 36093 , (Feb. 17, 1993), quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated in part on other grounds 438 U.S. 911 (1978). {¶24} “The State bears the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barr, 9th Dist. 2016Summit No. 15777, 1993 WL 36093 , (Feb. 17, 1993), quoting State v. Edwards, 49 Ohio St.2d 31 , 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated in part Richland County, Case No. 16 CA 13 10 on other grounds 438 U.S. 911 , 98 S.Ct. 3147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978). {¶44} “The State bears the burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barr, 9th Dist. | 3 | 2011–2016 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2011Id. {¶ 30} With regard to the issue of whether counsel commits a prejudicial error in failing to file a motion to suppress evidence, we note that counsel does not perform ineffectively by failing to file futile motions and is not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence when there is no reasonable probability that the motion would be granted. 2011Id. {¶ 44} Moreover, counsel does not perform ineffectively by failing to file futile motions, and is not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence when there is no reasonable probability that the motion would be granted. | 3 | 2001–2011 |
Ambulatory Care Review Services v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
green
2 sentences2025Murtha at ¶ 20 , quoting ACRS, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota, 131 Ohio App.3d 450 (8th Dist. 1998). 2010Murtha at ¶ 20 . “ ‘[T]he question of waiver is usually a fact-driven issue and an appellate court will not reverse’ the trial court’s decision ‘absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.’ ” Id., quoting ACRS, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minnesota (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 450 , 722 N.E.2d 1040 ; see also Stoll v. United Magazine Co., 10th Dist. | 2 | 2010–2025 |
Morris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
green
2 sentences2022No. 20AP-131, 2021-Ohio-3803 , ¶¶ 30- 32. {¶8} As noted, plaintiff had the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 2022No. 20AP-131, 2021-Ohio-3803 , ¶¶ 30- 32. {¶11} As noted, plaintiff bore the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co.
green
2 sentences2017"A court granting the motion must find that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him or her to relief." Id. " '[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings has been characterized as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be *70 granted.' " Orwell, supra , quoting Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. , 96 Ohio App.3d 160 , 163, 644 N.E.2d 731 (9th Dist.1994). {¶ 20} "Generally, the party asserting immunity as an affirmative defense has the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. 2017"A court granting the motion must find that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him or her to relief." Id. " '[A] motion for judgment on the pleadings has been characterized as a belated Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be *70 granted.' " Orwell, supra , quoting Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. , 96 Ohio App.3d 160 , 163, 644 N.E.2d 731 (9th Dist.1994). {¶ 20} "Generally, the party asserting immunity as an affirmative defense has the burden of proving that defense by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2010State v. Bays (Jan. 30,1998), Greene App. No. 95-CA118, 1998 WL 32595 , citing State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 111 , 18 O.O.3d 348 , 413 N.E.2d 819 . 2010State v. Bays (Jan. 30,1998), Greene App. No. 95-CA118, 1998 WL 32595 , citing State v. Jackson (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 111 , 18 O.O.3d 348 , 413 N.E.2d 819 . | 2 | 2005–2010 |
Hubbell v. City of Xenia
green
2 sentences2022Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and is therefore a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Hubbell v. City of Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 , 873 N.E.2d 878 , 2007- Ohio-4839, at the syllabus. {¶7} New Middletown’s sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT THE BENEFIT OF IMMUNITY UNDER CHAPTER 2744 OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE. {¶8} New Middletown argues it is immune from liability for a negligence claim because it is a political subdivision entitled to the presumption of immunity, placing the burden of proving a 2022Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and is therefore a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Hubbell v. City of Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 , 873 N.E.2d 878 , 2007- Ohio-4839, at the syllabus. {¶7} New Middletown’s sole assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE APPELLANT THE BENEFIT OF IMMUNITY UNDER CHAPTER 2744 OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE. {¶8} New Middletown argues it is immune from liability for a negligence claim because it is a political subdivision entitled to the presumption of immunity, placing the burden of proving a | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Faggs (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2020State v. Faggs, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-523 , __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 1 and 6-7. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Morgan (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2019State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196 , 2017-Ohio-7565 , 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 52 . {¶ 57} In support of this assignment of error, appellant-mother points to her direct examination regarding her housing situation during the pendency of this case. 2019State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196 , 2017-Ohio-7565 , 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 52 . {¶ 57} In support of this assignment of error, appellant-mother points to her direct examination regarding her housing situation during the pendency of this case. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Seliskar
green
2 sentences2018State v. Seliskar , 35 Ohio St.2d 95 , 96, 298 N.E.2d 582 (1973), citing State v. Champion , 109 Ohio St. 281 , 142 N.E. 141 (1924). 2018State v. Seliskar , 35 Ohio St.2d 95 , 96, 298 N.E.2d 582 (1973), citing State v. Champion , 109 Ohio St. 281 , 142 N.E. 141 (1924). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Champion green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Taylor green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Center green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Schneider green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Fisher v. Fisher, Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004) green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Pasqua v. Council green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Perry green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Massaro v. United States green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Vaughn v. Maxwell green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Cross green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| White Co. v. Canton Transportation Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Kelly v. Kelly green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Rinehart v. Rinehart green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Still v. Hayman, Unpublished Decision (7-30-2003) green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Hoeppner v. Jess Howard Electric Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Nease v. Medical College Hospitals green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State ex rel. Board of County Commissioners v. Board of Directors green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In Re Purola green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Lane v. Kennedy green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Lott green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| In re Adoption of Sunderhaus green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Martinez v. United States green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| City of Xenia v. Wallace green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Hill green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Doran green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.