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28 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smitergreen1 sentence2011See Smiter, 331 Wis. 2d 431, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dyessgreen2 sentences2010See id., ¶ 17; see also State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543 , 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985) (beneficiary of the error has the burden of proving the error is harmless). 2010See id., ¶ 17; see also State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543 , 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985) (beneficiary of the error has the burden of proving the error is harmless). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Federal Express Corp.green1 sentence2007Express Corp., 918 F.Supp. 912, 918 (D.Md.1996). ¶ 97 If a case proceeds to a hearing, the burden of proving a defense falls to the employer. | 1 | 1 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences1999See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)(stating that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof whenever the State bears the burden of proving waiver of the rights protected by Miranda); Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12 (holding that the State must prove the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings and waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78 , 114a, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995)(per curiam on motion for reconsiderationXstriking from the court's original opinion the statement that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights 1999As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence...." See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364 , 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights by a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Santiagogreen1 sentence1999See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)(stating that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof whenever the State bears the burden of proving waiver of the rights protected by Miranda); Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12 (holding that the State must prove the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings and waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78 , 114a, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995)(per curiam on motion for reconsiderationXstriking from the court's original opinion the statement that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Matlockgreen1 sentence1999As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence...." See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364 , 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights by a | 1 | 1 |
State v. Doegreen2 sentences1978See also State v. Doe, 78 Wis.2d 161 , 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977), where the John Doe judge permitted counsel to argue. [32] The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." See also Art. 1978See also State v. Doe, 78 Wis.2d 161 , 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977), where the John Doe judge permitted counsel to argue. [32] The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." See also Art. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alexopoulos v. Dakouras
green
2 sentences2020Barksdale v. Litscher, 2004 WI App 130, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 493 , 685 N.W.2d 801 ("The burden of proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability." (citing Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 37 , 179 N.W.2d 836 (1970))). ¶24 The court of appeals' opinion provides no guidance on this question either. 2020Barksdale v. Litscher, 2004 WI App 130, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 493 , 685 N.W.2d 801 ("The burden of proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability." (citing Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 37 , 179 N.W.2d 836 (1970))). ¶24 The court of appeals' opinion provides no guidance on this question either. | 5 | 2002–2025 |
Pasko v. City of Milwaukee
green
2 sentences2023“The burden of proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability.” Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶16 , 252 Wis. 2d 1 , 643 N.W.2d 72 . 2023“The burden of proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability.” Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶16 , 252 Wis. 2d 1 , 643 N.W.2d 72 . | 2 | 2019–2023 |
State Ex Rel. Barksdale v. Litscher
green
2 sentences2020Barksdale v. Litscher, 2004 WI App 130, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 493 , 685 N.W.2d 801 ("The burden of proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability." (citing Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 37 , 179 N.W.2d 836 (1970))). ¶24 The court of appeals' opinion provides no guidance on this question either. 2020Barksdale v. Litscher, 2004 WI App 130, ¶13 , 275 Wis. 2d 493 , 685 N.W.2d 801 ("The burden of proving claim preclusion is upon the party asserting its applicability." (citing Alexopoulos v. Dakouras, 48 Wis. 2d 32, 37 , 179 N.W.2d 836 (1970))). ¶24 The court of appeals' opinion provides no guidance on this question either. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Tiepelman
green
2 sentences2019State v. Tiepelman , 2006 WI 66 , ¶3, 291 Wis. 2d 179 , 717 N.W.2d 1 . ¶89 A termination of parental rights proceeding is civil in nature. 2019State v. Tiepelman , 2006 WI 66 , ¶3, 291 Wis. 2d 179 , 717 N.W.2d 1 . ¶89 A termination of parental rights proceeding is civil in nature. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Szulczewski
green
2 sentences2019The maximum civil commitment is of a shorter duration, less restrictive than imprisonment, *102 subject to review on a regular basis, and is not "punishment" but rather, is "to treat the NGI acquittee's mental illness and to protect the acquittee and society from the acquittee's potential dangerousness." State v. Szulczewski , 216 Wis. 2d 495 , 504, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 2019The maximum civil commitment is of a shorter duration, less restrictive than imprisonment, *102 subject to review on a regular basis, and is not "punishment" but rather, is "to treat the NGI acquittee's mental illness and to protect the acquittee and society from the acquittee's potential dangerousness." State v. Szulczewski , 216 Wis. 2d 495 , 504, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2017State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶42 , 307 Wis. 2d 555 , 745 N.W.2d 397 . ¶94 Given the typically damning nature of a co-defendant's inculpatory confession, the State's burden is difficult to meet. 2017State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶42 , 307 Wis. 2d 555 , 745 N.W.2d 397 . ¶94 Given the typically damning nature of a co-defendant's inculpatory confession, the State's burden is difficult to meet. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Glassner v. Detroit Fire & Marine Insurance
green
2 sentences1989Id. 1989Id. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Brunton v. NUVELL CREDIT CORP.
green
1 sentence2025See id.; Brunton, 325 Wis. 2d 135, ¶¶37-38 . 8 No. 2023AP221 ¶19 Thus, under either Wisconsin or Minnesota law, in order to establish that Selective waived its statutory right to subrogation under the Act, Jaster was required to show that Selective made a clear and specific renunciation of that right or, stated differently, an expression of intent to relinquish the right. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stores v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
green
1 sentence2017Id. at 9 . ¶ 61. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Stuart
green
2 sentences2008State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶ 40 , 279 Wis. 2d 659 , 695 N.W.2d 259 . 2008State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶ 40 , 279 Wis. 2d 659 , 695 N.W.2d 259 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences1999See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)(stating that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof whenever the State bears the burden of proving waiver of the rights protected by Miranda); Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12 (holding that the State must prove the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings and waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78 , 114a, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995)(per curiam on motion for reconsiderationXstriking from the court's original opinion the statement that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights 1999See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986)(stating that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard of proof whenever the State bears the burden of proving waiver of the rights protected by Miranda); Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12 (holding that the State must prove the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings and waiver of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence); State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78 , 114a, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995)(per curiam on motion for reconsiderationXstriking from the court's original opinion the statement that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. McCoy
green
2 sentences1999Is otherwise authorized by law. (b) A defendant who raises an affirmative defense has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 As Inglin points out, the effect of § 948.04, Stats., could not have been considered by the supreme court in State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274 , 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988), because the statute was enacted subsequent to the McCoy decision. 1999Is otherwise authorized by law. (b) A defendant who raises an affirmative defense has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 13 As Inglin points out, the effect of § 948.04, Stats., could not have been considered by the supreme court in State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274 , 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988), because the statute was enacted subsequent to the McCoy decision. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Rewolinski
green
2 sentences1999As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence...." See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364 , 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights by a 1999As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence...." See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364 , 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights by a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences1999As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence...." See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364 , 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights by a 1999As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178, n.14 (1974), "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence...." See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 (citing this language from Matlock with approval); State v. Rewolinski, 159 Wis. 2d 1 , 16 n.7, 464 N.W.2d 401 (1990)(quoting this language from Matlock); State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 364 , 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993)(holding, based on Connelly and Rewolinski, that the State must prove waiver of Miranda rights by a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Ward
green
1 sentence1984It held that the state was not required, in light of this rule, to prove that a defendant in habitual offender proceedings had waived or been afforded constitutionally requisite counsel for each underlying criminal offense, but rather that the burden of proving a violation of that right was on the defendant when he “challenges the validity rather than the existence of a prior conviction.” 395 A.2d at 513 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Wurtz v. Fleischman
green
2 sentences1980The court of appeals concluded that economic duress was an intentional tort and that Fleisehman therefore had the burden of proving the defense “to a reasonable degree of certainty, by evidence that [was] clear, satisfactory and convincing ....” 89 Wis.2d at 302 . 1980Without mentioning the trial court’s findings, the court of appeals made a de novo analysis of the record and held that, under the criteria adopted from the law review note, Fleisehman had established the defense of economic *107 duress “by the greater weight of the credible evidence.” 2 89 Wis.2d at 308 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
City of Madison v. Geier
green
2 sentences1969Madison v. Geier (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 687 , 135 N. W. 2d 761 . 1969Madison v. Geier (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 687 , 135 N. W. 2d 761 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Schuh v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence1959Schuh v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 2 Wis. (2d) 611, 87 N. W. (2d) 256 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.