burden of proving claim in California

2016A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' " ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 832-833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 693.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant. ( People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808 , 816, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 548 P.2d 1110 .) Defendants have not carried their burden.

2016A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' " ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 832-833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 693.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant. ( People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808 , 816, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 548 P.2d 1110 .) Defendants have not carried their burden.

2014(Dennis, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 872 .) In doing so, the court in Dennis explained: “Where a defendant contends that a verdict was the result of ineffective assistance, he bears the burden of proving the claim. [Citation.] To meet this burden the defendant must prove two things: (1) that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent advocate, and (2) that counsel’s errors or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense or that it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have occurred in the absence of counsel’s failin

1992The burden of proving a claim of inadequate trial assistance is on the appellant. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ].) He must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

2016A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' " ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 832-833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 693.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant. ( People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808 , 816, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 548 P.2d 1110 .) Defendants have not carried their burden.

2016A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' " ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 832-833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 693.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant. ( People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808 , 816, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 548 P.2d 1110 .) Defendants have not carried their burden.

2024(People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 .) This right “entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance. [Citations.] Specifically, it entitles [the defendant] to ‘the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as [a] diligent conscientious advocate.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics omitted.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant.

2024(People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 .) This right “entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance. [Citations.] Specifically, it entitles him to ‘the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscientious advocate.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant.

2016A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' " ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 832-833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 693.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant. ( People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808 , 816, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 548 P.2d 1110 .) Defendants have not carried their burden.

2016A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' " ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 , 832-833, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373 , 855 P.2d 391 ; accord, Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 693.) The burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is squarely upon the defendant. ( People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808 , 816, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438 , 548 P.2d 1110 .) Defendants have not carried their burden.

2014(Dennis, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 872 .) In doing so, the court in Dennis explained: “Where a defendant contends that a verdict was the result of ineffective assistance, he bears the burden of proving the claim. [Citation.] To meet this burden the defendant must prove two things: (1) that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent advocate, and (2) that counsel’s errors or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense or that it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have occurred in the absence of counsel’s failin

1986II INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (8) The charge of inadequate assistance at trial is a serious one, and the appellant has the burden of proving his claim. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 , 425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ].) "[I]n cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on acts or omissions not amounting to withdrawal of a defense, a defendant may prove such ineffectiveness if he establishes that his counsel failed to perform with reasonable competence and that it is reasonably probable a determination more favorable to the defendant would have res

2020(Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328 , 351–352 (Carver); Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 , 1558–1560 [neither subtle differences between plaintiff’s actual conduct and that reported by defendant nor true errors void privilege (word-for-word quotations from legal proceedings not required)].) Defendants bear the burden of proving the privilege’s applicability. ( Carver, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 348–349.) Because there is no meaningful factual dispute over the content and distribution of Rodriguez’s statements to the press, whether the privilege applie

2020(Carver v. Bonds (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 328 , 351–352 (Carver); Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1551 , 1558–1560 [neither subtle differences between plaintiff’s actual conduct and that reported by defendant nor true errors void privilege (word-for-word quotations from legal proceedings not required)].) Defendants bear the burden of proving the privilege’s applicability. ( Carver, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at pp. 348–349.) Because there is no meaningful factual dispute over the content and distribution of Rodriguez’s statements to the press, whether the privilege applie

2022Although the plaintiff bears the burden at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show a probability of prevailing on his or her claims, “the defendant bears the burden of proving the privilege’s applicability.” (Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 794; accord, Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 278 .) (b) The fair report privilege protects most of the challenged statements by West, Hakala, and Melugin regarding West’s allegations against Dr. Calvert The Fox defendants contend Dr. Calvert cannot establish a probability of prevailing on hi

2021On that issue, “[d]efendants bear the burden of proving the privilege’s applicability. [Citation.]” (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 278 (Hawran); Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 769 .) But Dababneh “retains the burden to show, under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, that he has a probability of prevailing on the merits of the claim.” (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 769 .) A plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if a privilege precludes liability on a defamation claim.

2020Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1682, 1691 .) “An insurer may ‘seek[] summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded,’ in which case it has ‘the burden . . . to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To satisfy its burden, an insurer need not ‘disprove every possible cause of the loss’ and once the insurer establishes the claim is excluded, the burden shifts to the insured to show a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406 .) “‘[A]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within th

2020Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1682, 1691 .) “An insurer may ‘seek[] summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded,’ in which case it has ‘the burden . . . to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To satisfy its burden, an insurer need not ‘disprove every possible cause of the loss’ and once the insurer establishes the claim is excluded, the burden shifts to the insured to show a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406 .) “‘[A]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within th

2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) The California Supreme Court explained this was required because, in such statutes, the defenses negated an element of the offense in question. ( Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) Requiring a defendant to prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a burden higher than merely raising a reasonable doubt an element has been negated would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule in criminal cases that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , and [that] it is error to de

2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) The California Supreme Court explained this was required because, in such statutes, the defenses negated an element of the offense in question. ( Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) Requiring a defendant to prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a burden higher than merely raising a reasonable doubt an element has been negated would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule in criminal cases that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , and [that] it is error to de

2025(See Standard Pacific Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 828, 834 [“As a rule, the party seeking to rely on an exception to a general rule has the burden of proving the exception.”]; see also Evid.

2016A more pertinent principle may be that “the party seeking to rely on an exception to a general rule has the burden of proving the exception.” (Standard Pacific Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 828, 834 , italics added; see Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 25 , fn. omitted [referring to the “long- standing rule of construction that the party seeking to benefit from an exception to a general statute bears the burden to establish the exception”]; ibid., quoting City of Lafayette v. East Bay Mun.

2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) The California Supreme Court explained this was required because, in such statutes, the defenses negated an element of the offense in question. ( Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) Requiring a defendant to prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a burden higher than merely raising a reasonable doubt an element has been negated would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule in criminal cases that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , and [that] it is error to de

2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) The California Supreme Court explained this was required because, in such statutes, the defenses negated an element of the offense in question. ( Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) Requiring a defendant to prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a burden higher than merely raising a reasonable doubt an element has been negated would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule in criminal cases that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , and [that] it is error to de

2025(Butler v. Nepple (1960) 54 Cal.2d 589, 597-598 ; see Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Employees & Helpers Union (1955) 45 Cal.2d 784, 788 (Oosten).) “ ‘[M]ere increase in expense does not excuse the performance unless there exists “extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss involved.” ’ ” (West Pueblo Partners, LLC, at pp. 1188, see id. at pp. 1191-1192; City of Vernon, at pp. 717-720; SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 882 , 892-894; see also Butler, at pp. 599-600.) We independently determine whether the facts establish the defense.

1967(Oosten v. Hay Haulers etc. Union, 45 Cal.2d 784, 788 [ 291 P.2d 17 ]; Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal.App.2d 71, 83 [ 268 P.2d 12 ].) King did not even attempt to meet this burden.

2025(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 [“it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment”]; E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 [“On appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of proving error.”].) To demonst

2013Metz v. CCC Information Services, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 402, 412 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 ].) “On appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of proving error. [Citation.] ‘Because the trial court’s determination is made as a matter of law, we review the ruling de novo.’ [Citation.]” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 ].) I.

2020Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1682, 1691 .) “An insurer may ‘seek[] summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded,’ in which case it has ‘the burden . . . to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To satisfy its burden, an insurer need not ‘disprove every possible cause of the loss’ and once the insurer establishes the claim is excluded, the burden shifts to the insured to show a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406 .) “‘[A]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within th

2020Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1682, 1691 .) “An insurer may ‘seek[] summary judgment on the ground the claim is excluded,’ in which case it has ‘the burden . . . to prove that the claim falls within an exclusion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] To satisfy its burden, an insurer need not ‘disprove every possible cause of the loss’ and once the insurer establishes the claim is excluded, the burden shifts to the insured to show a triable issue of material fact exists.” (Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1406 .) “‘[A]n insured has the burden of proving its claim falls within th

2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) The California Supreme Court explained this was required because, in such statutes, the defenses negated an element of the offense in question. ( Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) Requiring a defendant to prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a burden higher than merely raising a reasonable doubt an element has been negated would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule in criminal cases that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , and [that] it is error to de

2015(Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 479 .) The California Supreme Court explained this was required because, in such statutes, the defenses negated an element of the offense in question. ( Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 480 .) Requiring a defendant to prove the existence of an affirmative defense by a burden higher than merely raising a reasonable doubt an element has been negated would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule in criminal cases that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , and [that] it is error to de

1988People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ] . . . held that the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. ( 21 Cal.3d at p. 608 .)[ 1 ] That requirement applies equally to admissions by a defendant [citation], and, since confessions or admissions obtained without a valid waiver of Miranda rights are deemed to have been coerced, the prosecution bears also the burden of proving waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] On appeal, it is our ‘duty to examine the uncontradicted facts to determine independently whether the

1988People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 ] . . . held that the prosecution must prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt. ( 21 Cal.3d at p. 608 .)[ 1 ] That requirement applies equally to admissions by a defendant [citation], and, since confessions or admissions obtained without a valid waiver of Miranda rights are deemed to have been coerced, the prosecution bears also the burden of proving waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] On appeal, it is our ‘duty to examine the uncontradicted facts to determine independently whether the

2025The situation presented to the defendant must be of an emergency nature, threatening physical harm, and lacking an alternative, legal course of action. [Citation.] The defense involves a determination that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged. [Citation.] Necessity does not negate any element of the crime, but represents a public policy decision not to punish such an individual despite proof of the crime.” (People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892 , 900–901.) “[T]he defense does 18 not negate

2014(People v. Heath (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 892, 901 (Heath).) In order to “justify an instruction on the defense of necessity, there must be evidence sufficient to establish that defendant violated the law (1) to prevent a significant evil, (2) with no adequate alternative, (3) without creating a greater danger than the one avoided, (4) with a good faith belief in the necessity, (5) with such belief being objectively reasonable, and (6) under circumstances in which he did not substantially contribute to the emergency.” (People v. Pepper (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 .) “Necessity does not negat

2023(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 .) 12 The standards for determining waiver of the right to arbitrate are not identical under California and federal law.

2013(Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [ 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 514 , 282 P.3d 1217 ].) Harker contends, as it did below, that the Biglers are equitably estopped from asserting the invalidity of the arbitration clause—or, alternatively, they forfeited or waived this argument—because they initiated and pursued arbitration for their own claims based on the same events.