burden of proving claim in Colorado

1989See Howey v. Eshe, 168 Colo. 568, 574 , 452 P.2d 393, 396 (1969); Board of County Commissioners of Ouray County v. Madsen, 153 Colo. 247 , 385 P.2d 601 (1963); Evans v. Welch, 29 Colo. 355 , 68 P. 776 (1902).

1989See Howey v. Eshe, 168 Colo. 568, 574 , 452 P.2d 393, 396 (1969); Board of County Commissioners of Ouray County v. Madsen, 153 Colo. 247 , 385 P.2d 601 (1963); Evans v. Welch, 29 Colo. 355 , 68 P. 776 (1902).

2025Id. ¶ 31 Here, the jury instructions accurately conveyed that “[t]he prosecution ha[d] the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Thompson’s] conduct was not legally authorized by this defense.

2015Furthermore, “the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶24       Without knowing what communication occurred between counsel and the court, defendant’s absence created a risk that his right to a fair trial was impaired.

2024The party seeking attorney fees “has the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269, 275 (Colo. App. 2005).

2024The party seeking attorney fees “has the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.” Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269, 275 (Colo. App. 2005).

2018But, the statements here were admitted in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, not as impeachment evidence. 16 State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11 . ¶ 41 The evidence of Jaquez’s guilt (other than his statements to the clerk) consisted of the following:  the voice identification made by the clerk;  certain jailhouse phone calls made to Jaquez’s family in which he apologized for his mistake;  an officer’s testimony that Jaquez and the robber had the same gait and crease in their jeans;  Harris’s testimony regardi

2015“Under this standard, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating that the ex parte [communication] did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction.” Key , 865 P.2d at 827 ; see Hagos , ¶11 (“[T]he State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

2002People v. Rostad , 669 P.2d 126, 127 ( 1983 ) .

2002People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126, 127 (1983).

1989In 1983, we followed the “clear and convincing” standard in Raftopoulos v. Monger, 656 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Colo.1983), where we said: One claiming title by adverse possession has the burden of proving his claim by clear and convincing evidence.

1988Raftopoulos v. Monger, 656 P.2d 1308 (Colo.1983).

1989People v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 951 ; People v. Small, 631 P.2d at 154; Gelfand v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 489 , 586 P.2d 1331, 1332 (1978).

1989People v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 951 ; People v. Small, 631 P.2d at 154; Gelfand v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 489 , 586 P.2d 1331, 1332 (1978).

2026People v. Howell, 64 P.3d 894, 896 (Colo. App. 2002). ¶ 22 The prosecution bears the burden of proving a violation of a deferred judgment and sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, and whether it has done so is a factual determination for the trial court.

2026People v. Rivera-Bottzeck, 119 P.3d 546, 548 (Colo. App. 2004).

2025Indeed, Rule 16(III)(g) is triggered only when “it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule.” (Emphasis added.) See United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148 , 1196 (10th Cir. 2025) (the defendant has the burden of proving a violation of the prosecution’s discovery obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)); State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989) (holding, under a rule worded almost identically to Rule 16(III)(g), that the moving party has the burden of showing that the other party failed to provide discovery required under t

2025Ct., 790 P.2d at 338 (noting that, under Rule 16(I)(d)(1), the court has discretion to order disclosure of material not covered by Rule 16(I)(a) “upon a showing by the defense that the request is reasonable” (emphasis added) (quoting Crim.

2012Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo.2001). 110 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that immunity has been waived.

2012Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 925 (Colo.1993).

2000See Palmer Ranch, Ltd. v. Suwansawasdi, 920 P.2d 870 (Colo.App.1996)(one claiming title by adverse possession has the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence); § 38-44-109, C.R.S.1999 (established common boundary binding upon all the parties).

1998Compare Rodriguez v. Safeco Insurance Co., supra, with Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 810 F.Supp. 1406 (D.Del.1992).

1997See C.R.C.P. 8(e); Ballow, 878 P.2d at 680 ; see also Burt v. Beautiful Savior Lutheran Church, 809 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Colo.App.1990); Comfort Homes, Inc. v. Peterson, 37 Colo.App. 516, 519 , 549 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1976); CJI-Civ.3d 5:2.

1997See C.R.C.P. 8(e); Ballow, 878 P.2d at 680 ; see also Burt v. Beautiful Savior Lutheran Church, 809 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Colo.App.1990); Comfort Homes, Inc. v. Peterson, 37 Colo.App. 516, 519 , 549 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1976); CJI-Civ.3d 5:2.

1997See C.R.C.P. 8(c); Ballow, 878 P.2d at 680 ; see also Burt v. Beautiful Savior Lutheran Church, 809 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Colo.App.1990); Comfort Homes, Inc. v. Peterson, 37 Colo.App. 516, 519 , 549 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1976); CJI-Civ.3d 5:2.

1997See C.R.C.P. 8(e); Ballow, 878 P.2d at 680 ; see also Burt v. Beautiful Savior Lutheran Church, 809 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Colo.App.1990); Comfort Homes, Inc. v. Peterson, 37 Colo.App. 516, 519 , 549 P.2d 1087, 1090 (1976); CJI-Civ.3d 5:2.