61 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bushgreen2 sentences2014State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997). 2013State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997). | 31 | 32 |
State v. Harkinsgreen2 sentences2010State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). 2000State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Edgingreen2 sentences2020State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995), as amended on rehearing (Tenn. July 10, 1995). 2019State v. Edgin, 902 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995), as amended on rehearing (Tenn. July 10, 1995). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Holdergreen2 sentences2019Once submitted to the jury, “the defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.” T.C.A. § 39-11-501(a); see also State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. 2002Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501 (a); see also State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Flakegreen2 sentences2025Such ultimate issue is a matter for the trier of fact alone. “[A]ppellate courts in Tennessee should reverse a jury verdict rejecting the insanity defense only if, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable trier of fact could have failed to find that the defendant’s insanity at the time of the offense was established by clear and convincing evidence.” State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002). 2014See State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 554 (Tenn. 2002). -5- (b) As used in this section, mental disease or defect does not include any abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. (c) No expert witness may testify as to whether the defendant was or was not insane as set forth in subsection (a). | 2 | 3 |
Rhea v. Marko Construction Co.green2 sentences2016Rhea v. Marko Construction Co., 652 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn.1983) and Inland Equipment Co. v. Tennessee Foundry & Machine Co., 192 Tenn. 548, 552 , 241 S.W.2d 564, 565 (1951). 1987Rhea v. Marko Construction Co., 652 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn.1983) and Inland Equipment Co. v. Tennessee Foundry & Machine Co., 192 Tenn. 548, 552 , 241 S.W.2d 564, 565 (1951). | 2 | 2 |
Inland Equipment Co. v. Tennessee Foundry & MacHine Co.green2 sentences2016Rhea v. Marko Construction Co., 652 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn.1983) and Inland Equipment Co. v. Tennessee Foundry & Machine Co., 192 Tenn. 548, 552 , 241 S.W.2d 564, 565 (1951). 2016Rhea v. Marko Construction Co., 652 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tenn.1983) and Inland Equipment Co. v. Tennessee Foundry & Machine Co., 192 Tenn. 548, 552 , 241 S.W.2d 564, 565 (1951). | 2 | 2 |
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Greergreen2 sentences2009When interpreting a statute, courts should use the “natural and ordinary meaning[s of the statutory language], unless the legislature used [the words] in a specialized, technical sense.” BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Green, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. App. 1997). 2008When interpreting a statute, courts should use the “natural and ordinary meaning[s of the statutory language], unless the legislature used [the words] in a specialized, technical sense.” BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Green, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. App. 1997). | 2 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. Joy Kennedygreen1 sentence2016However, diminished capacity and insanity cannot be equated. ―[I]nsanity is an affirmative defense, and as such, the defendant bears the burden of proving the defense by clear and convincing evidence.‖ State v. Kennedy, 152 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Otha Smith v. Marjorie Smithgreen1 sentence2009See Waste Conversion Sys., Inc. v. Greenstone Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn.2000) (placing the burden of persuasion on the party having the affirmative of the issue); Smith v. Smith, 989 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998) (placing the burden of proving the waiver of the right to appeal on the party claiming that the opposing party had waived its right to appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Wcs v. Gsigreen1 sentence2009See Waste Conversion Sys., Inc. v. Greenstone Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn.2000) (placing the burden of persuasion on the party having the affirmative of the issue); Smith v. Smith, 989 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998) (placing the burden of proving the waiver of the right to appeal on the party claiming that the opposing party had waived its right to appeal). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sandersongreen1 sentence2002The prescription exception is applicable “when the prescription is issued by a licensed practitioner, acting in good faith and in accord with accepted medical standards and when the person obtaining the prescription is also acting in good faith and is free from fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” State v. Sanderson, 550 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tenn. 1977); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-202 (providing that the defendant has the burden of proving an exception by a preponderance of the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
McCammon v. Meredithgreen1 sentence2000Blakemore v. Matthews, 154 Tenn. 334 , 285 S.W. 567 ; Bingham v. Knipp, 1999 WL 86985 , at*3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) citing McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) and Fite v. Gassaway, 184 S.W.2d 564, at 567 (Tenn. 1944). | 1 | 1 |
Inman v. Union Planters National Bankgreen1 sentence2000Inman v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank, 634 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Fite v. Gassawaygreen1 sentence2000Blakemore v. Matthews, 154 Tenn. 334 , 285 S.W. 567 ; Bingham v. Knipp, 1999 WL 86985 , at*3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) citing McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) and Fite v. Gassaway, 184 S.W.2d 564, at 567 (Tenn. 1944). | 1 | 1 |
Koontz v. Fleminggreen2 sentences2000See Koontz v. Fleming, 17 Tenn. App. 1, 8 , 65 S.W.2d 821, 825 (1933). 2000See Koontz v. Fleming, 17 Tenn. App. 1, 8 , 65 S.W.2d 821, 825 (1933). | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Stategreen1 sentence1997In post-conviction proceedings, the defendant has the burden of proving the claim s raised in the petition by a prep ondera nce of the evidenc e. Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W .2d 497 , 500 (T enn. 19 96); Wa de v. State , 914 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tenn. C rim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Evans
green
1 sentence2014Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 237 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Chattem, Inc. v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Moon v. St. Thomas Hospital
green
1 sentence2002According to this section, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action has the burden of proving the standard of care, the defendant’s breach of the standard of care, and causation.2 Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Blakemore v. Matthews
green
2 sentences2000Blakemore v. Matthews, 154 Tenn. 334 , 285 S.W. 567 ; Bingham v. Knipp, 1999 WL 86985 , at*3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) citing McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) and Fite v. Gassaway, 184 S.W.2d 564, at 567 (Tenn. 1944). 2000Blakemore v. Matthews, 154 Tenn. 334 , 285 S.W. 567 ; Bingham v. Knipp, 1999 WL 86985 , at*3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) citing McCammon v. Meredith, 830 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) and Fite v. Gassaway, 184 S.W.2d 564, at 567 (Tenn. 1944). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Ill.
green
2 sentences1985General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 , 84 S.Ct. 1564 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, *535 340 U.S. 534 , 71 S.Ct. 377 , 95 L.Ed. 517 (1951). 1985General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 , 84 S.Ct. 1564 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, *535 340 U.S. 534 , 71 S.Ct. 377 , 95 L.Ed. 517 (1951). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
General Motors Corp. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1985General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 , 84 S.Ct. 1564 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, *535 340 U.S. 534 , 71 S.Ct. 377 , 95 L.Ed. 517 (1951). 1985General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 , 84 S.Ct. 1564 , 12 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964); Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, *535 340 U.S. 534 , 71 S.Ct. 377 , 95 L.Ed. 517 (1951). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.