burden of proving defense in South Carolina

2019Code Ann. § 17-24-10 (B) (2014) ("The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence."); State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 205, 208 , 379 S.E.2d 287, 288 (1989) ("A criminal defendant is presumed to be sane; the State does not have to prove sanity."); S.C.

2019Code Ann. § 17-24-10 (B) (2014) ("The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence."); State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 205, 208 , 379 S.E.2d 287, 288 (1989) ("A criminal defendant is presumed to be sane; the State does not have to prove sanity."); S.C.

2011“A party claiming impossibility of performance has the burden of proving the defense.” Id.

2009Corp. , 328 S.C. 585, 593 , 493 S.E.2d 875, 879 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining a party claiming impossibility of performance has the burden of proving the defense and impossibility must be real and not a mere inconvenience); Id. ("A party to a contract cannot be excused from performance on the theory of impossibility of performance unless it is made to appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means be accomplished, for if it is only improbable or out of the power of the obligor, it is not deemed in law impossible."); Moon v. Jordan , 301 S.C. 161, 164 , 390 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 1990) (

2026See State v. Flowers, 360 S.C. 1, 5, 598 S.E.2d 725, 728 (Ct. App. 2004) ("When a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property being searched, Fourth Amendment rights apply to the search.").

2026See State v. Flowers, 360 S.C. 1, 5, 598 S.E.2d 725, 728 (Ct. App. 2004) ("When a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property being searched, Fourth Amendment rights apply to the search.").

2026It was an abuse of discretion to order the production of these materials from non-parties where Respondent did not seek to pierce the corporate veil in this action. 6 See, e.g., Wilson v. Friedberg, 323 S.C. 248, 251 , 473 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he party seeking to have the corporate identity disregarded has the burden of proving the doctrine should be applied.").

2026It was an abuse of discretion to order the production of these materials from non-parties where Respondent did not seek to pierce the corporate veil in this action. 6 See, e.g., Wilson v. Friedberg, 323 S.C. 248, 251 , 473 S.E.2d 854, 856 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he party seeking to have the corporate identity disregarded has the burden of proving the doctrine should be applied.").

2018See Byrd v. Livingston, 398 S.C. 237, 245 , 727 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Ct. App. 2012) (adopting the trial court's order as to some issues); Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 6 , 623 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2005) (adopting the reasoning set forth in the trial court's order as to some of the issues on appeal).

2018See Byrd v. Livingston, 398 S.C. 237, 245 , 727 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Ct. App. 2012) (adopting the trial court's order as to some issues); Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 6 , 623 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2005) (adopting the reasoning set forth in the trial court's order as to some of the issues on appeal).

2018See Byrd v. Livingston, 398 S.C. 237, 245 , 727 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Ct. App. 2012) (adopting the trial court's order as to some issues); Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 6 , 623 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2005) (adopting the reasoning set forth in the trial court's order as to some of the issues on appeal).

2018See Byrd v. Livingston, 398 S.C. 237, 245 , 727 S.E.2d 620, 624 (Ct. App. 2012) (adopting the trial court's order as to some issues); Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 367 S.C. 1, 6 , 623 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2005) (adopting the reasoning set forth in the trial court's order as to some of the issues on appeal).

2016Reserve Fund, 313 S.C. 546, 548 , 443 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1994) (holding the word “sudden” in an exception to a pollution exclusion was ambiguous and should be interpreted as “unexpected”). “[I]t is the insured who bears the burden of proving an exception to [an] exclusion.” Helena Chemical Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins.

2016Reserve Fund, 313 S.C. 546, 548 , 443 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1994) (holding the word “sudden” in an exception to a pollution exclusion was ambiguous and should be interpreted as “unexpected”). “[I]t is the insured who bears the burden of proving an exception to [an] exclusion.” Helena Chemical Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins.

2012Confrontation Clause: State v. Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 285 , 676 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2009) ("Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis."); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 333 , 563 S.E.2d 315, 318-19 (2002) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular facts of each case and upon a host of factors including: 'the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-exa

2012Confrontation Clause: State v. Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 285 , 676 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2009) ("Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis."); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 333 , 563 S.E.2d 315, 318-19 (2002) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular facts of each case and upon a host of factors including: 'the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-exa

2012Confrontation Clause: State v. Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 285 , 676 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2009) ("Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis."); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 333 , 563 S.E.2d 315, 318-19 (2002) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular facts of each case and upon a host of factors including: 'the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-exa

2012Confrontation Clause: State v. Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 285 , 676 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2009) ("Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis."); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 333 , 563 S.E.2d 315, 318-19 (2002) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular facts of each case and upon a host of factors including: 'the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-exa

2012Confrontation Clause: State v. Holder, 382 S.C. 278, 285 , 676 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2009) ("Violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to a harmless error analysis."); State v. Mizzell, 349 S.C. 326, 333 , 563 S.E.2d 315, 318-19 (2002) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular facts of each case and upon a host of factors including: 'the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-exa

2012Code Ann. § 17-24-10 (B) (2003) ("The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence."); State v. Lewis, 328 S.C. 273, 278 , 494 S.E.2d 115, 119 (1997) (holding a defendant may use lay testimony to 1 The report submitted by the Department of Mental Health summarily concluded Wylie was competent to stand trial and did not contain any specific findings. 2 This report also only stated in a conclusory fashion that Wylie was criminally responsible and had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. prove insanity); State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 205, 20

2012Code Ann. § 17-24-10 (B) (2003) ("The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence."); State v. Lewis, 328 S.C. 273, 278 , 494 S.E.2d 115, 119 (1997) (holding a defendant may use lay testimony to 1 The report submitted by the Department of Mental Health summarily concluded Wylie was competent to stand trial and did not contain any specific findings. 2 This report also only stated in a conclusory fashion that Wylie was criminally responsible and had the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. prove insanity); State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 205, 20

2009As to whether the master in equity erred in its award of damages and finding A to Z liable for a contract it did not sign: In re Care and Treatment of McCracken , 346 S.C. 87, 93 , 551 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2001) ("A bald assertion, without supporting argument, does not preserve an issue for appeal."). 3.

2009As to whether the master in equity erred in its award of damages and finding A to Z liable for a contract it did not sign: In re Care and Treatment of McCracken , 346 S.C. 87, 93 , 551 S.E.2d 235, 239 (2001) ("A bald assertion, without supporting argument, does not preserve an issue for appeal."). 3.

2009Corp. , 328 S.C. 585, 593 , 493 S.E.2d 875, 879 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining a party claiming impossibility of performance has the burden of proving the defense and impossibility must be real and not a mere inconvenience); Id. ("A party to a contract cannot be excused from performance on the theory of impossibility of performance unless it is made to appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means be accomplished, for if it is only improbable or out of the power of the obligor, it is not deemed in law impossible."); Moon v. Jordan , 301 S.C. 161, 164 , 390 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 1990) (

2009Corp. , 328 S.C. 585, 593 , 493 S.E.2d 875, 879 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining a party claiming impossibility of performance has the burden of proving the defense and impossibility must be real and not a mere inconvenience); Id. ("A party to a contract cannot be excused from performance on the theory of impossibility of performance unless it is made to appear that the thing to be done cannot by any means be accomplished, for if it is only improbable or out of the power of the obligor, it is not deemed in law impossible."); Moon v. Jordan , 301 S.C. 161, 164 , 390 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 1990) (

1995State v. Attardo, 263 S.C. 546 , 211 S.E. (2d) 868 (1975) (when the State makes out a prima facie case under a statute and the defendant claims to fall within an “exception” in the statute, the burden is on the defendant to establish the defense); see also State v. Clarke, 302 S.C. 423 , 396 S.E. (2d) 827 (1990) (when dealing with a statutory crime to which there are exceptions, the defendant bears the burden of .showing his actions fit within the exception and the State is not required to negate each exception to the offense in order to sustain its burden of proof). 3.

1995State v. Attardo, 263 S.C. 546 , 211 S.E. (2d) 868 (1975) (when the State makes out a prima facie case under a statute and the defendant claims to fall within an “exception” in the statute, the burden is on the defendant to establish the defense); see also State v. Clarke, 302 S.C. 423 , 396 S.E. (2d) 827 (1990) (when dealing with a statutory crime to which there are exceptions, the defendant bears the burden of .showing his actions fit within the exception and the State is not required to negate each exception to the offense in order to sustain its burden of proof). 3.