burden of proving defense in Maryland

2007The attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert “an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation[, but] has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Maryland Rule 16-757(b); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50-51 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2007The attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert “an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation[, but] has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Maryland Rule 16-757(b); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50-51 , 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006).

2019App. 520, 527-28 (2004); WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233, 247 (1984) (holding no abuse of discretion in denial of TV station’s motion, based on a qualified First Amendment privilege, to quash summons by the State to produce the unbroadcast 5 In an action under this section: (1) it is presumed that the public body did not violate any provision of this title; and (2) the complainant has the burden of proving the violation. 5 portions of a videotaped interview with criminal defendant for possible use at trial).

2019App. 520, 527-28 (2004); WBAL-TV Div., Hearst Corp. v. State, 300 Md. 233, 247 (1984) (holding no abuse of discretion in denial of TV station’s motion, based on a qualified First Amendment privilege, to quash summons by the State to produce the unbroadcast 5 In an action under this section: (1) it is presumed that the public body did not violate any provision of this title; and (2) the complainant has the burden of proving the violation. 5 portions of a videotaped interview with criminal defendant for possible use at trial).

2019Generally, an abuse of discretion occurs “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court.” Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 604 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

2019Generally, an abuse of discretion occurs “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court.” Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 604 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).

2006Rule 16-757(b), we consider also that the attorney “who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” 11 See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85 , 797 A.2d 757, 765 (2002) (stating that “an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding need only establish factual matters in defense of an attorney’s position by the preponderance of the evidence, including whether mitigating circumstances existed at the time of the alleged misconduct”).

2006Rule 16-757(b), we consider also that the attorney “who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” 11 See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85 , 797 A.2d 757, 765 (2002) (stating that “an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding need only establish factual matters in defense of an attorney’s position by the preponderance of the evidence, including whether mitigating circumstances existed at the time of the alleged misconduct”).

2024Given that Petitioner did not take exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions, we will proceed without discussion of those charges. 9 mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” “If the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 419 , 969 A.2d 1010, 1019 (2009).

2024Given that Petitioner did not take exception to the hearing judge’s conclusions, we will proceed without discussion of those charges. 9 mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” “If the hearing judge’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 419 , 969 A.2d 1010, 1019 (2009).

2021As part of that credibility evaluation, the hearing judge “may pick and choose what evidence to believe.” Woolery, 462 Md. at 230 , 198 A.3d at 847 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2021As part of that credibility evaluation, the hearing judge “may pick and choose what evidence to believe.” Woolery, 462 Md. at 230 , 198 A.3d at 847 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2020If the attorney asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” 20 We have “the ultimate authority to decide whether a lawyer has violated the professional rules.” Harrington, 367 Md. at 49 , 785 A.2d at 1267 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2020If the attorney asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” 20 We have “the ultimate authority to decide whether a lawyer has violated the professional rules.” Harrington, 367 Md. at 49 , 785 A.2d at 1267 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

2020If the attorney asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation, the attorney has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” The findings of fact will not be found to be clearly erroneous if they are supported by “any competent material evidence.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 (2014).

2016AGGRAVATING FACTORS The Court of Appeals has identified aggravating factors in attorney discipline matters to include the following: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the attorney disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the Commission; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney disciplinary proceeding; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of the vict

2016AGGRAVATING FACTORS The Court of Appeals has identified aggravating factors in attorney discipline matters to include the following: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the attorney disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the Commission; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney disciplinary proceeding; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of the vict

2013The text of the Fair Housing Act provides no hint that Congress sought to change the normal rule that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving a violation of law by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 178 (internal citation omitted).

2013See also Groner v. Golden Gate Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039 , 1045 (6th Cir.2001) (“[T]he plaintiff in a Fair Housing Act case has the burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.”).

2011Guida, 391 Md. at 50-51 , 891 A.2d at 1095 (citing Rule 16-757(b)). `Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.' State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998).

2011Guida, 391 Md. at 50-51 , 891 A.2d at 1095 (citing Rule 16-757(b)). `Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder.' State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998).

2010Ashley Coiy., supra, 131 Md.App. at 582 , 750 A.2d 618 , and, specifically, of proving that “ ‘the price is so glaring and palpable as to indicate fraud or unfairness, or suggest that the trustee lacked the judgment and skill necessary to any adequate administration of the duties of his office.’ ” Id. at 584, *475 750 A.2d 618 (quoting Ten Hills, supra, 176 Md. at 449, 5 A.2d 830 ).

2010Ashley Coiy., supra, 131 Md.App. at 582 , 750 A.2d 618 , and, specifically, of proving that “ ‘the price is so glaring and palpable as to indicate fraud or unfairness, or suggest that the trustee lacked the judgment and skill necessary to any adequate administration of the duties of his office.’ ” Id. at 584, *475 750 A.2d 618 (quoting Ten Hills, supra, 176 Md. at 449, 5 A.2d 830 ).

2009In light of § 10-510(c), to conclude other than as we do here would violate one of the cardinal rules of statutory interpretation of “ensur[ing] that ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Jackson v. State, 408 Md. 231, 236-37 , 969 A.2d 277, 281 (2009) (quoting Int’l Ass’n *695 of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 v. Mayor of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 9 , 962 A.2d 374, 378 (2008)). 34 Accordingly, the Circuit *696 Court for Baltimore City must resolve finally its general attorney’s fees award. 35 *697 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

2009In light of § 10-510(c), to conclude other than as we do here would violate one of the cardinal rules of statutory interpretation of “ensur[ing] that ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Jackson v. State, 408 Md. 231, 236-37 , 969 A.2d 277, 281 (2009) (quoting Int’l Ass’n *695 of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 v. Mayor of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 9 , 962 A.2d 374, 378 (2008)). 34 Accordingly, the Circuit *696 Court for Baltimore City must resolve finally its general attorney’s fees award. 35 *697 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

2009In light of § 10-510(c), to conclude other than as we do here would violate one of the cardinal rules of statutory interpretation of “ensur[ing] that ‘no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’ ” Jackson v. State, 408 Md. 231, 236-37 , 969 A.2d 277, 281 (2009) (quoting Int’l Ass’n *695 of Fire Fighters, Local 1715 v. Mayor of Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 9 , 962 A.2d 374, 378 (2008)). 34 Accordingly, the Circuit *696 Court for Baltimore City must resolve finally its general attorney’s fees award. 35 *697 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

2009Moreover, “[t]he attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation, but has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Siskind, 401 Md. at 54 , 930 A.2d at 335 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

2009Moreover, “[t]he attorney subject to the disciplinary hearing may assert an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation, but has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence.” Siskind, 401 Md. at 54 , 930 A.2d at 335 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

2006See Maryland Rule 16-757(b) ("A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 566-67 , 903 A.2d 895, 907-08 (2006) ("The hearing judge made no findings as to whether Respondent established by a preponderance of the evidence any mitigating factors. . . .

2006See Maryland Rule 16-757(b) ("A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evidence."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 566-67 , 903 A.2d 895, 907-08 (2006) ("The hearing judge made no findings as to whether Respondent established by a preponderance of the evidence any mitigating factors. . . .

2006In Fellner v. Bar Assn, 213 Md. 243, 247 , 131 A.2d 729, 732 (1957), the reprehensible conduct was the use of slugs in the parking meters in *138 the City of Baltimore, a practice that the Court concluded was neither “casual nor thoughtless.”

2006In Fellner v. Bar Assn, 213 Md. 243, 247 , 131 A.2d 729, 732 (1957), the reprehensible conduct was the use of slugs in the parking meters in *138 the City of Baltimore, a practice that the Court concluded was neither “casual nor thoughtless.”